National Security Review

The Study of National Security at 50:

RE-AWAKENINGS

A GOLDEN ANNIVERSARY PUBLICATION OF THE NATIONAL DEFENSE COLLEGE OF THE PHILIPPINES
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From idealism after the First World War to realization of real and persistent conflicts in the Second World War and beyond, studies on security have been highly influenced by the lens and language of realism. As a powerful theoretical tradition in International Relations and its subfield of Security Studies, realism provides systematic explanation and understanding of the security environment in which threats are real. It has brought back security theorizing to its senses, by making the discourse on realpolitik, armed conflicts, and state survival in an anarchic international community even more vibrant and vigilant.

In the absence of a central governing authority in the international system, security has been construed by sovereign states along the lines of their own national security interests and strategic goals. Given this reality of power struggles, scholars of the field have not relented looking at security dynamics and imperatives that will balance power and, as Ruggie entitled his postmodern academic journal in 1998, “make the world hang together.”

Notwithstanding mainstream studies on security, the post Cold War in the early 1990s saw the resurgence of idealist notions and constructivist challenges to security, both as a concept and as a condition for policy. With the end of tense rivalry between the two Cold War titans, which left the United States of America (USA) as the lone superpower, the academic preoccupation on state and national defense seemingly waned. Non-military threats such as natural disasters, pandemics, financial meltdown, and poverty started to receive increased attention from academics and policymakers alike.

With the rise of non-traditional security concerns, there have been dramatic attempts to widen the scope of security as a subject of analysis. From a realist and state-centric concept, “security” is socially constructed by idealists to encompass concerns on economic development, governance, human rights, gender, natural resources, climate change, and technology, among others. Studies on these other security concerns have thus produced eclectic bodies of knowledge as various scholars interpret complex security problems from the vantage points of their own disciplines.

The constructivist paradigm of human security in all its dimensions, no doubt, has enriched the academic discourse on security as a comprehensive but nonetheless contested concept. Such conceptual extension of security that has become a powerful political construct did not proceed without criticism. With the
idealistic expansion of the scope of *security* came serious epistemological issues of *conceptual overstretched* and lack of focus of the subject matter especially if this is to be translated to policy and strategy. The attention afforded to non-traditional security concerns renders the concept of *security* highly fluid and amorphous. Moreover, the cognitive borders of its distinct intellectual tradition would be diluted if Security Studies were to champion the research agenda of other academic disciplines [i.e. Public Administration and Governance, Economics, Anthropology, etc.] with their own policy advocacies.

There is no argument that scholars of Security Studies must learn to comprehend the reach of their discipline by crossing over the theoretical domains of other fields. Discursive inquiries on the nature, scope, causes, and context of security essentially invite multi-disciplinary approaches. But while the ripples are important in a comprehensive picture of a security problem, where security analysts will throw their stone at to create the waves is more crucial, especially in the study of “national security.” It must be taken into account that the widening of ontological perspectives in Security Studies does not and should not mean a diminution of the core research interests of this prestigious intellectual field.

Notably, the discourse on *security* is shaped and influenced by unfolding events and developments in the real world. Dr. Condoleezza Rice, former National Security Adviser and Secretary of State in the US under President George W Bush, essayed her thoughts on security in the light of the tragedy of terror attacks that had breached US security on September 11, 2001. As she wrote in her book entitled “No Higher Honor” in 2011:

> “The United States was the most powerful country in the world—militarily and economically. And yet, we had not been able to prevent a devastating attack by a stateless network of extremists, operating from the territory of one of the world’s poorest countries. Our entire concept of what constituted security had been shaken.”

The American experience and realization illustrates a rethinking of ‘security’ as a concept and as policy agenda attuned to contemporary events, many of which are cataclysmic in nature. The 20th century had seen two tragic World Wars, as well as ensuing Cold War, nuclear proliferation, civil wars, global financial crisis, pandemics, and ethnic conflicts. The new century world, despite its promise of democratic peace, has crossed a new era of more complex security threats and scenarios with broad impact to humanity.
Acts of terrorism, unconventional warfare, and mass destruction; as well as forces of climate change and natural disasters threaten the survival of people, states, and the world. From ancient to contemporary times, security threats—whether traditional or non-traditional, have always been the core concerns of nation states. The reality remains that human development, economic progress, and technological advancement have not precluded the eruptions of conflicts within states and the international system.

The discourse on security does not take place in a vacuum. There is always a context that makes security an intelligible subject of academic inquiry and policy discussion. In the Philippines, the praxis of ‘security’ across history has had a mixed-up character, similar to those of other developing countries and struggling democracies in Southeast Asia as well as in Latin America. Factors such as colonial legacies, geographical make-up, ideological competition, cultural diversities, politico-administrative structures, authoritarian experience, democratization process, and regional security dynamics weigh heavily on state and human security discourse in the country.

A sensible understanding of such an abstract concept of security entails a more realistic examination of its complex environment and political idiosyncrasies. Given the essential diversity of theoretical perspectives on the subject matter, security thinkers and policymakers in the Philippines are encouraged to carry on the academic discussions on the subject of ‘security,’--its ontological views, epistemological issues, and methodological approaches, as well as historical experiences not only in the country but also in other nations.

The National Defense College of the Philippines (NDCP), which aspires to be the center of excellence in the field, must revisit the scholarly literature and rethink the conceptual boundaries and constituent elements of national security. Significantly, the contemporary security discourse invites us to take a more comprehensible look at the State, as the core actor in security and the prime mover of policy both in domestic and international affairs.

Considering the complex security threats that nations face, the state stands as the predominant and legitimate institution that arbitrates conflicts, decides on policies, and shapes the strategic security environment. How the state performs this primary role, given the socio-economic and political milieu in the country as well as the security dynamics in the international community, constitutes essentially the field of Security Studies. However, this area of concern seems to be relegated to the doldrums of a national security administration course in the Philippines in favor of the populist agenda of social welfare, poverty alleviation, economic progress,
political development, and environment, among others. A reawakening of the vibrancy of a focused subject matter must be in order.

As a humble contribution to the ongoing scholarly conversations on national security in the Philippines, the NDCP, in its 50th year founding anniversary, publishes this special edition of the National Security Review (NSR) with the theme “The Study of National Security at Fifty: Re-awakenings.” Covering a wide but well-defined range of security issues and policy questions, Filipino scholars ruminate on the study of national security as a cardinal concern in international relations more than in public administration.

This NSR is divided into four chapters, representing key themes in contemporary Security Studies. The thematic parts of this Journal hold a compendium of scholarly works that define the core concerns, the contours, and the challenges of the academic field. The articles hope to form a body of knowledge that makes studies on national security distinct from other fields.

Chapter I is on “Themes, Trends, and Transformations of Security Thought”. This chapter traces the theoretical foundations and historical context of the study of national security in the Philippines. It frames security in the light of major events and developments that have shaped the landscape of security and policy in the Philippines.

• Dr. Cesar P. Pobre’s article on “Trends in Security Thought” examines the transformations of the thinking patterns and approaches on national security problems in response to key events and developments in the Philippines. Tracing the evolution of security thought, Dr Pobre relates the concept of ‘national security’ to ‘human security,’ postulating the complementarity of the two concepts in a comprehensive understanding of security phenomena, and in sound policymaking by the state.

• Dr. Gabriel Lopez’s article on “Integrating National Security into Philippine Regional Development Planning” explores various avenues in which national security imperatives can figure in regional development planning in the country. Dr Lopez analyzes theoretical relations between national security and development planning, with the end view of crafting a comprehensive framework for institutional linkages among key players.

• Professor Chester B. Cabalza, in his article on “The Anthropology of National Security: Towards the Development of a New Epistemology,” offers a
socio-cultural perspective of the study of national security in the Philippines. His anthropological viewpoint on national identity as a moral force seeks to build-up an alternative constructivist paradigm that enriches the body of knowledge in Security Studies.

- Using a critical approach, Dr. Ananda Devi Domingo-Almase reflects on the principles, policies, and problematique of national security in the article entitled “What the Subject of Security Really Means: A Look into the Content and Context of the 2011-2016 National Security Policy in the Philippines.” Her conceptual understanding of security places the subject in proper perspectives which is to look at security as a theoretical discourse, as a political construct, and as a policy agenda. Her study argues that the soundness of a policy on national security must be informed by a clear theoretical framework that would make sense of real security challenges.

**Chapter II** is on “Security Sector Reform: Way Forward for Democracy and Development”. This part presents studies on the ideational transformations and civil-relations of the military in the Philippines as well as in other countries. This chapter allows Filipino scholars to introspect on the professed values and principles of the existing study of national security in the defense department vis-à-vis the prescribed theories and norms of Security Studies in the academic community. Looking at the experiences of other nations in democratization and security sector development, homegrown security thinkers and practitioners can reevaluate their national security perspective to know how Philippine realities measure up to what is ideal in a truly democratic country.

- In “Security Sector Reform: Way Forward for Democracy and Development,” Atty. Rodel A. Cruz draws lessons from the social construction of new identities of Germany and Japan, both of which had been under militaristic and totalitarian regimes during the era of world war. Using the experiences of these two countries as model of security sector reform, the paper analyzes the transformation of the Philippine military from a maligned machinery under the martial rule of a dictator, to a reformed institution in democratic governance.

- Dr. Renato De Castro’s article entitled “21st Century Philippine-Civil Military Relations: Why Partnership Instead of Subordination” likewise discusses the role of the armed forces under the principle of democratic control of civilian authorities. The analysis, however, takes on a critical look into the refurbished character of the Philippine military as the latter assumes the
primary responsibility in internal peace and security. Dr De Castro argues that the catalyst role accorded to the armed forces in nation-building and socio-economic development speaks of an anomaly in a supposedly progressive democracy.

Chapter III is on “Security Threats and Challenges in the Country in the 21\textsuperscript{st} Century.” In the sole article in this chapter, entitled “Current Terrorist Groups and Emerging Extremist Armed Movements in the Southern Philippines: Threat to Philippine National Security,” Professor Rommel C. Banlaoi provides a comprehensive discussion on the existing and emerging non-state armed groups that continue to threaten and disrupt peace and stability in the country. His paper discusses the involvement of these groups in criminal and terrorist acts, which complicate efforts to ensure national security. Professor Banlaoi brings to the fore of the security debate the persistence of real and complex threats that thwart the idealist vision of peace and progress.

Chapter IV is on “Security Cooperation and Regional Security Dynamics,” with particular focus on the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) and ASEAN Defense Ministers Meeting Plus (ADMM-Plus). The contributors in this Chapter locate Philippine national interests in the complex milieu of regional networks and security cooperation.

- Professor Raymund Jose G. Quilop, in his article “Furthering Community Building: Prospects and Challenges for the ADMM-Plus,” puts forth his observations about ADMM-Plus and the circumstances surrounding its defense cooperative mechanism. He highlights the challenges that confront the ADMM-Plus, which include the management of strategic competition among regional powers.

- Dr. Aileen SP Baviera’s article on “China-ASEAN Conflict and Cooperation in the South China Sea: Managing Power Asymmetry,” on the other hand, explores strategies on how the Philippines, Vietnam, and Malaysia can deal with China as an emerging power in the region. Dr Baviera’s paper discusses the security dynamics between a big power and its smaller neighbors in the longstanding territorial issues in the South China Sea.

Through this Special Edition of the NSR, the NDCP seeks to enrich the discourse and praxis of national security administration in the Philippines.
This publication invites more in-depth discussions of the subject of ‘security’ using theoretical perspectives, historical insights, and policy imperatives. The contributions of scholars towards this goal will help in the development of the academic field of Philippine security that is not myopic on domestic issues but strategic in international relations. The progress of this intellectual enterprise calls for a reawakening of national security thought, which can be realized by going back to the basics.

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CHAPTER I

Themes, Trends, and Transformations of Security Thought
This journal article is motivated by the necessity of identifying emerging trends in the theory and practice of security. The article mainly argues that trends in security thought are reflected in shifts, modifications, and variations of the approaches to and policies on the security problem. It delves into the nature of security from a historical context, treating security as an end in state-oriented principles of colonialism, mercantilism, and imperialism/neo-imperialism. The article also juxtaposes national security and human security, analyzing their corresponding referent objects, values, threats, and means. The article’s findings regarding national and human security reflect the complementarity of both approaches. The findings also reflect the need for a broadened and integrated security concept that can manage and combine these two approaches based on importance and urgency. The article also concentrates on the emerging threats to both national and human security. Terrorism, Transnational Crime in different forms, and Cybercrime are the serious, emerging threats identified in this article. The article concludes by emphasizing the need for re-directing the course of security thought in line with the adoption of new, modified, or varied measures against security threats.

Security thought is an idea, a concept or frame of mind that has earned its birth from the necessity to acquire, preserve and enhance security or power. It is also that which has given birth to the convictions, views and positions on the approaches to and policies on security. Its trends are traced through its historical development or the course it has taken over time.

Policies on security refer to the modes of dealing with the security environment in a way that their formulation is in essence the “forming of intentions” as distinguished from the “forming of ends.” Intentions include actions as well as statements of principles and inspirations. For example, some years ago the ASEAN ministers issued a communiqué that it was their common hope for the region of

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Southeast Asia to become a zone free from nuclear weapons. In 1823, U.S. President James Monroe declared that “. . . the American continents [Western Hemisphere], by the free and independent condition which they have assumed and maintain, are henceforth not to be considered as subjects for colonization by any European Power.” This policy statement has since been known as the Monroe Doctrine.  

This paper is an attempt to show that the trends in security thought are reflected in the shifts, modifications and variations of the approaches to and policies on the security problem. Such approaches and policies have been expressed in terms of geopolitics and the acquisition, preservation and enhancement of power, like unilaterism, balance of power, cooperative security, empire building, and world government. Also included are imperialism and mercantilism.

Likewise, this paper tries to show that the trends in security thought have been driven by the need to identify the types of security threat that have emerged or been emerging in the world of today. Their appearance has been brought to the fore with the advent of globalization and advanced technology especially in information, communication, and transportation. These are the transnational crimes, so called because they are carried out beyond state borders. There is also another species of transnational legal or illegal acts (depending on their nature) which is being done in the computer-internet: the cybercrime.

With the above-stated premises of this paper, let us begin by way of examining more closely the meaning, nature, implications and other aspects of security, keeping in mind national or state security vis-à-vis human security.

Security, according to the dictionary, is “freedom from danger, risk, etc.; safety.” Safety is “freedom from the occurrence or risk of injury, danger, or loss.”

Security is everybody’s business, so people say. It is very much a part of us. As humans it is our nature, instinct, and inherent tendency to take precautions against risk or injury. We look for ways and means – any way, any means for that matter – to safeguard dear life. Self-preservation, a proverb says, is the first law of human nature; it is a first principle.

We see signs of security almost everywhere. In many public places, private buildings, business installations, like hotels, restaurants, shopping malls, recreation centers; and in a good number of schools, colleges or universities – indeed in virtually all establishments and facilities worth the name – there is the white-and-blue

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uniformed man: the security guard. Private homes have fences and the more opulent housing areas are gated. People have dogs. People comb the internet in search for job offerings, here or abroad. In the banks depositors and borrowers mill around.

The guard is there to secure the place from robbers. Fences are erected to discourage burglars from entering the premises. Windows are with iron grills and doors are kept locked to ensure safety of life and property inside the house. Dogs are kept as pets and guards as well. People need jobs to be able to live. People deposit their money in banks not only to make it grow but also for safe-keeping. Borrowers have to have collaterals to guarantee their bank loans.

All these are meant to prevent lives and possessions from being lost, and loss prevention, we must quickly emphasize, is the essence of security. Loss, we should likewise add, needs to be of something that has value; otherwise, the sense of loss or the realization of missing something, tangible or not, does not arise. In another way of saying, loss and value are functional; they are actually the two faces of the same coin, and that coin is security.

Because it is innate, security may be said to be part of man’s evolution. For his self-preservation and as a thinking animal, man in the beginning needed to think of securing himself. This he had to do because he lived in an environment as hostile as there were predators around preying on him. He succeeded and was even able to raise his family.

Over time families multiplied and enlarged into clans, and clans expanded into tribes. These human groups bound by blood relations were actually political and social entities. They had their own mode of governance and system of defense and security, among others.

In pre-Spanish times, before the 16th century, Filipinos across the country ordinarily were settled in politically organized, kin-based communities called barangays, composed of 30 to 100 families. However, there were also large barangays and even confederations of barangays, composed of about 7,000 people. They were independent of one another and not always in the friendliest of terms; in fact, they had feuds which oftenly erupted into fighting. No wonder, each one had to have its own armed force constituted by the able-bodied males of the community, ready to go to battle at the beck and call of the barangay chieftain. For the barangay to avenge a wrong done or defend itself from threats by another barangay, it had to think of how to go it alone.
Call this security thought “unilateralism”, if you will, but this was not all the option it had. When for example, barangay A had to face a stronger enemy B which was also the enemy of another barangay C, what A did was to ask help from C so that they would combine to fight B. This was in effect a sort of balance-of-power defense/security strategy.

Sultan Kudarat of Maguindanao, in Mindanao, would ask neighboring sultans or datus, whom he usually had feuds with, to put aside their quarrels for the time being and combine to fight a formidable foe. Their enemy was the Spanish colonial government of the Philippines. From time to time in the 17th century it fitted out military expeditions mostly composed of willingly or forcibly recruited Christianized natives of Luzon and Visayas to subjugate the recalcitrant Filipino Muslims or Moros. If the combined forces proved unable to repel the aggression Sultan Kudarat would ask reinforcements from as far away as Ternate in Indonesia. By employing this balance-of-power strategy for defense and security, Sultan Kudarat succeeded in effectively frustrating all attempts of the Spaniards to conquer them.²

Eventually, such political bodies as the barangays and sultanates in the Philippines and such feudal political entities as had obtained in Europe, Japan (the shomyos and daimyos) or elsewhere were consolidated into higher and much bigger forms of political organizations: the nation-states. But like the lower-level bodies before them, the nation-states were not always in friendly terms with each other. Mutual suspicion and distrust characterized their relationship for the most part. They looked at one another as potential enemies and kept themselves ever ready to go to war “just in case.” Why so? Is it all because of the will to power, the desire to dominate, or the obsession to preserve and promote national interest? The answer is “all the above.”

Nation-states are like humans. They have to live and grow if they don’t want to be brought under control or absorbed by others. They need to struggle for strength and power in order to survive in a world of uncertainty. In short, the problem of security is actually the problem of power. States have to have power to be secure, or at least to feel being secure.

Policies on the Security Problem

Which probably explains why the geopolitical thinker, Friedrich Ratzel, in the late 1800’s or early 1900’s, enunciated the so-called “organic” idea. He postulated that the state is an organism (underscoring supplied for emphasis) which biologically needs to grow by “securing essential missing organs, if necessary, by force.”

What these missing organs are may well be the factors that make for power. These are location, size and shape, climate, population and manpower, natural resources and industrial capacity, social and political organizations, and last but not least, technology and technical know-how.

Ratzel’s organic idea was closely akin if not complementary to Professor Doctor Karl Haushofer’s concept of “Lebensraum”, or space for living. Haushofer, a German general, was so enamored with the value of space that he went on strongly advocating a nation must expand or perish.

Ratzel’s and Haushofer’s ideas were not lost on Adolf Hitler, Nazi Germany’s dictator. In fact, it was these ideas that inspired and drove him to implementing by “blood and iron” the policy of German leaders since the time of Kaiser William II (emperor of Germany from 1888 to 1918). That policy was the “Drang nach Osten,” or Drive to the East. The Kaiser thought of pushing toward Baghdad (Iraq). On the other hand, Hitler schemed to drive in the direction of Kiev, in Ukraine, while military and other operations to subjugate the Balkans and the rest of Europe were to be in progress.

Earlier in the latter half of the 19th century, soon after the so-called Meiji Restoration and upon transforming itself into a power in its own right, Japan set out to pursue an ambitious program of expansion. With the Monroe Doctrine as its cue, the Land of the Rising Sun centered its security thought on the establishment of a New Order in Greater East Asia. This stemmed from the pentagonal principles of Pan-Asianism, self-defense, right to live, Japanese leadership in the Far East, and “special interests.” This security thought led to Japan’s conquest of Korea.

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5 Ibid., 16-17.
6 Ibid., 68.
7 Ibid., 94.
Manchuria and other parts of China; to its attack on Pearl Harbor, Hawaii; and to the opening of the Asia-Pacific theater of World War II.

The rest is history. But what history shows is the ever continuing rivalry among states in amassing power to solve their respective nagging security problem. Paradoxically, strong states not only want to hold on to their power because as has been said “power is sweet and once tasted very hard to forswear.” Yet they still crave for more and more – and more – as if their appetite increases by eating.

History also instructs us that states utilize war as an instrument to dominate others. They want to build empires in order to ensure their security and impose peace in their own terms – not that their ultimate goal is peace, no, but their security or self-preservation. Such was how the Roman Empire or Pax Romana (in the first four centuries of the Current Era) and the British Empire or Pax Britannica (in the 19th century) were established.

But they rose only to fall. Like what the Chinese say, “the fellow born is the fellow dying,” so do empires get destroyed by their very existence, or perhaps collapse by their very weight. This is so because nation-states have to jostle with one another for power in a seemingly endless, persistent and tenacious manner in the name of security and freedom. Depending upon the degree and type of power, especially military power, that a state accumulates so do others, particularly its potential enemies, make moves for equal or greater power because, understandably, they wouldn’t want to be outdone. In the process of shooing and shoving as it were, conflict of interest could prove unavoidable, thus precipitating war. But war is a very costly affair; it saps the very stamina of the protagonists and could lead the loser to its doom. Unlike in sports where not only the champion but the runners-up are awarded prizes, in war the losers get the worst, possibly they get hanged.

What history moreover tells us is that a nation-state’s efforts to gain and further strengthen its power have been geared in the direction of imperialism or colonialism. These two terms are actually the two sides of the same coin since what is imperial to the ruler is colonial to the ruled. Imperialism, on the one hand, implies the “extension of a state’s rule over people inhabiting areas outside its borders.”

Colonialism may be viewed as “movement of nationals from a metropolitan or home country to a territory abroad for permanent settlement in that territory.”

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9 Ibid.
This view reminds us of Japan’s annexation of Korea to exploit the latter’s food producing capacity so it could feed its burgeoning population. It thus encouraged its people to migrate to Korea so that by 1910, the year when Korea was formally incorporated into the Japanese Empire, some 170,000 Japanese had settled in Korea – the largest overseas Japanese community at the time.\textsuperscript{10}

Imperialism has a long history and may be divided into three periods. The first began from times long past to the late 15\textsuperscript{th} century. The second was from the 15th century up to the beginning of the 19\textsuperscript{th} century. This period covers the Age of Discovery that was mostly about exploration of many parts of the world particularly by Spain and Portugal. Finally, the third (often called “New Imperialism”) followed, with the renewed interest in colonies by the developed and more powerful countries at the time: Great Britain, France, Italy, Netherlands, Belgium, Germany, Russia, and even U.S.A. and Japan.\textsuperscript{11}

The neo-imperialists’ race for colonies was staged in Africa and the Asia-Pacific. Their mode of colonization was varied, depending on the specific interests they had. Some chose direct and actual (or physical) control; others preferred carving out spheres of influence or extracting concessions. Out of the territories of China, then under the decrepit Manchu Dynasty, the Western Powers had each demarcated their respective turfs, utilizing them as centers of their activities and interests. Their cutting up parts of China’s territory was euphemistically called “sharing the Chinese melon.” Through coercion or actual use of force (gunboat policy) the imperialists demanded rights, privileges, immunities and the like with the understanding that whatever grant the Chinese government gave to one automatically was made available to the others in accordance with what was known as most-favored-nation clause. Among these were extraterritoriality, trade (opium included) and commerce, opening of ports, railway projects, areas of residence, etc. The Western Powers established in Shanghai an international settlement that was made off-limits to “dogs and Chinese.”

Towards the end of the 19\textsuperscript{th} century the USA joined the scramble for concessions, particularly in the Pacific and Asia. It pressured Japan to open its doors and allow intercourse with foreigners. It annexed Hawaii, the way it did with Texas, by outmaneuvering the ruling native Queen, Lilioukalani, as well as some of the more important islands in the Pacific. It agreed to a tripartite protectorate of

\textsuperscript{10} Pobre, Cesar P., Filipinos in the Korean War (Quezon City, Philippines, Philippine Veterans Administration Office, 2012), p.11.
Samoa and got Guam from Spain following the Spanish-American War of 1898.\(^\text{12}\)

By this time, the Filipinos had succeeded through revolution in liberating themselves from almost 400 years of Spanish rule, declared themselves independent and inaugurated the Philippine Republic. The Republic was nipped in the bud, however.

The United States by then had become an industrial country with a burgeoning economy. It needed new markets, areas of investment and sources of raw materials to feed its industries, as well as points for power projection and for other defense and security reasons. Thus, finding a convenient excuse in such literary phrase as “manifest destiny” to “take up the Whitman’s burden,” as Rudyard Kipling, the acknowledged poet of Western imperialism, had versified, the United States which had strongly spurned colonialism in the Age of Reason, now would find itself coveting the Philippines.

The Philippine-American War thus ensued with all savagery and ended with the Philippines becoming once again a colony, this time, of the Americans. US President William McKinley explained to a group of Protestant clergymen, who called on him in November 1899, why he decided to take the Philippines. Said he:

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\ldots \text{The truth is, I didn’t want the Philippines, and when they came to us, as a gift from the gods, I did not know what to do with them. . . I sought counsel from all sides – Democrats as well as Republicans – but got little help. I thought first we would take only Manila; then Luzon, then other islands, perhaps, also. I walked the floor of the White House night after night until midnight; and I am not ashamed to tell you, gentlemen, that I went down on my knees and prayed Almighty God for light and guidance more than one night.}
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\text{And one night late it came to me this way – I don’t know how it was but it came: (1) That we could not give them back to Spain – that would be cowardly and dishonorable; (2) That we could not turn them over to France or Germany – our commercial rivals in the Orient – that would be bad business and discreditable; (3) That we could not leave them to themselves – they were unfit for self-government – and they would soon have anarchy and misrule over there worse than Spain’s was; and (4) That there was nothing left for}
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us to do but to take them all, and to educate the Filipinos, and uplift
and civilize and Christianize them, and, by God’s grace, do the very
best we could [to] them, as our fellowmen for whom Christ also
died.

And then I went to bed, and went to sleep, and slept
soundly.\(^{13}\)

Thus one can see how the imperialists and colonizers, in their lust for power,
made use of conquered or controlled territories. They were utilized as sources of
raw materials, markets for manufactured products, places for investment of capital,
outlets for surplus population, sources of man power, strategic bases, areas for
religious missionary activities, prestige, etc.

Now that the empires have broken up and the Age of Globalization has set
in, some security thinkers believe that imperialism’s time has likewise gone. Other
analysts, however, have argued it is still very much around though in more indirect,
innocuous and subtle but no less efficient and effective forms.

A case in point is the International Monetary Fund and World Bank,
institutions that are subject to the absolute veto power of U.S.A. Their function is
to provide multilateral development assistance, particularly to countries that have
yet to attain the first stages of modernization or industrialization. In keeping with
globalization these institutions have closely if not strictly adhered to “free market”
policies which have the effect of (1) discouraging recipient states from becoming
industrialized and (2) preventing them from being relieved of their role as sources
of cheap labor for the production of export goods by multinationals.\(^{14}\)

In other words, imperialism/colonialism is not only a matter of political
but economic control as well; for after all, economic power begets political
power, or, is it also the other way around? This reminds us then of another “ism”
which, although primarily economic in nature, has much to commend itself in
the continuing struggle for power or supremacy among nation-states to attain their
security or self-preservation: mercantilism.

Mercantilism, according to Webster’s Unabridged Dictionary, was a system
of political and economic policy that evolved with the Western national state. It
proceeded from the premise that “money was regarded as a store of wealth, and
the goal of the state was the accumulation of precious metals [gold and silver],

\(^{13}\) Quoted in Corpuz, Onofre D., The Roots of the Filipino Nation, Vol. 2., p.376.

by exporting the largest possible quantity of its products and importing as little as possible, thus establishing a favorable balance of trade.” In fact, it was practically the gist of the Commercial and Mercantile System that the Scottish economist, Adam Smith (1723-90), had had in mind. This referred to practices, essentially protectionist and monetary, that the more powerful states observed. The idea behind it was that the wealth of a state was keyed to its store of gold and silver and that because the world was not unlimited of its resources a nation-state could thrive and prosper only at the expense of another, or others.

Note that these isms – mercantilism and imperialism – were inventions of nation-states by reason of their necessity to survive. These isms were their creation as an answer to the problem of security. They were the drive for the nation-states’ continuing quest for national security, or state security if you will, which has continued up to now to be dominant in security thought.

**National Security and Human Security**

Note further that national security, being essentially loss prevention, seeks to protect and preserve core values or vital interests, which was what Arnold Wolfers probably had been thinking when he said that security “points to some degree of protection of values previously acquired.” So did David Baldwin express a similar idea when he referred to security as a condition wherein obtains “a low probability of damage to acquired values.” Likewise, in December 1978, during the graduation exercises of senior military officers who took up the TANGLAW course, I defined national security as a state or condition under which the things that a state holds most dear are preserved and enhanced. These “dear” things that I had in mind are no less than the essential components of the state itself: people, sovereignty or independence, territory, and government. By definition, a state is a “community of persons more or less numerous, permanently occupying a definite portion of territory, independent of external control [sovereign], and possessing a government [or domestic political order] to which the great majority of inhabitants render habitual obedience.”\(^{15}\)

The highly respected American political thinker, Walter Lippman, wrote: “A nation is secure to the extent to which it is not in danger of having to sacrifice core values if it wishes to avoid war, and is able, if challenged, to maintain them.”\(^{16}\)

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\(^{16}\) Padelford, Norman J., et.al.,op.cit., p.183.
Lippman’s concept assumes that a state has an armed force strong enough to ensure victory to preserve its core values should these be threatened in case of war by another state. It implies, too, that a state can defend successfully by going it alone; that is, unilaterally, or through the “lone wolf” way. Indeed, unilateralism is one of five possible modes of addressing the problem of security. The other four are: 17

1. **Balance of Power.** Also called “gang versus gang”, this strategy calls for the state getting into alliance with one or more other states whose vital interests (those worth fighting for) are at the time in harmony with its own. It is aimed against coalition of potential enemy states.

2. **Collective Security.** States group themselves for individual protection. Collectively they take whatever action is deemed necessary to protect a threatened member or non-member. For example, in response to the UN call for military assistance to South Korea which was invaded by North Korea, on 25 June 1950, some 16 member nations led by USA responded, calling their involvement in the war a “police action.” One of them is the Philippines, which sent five battalion combat teams one after the other.

3. **World Government.** Such a sovereign entity as world government, to which all authority is centered, is established by force or universal agreement. Under this mode states no longer exist as such but may be autonomous, like the 50 states that compose the U.S.A. Warring between themselves thus becomes a thing of the past. All peoples are ruled by the entity which not only administers their affairs but maintains world peace, order and security. It is the world’s policeman and manager. The UNO is almost but not quite like a world government.

4. **World Conquest.** This was what Hitler dreamed of – a world under his feet in the name of the supposedly superior Aryan race. World domination was what the likes of Lenin and Stalin aspired for. They wanted to establish communism all over the world, subduing one country after another, like domino tiles falling in a sort of chain reaction.

But to go back to Walter Lippman’s concept of national security. His definition, it appears, is the generally accepted definition of the term but at the same time it has become the object of a close, searching second look by analysts for quite sometime now. They ask whether his concept is yet valid in the wake of modern-day developments. Among others, there has been a widening and intensifying

movement for the recognition and respect for such universal values as democracy, civil liberties and human rights. Indeed, at no other stage of human history has there been a greater awareness and assertion of man’s freedom from want and freedom from fear, to say nothing of freedom of expression and freedom of worship.

For one, so critics aver, state security or national security is observed to be “too unilateralist in its emphasis on force.” Which may no longer be valid especially in these times of growing interdependence of nations due to or as a result of globalization, of increasing production of weapons of mass destruction and likelihood of their proliferation, and of rising international terrorism. But what seems now to be more relevant and needful is for states to work together to achieve world peace and security, which can only be done through cooperative security.

For another, it envisions threats that are limited only to those from other states and of the kind that are only military in nature. But the probability is not remote that sources of threats could be those that are not necessarily traced directly to other states; they could be non-governmental actors, institutions, etc. Also, threats may be those affected with non-military character, like political, economic and socio-cultural. In which case then, what is needed is a concept of security that includes and not excludes – in a word, expansive or comprehensive, not exclusionary or restricted.

Still for another argument, instead of state security or national security whose primary objective is the welfare and well-being of the state, why not human security whose main aim is the preservation and enhancement of the welfare and well being of the individual, the person, the human being?

Note, however, that critics of state security or national security are not actually suggesting that it should be relegated to the backburner so that it can be replaced by another kind more suitable and encompassing, and that is human security. For to be sure they do not deny the former’s importance. But what some are saying is that “human security can be clearly delineated in relation to the dominant, neo-realist conception of security [state security] and that its elements can be presented compactly enough for further refinement.”

Let us thus examine how state security and human security may be viewed as to each other in accordance with the following:

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19 Ibid.
20 Ibid.,.3.
- For whom is security intended;
- For which values is security;
- By what threats is security endangered; and,
- By what means is security achieved.

On the one hand, state security – as the term suggests – is protection and defense of the state. It is the state that is the “referent object” of security. The core values to be preserved and enhanced are the state’s welfare and well-being, more specifically its territorial integrity, independence/sovereignty, and government/domestic political order. These are to be safeguarded against threats from other states. To contain such threats a state may resort to military power, military deterrence, balance of military power, military alliances, etc.

On the other hand, human security is protection and defense of the individual person or people. It is the human being or people themselves that are its referent object. The core values to be preserved and enhanced are explained in the 1994 UNDP (United Nations Development Program) “Human Development Report” as well as by the Canadian position. The former emphasizes the physical safety and well-being, as well as dignity of the individual – and human freedom too – while the latter is for security against economic privation, an acceptable quality of life, and guarantee of fundamental human rights. Further, in a sort of metaphorical way, the “Report” explains human security as a “child who did not die, a disease that did not spread, a job that was not cut, an ethnic tension that did not explode in violence, a dissident who was not silenced.” Additionally, “Human security... is concerned with how people live and breathe in a society, how freely they exercise their many choices, how much access they have to market and social opportunities – and whether they live in conflict or in peace.”

There is another way of identifying the core values and corresponding threats to them as contemplated by human security. From a domestic viewpoint these, according to the “Report”, are:

- Economics security which may be threatened by lack of productive and remunerative employment, precarious employment, absence of publicly financed safety nets;
- Food security which could be endangered by lack of food entitlements including insufficient access to assets, work, and assured incomes;
- Health security which could be made precarious by infectious and parasitic diseases, diseases of the circulatory system and cancers, lack of water, air pollution, lack of access to health care facilities;
- Environmental security which may be seriously compromised by declining...
water availability, water pollution, declining arable land, deforestation, desertification, air pollution, natural disasters;

- Personal security which may be at risk under conditions of violent crimes, drug trafficking, violence and abuse of children and women;
- Community security which may be rendered farcical if the following obtain: breakdown of the family, collapse of traditional languages and cultures, ethnic discrimination and strife, genocide and ethnic cleansing; and
- Political security which could be greatly impaired with the incidence of such government’s actions as repression, systematic human rights violations, militarization.

And from a global standpoint these are:

- Unchecked population growth,
- Disparities in economic opportunities,
- Excessive international migration,
- Environmental degradation,
- Drug Production and trafficking, and
- International terrorism.

Having dealt with the first three questions on security – for whom, for which values, and for what threats – the UNDP and Canadian schools of thought explain the means to achieve human security. The UNDP relies almost completely on development; the Canadian subscribes to the same as the primary instrument, allowing though the use of force but only as a last resort. Both schools envision the need for long-term cooperation of states; so also is the need to involve non-governmental organizations and international entities, agencies or instrumentalities, in particular the economic and financial. All these should join hands in promoting, disseminating and enforcing standards of conduct they may be able to agree on.

And so at this juncture, a recapitulation of what is state or national security vis-avis human security on the basis of the four questions is in order, with the following table, as shown in Prof. Bajpais’ paper:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Security for whom</th>
<th>National Security</th>
<th>Human Security</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Security for which values</td>
<td>Territorial integrity and national independence</td>
<td>Personal safety and individual freedom</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Security for whom</td>
<td>Primarily, the state</td>
<td>Primarily, the individual</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
From the table above, two significant points may be deduced. First, notwithstanding their differences, state or national security and human security are not really diametrically opposed to each other to the extent that they can not be reconciled. They can be harmonized since they are not really that incompatible.

Nonetheless there seems to be a contrast between national security and human security. But contrasting the two, it is argued, is not differentiating them, if by differentiating is meant showing they are the one and the other, and unlike each other. What the table actually shows is, as said earlier, delineation between

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Security from what threats</th>
<th>Direct threats from other states</th>
<th>Direct threats from states and non-state action + indirect threats</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Security by what means</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>• Force as the primary instrument of security, to be used unilaterally for a state’s own safety.</td>
<td>• Force as a secondary instrument, to be used primarily for cosmopolitan ends and collectively; sanctions, human development, and humane governance as key instrument of individual-centered security</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>• Balance of power is important; power is equated with military capabilities</td>
<td>• Balance of power is of limited utility; soft power is increasingly important</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>• Cooperation between states is tenuous beyond alliance relations</td>
<td>• Cooperation between states, international organizations and NGOs can be effective and sustained</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>• Norms and institutions are of limited value, particularly in the security/military sphere</td>
<td>• Norms and institutions matter; democratization and representativeness in institutions enhance their effectiveness</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
national security and human security with a listing of elements of the one vis-a-vis those of the other. Note, in the first place, that the referent objects of both are in effect identical; for just as human security refers to the protection and safety of the individual so is national security focused on the protection and safety of the state which, by definition, is a community of persons.

Second, the table suggests the need for a broadened and integrated concept of security. Broadened and integrated, so that security can efficiently and effectively cover possibly the ever increasing range of values that are the prime concern for protection and enhancement, with short-, mid-, and long-term measures, including military build-up, to negate whatever threats may endanger them. For it is evident that neither national security nor human security alone can suffice; they have to be combined. In other words, the concept of security is not about which of the two, national security or human security, is to be managed. It is also not about managing the two in tandem according to importance and urgency since both are important and needing utmost attention. But rather, they have to be taken up together or jointly.

**Types of Security Threat**

There are crimes (acts punishable by law) which endanger national security and human security, as well. They are committed by people who operate in a number of nation-states through what appears like a process of transmitting or replicating them beyond national borders. They are therefore in the nature of transnational crimes. Because of their serious impact on national security and people’s safety these crimes have become of such major importance that defense and security planners, thinkers and practitioners couldn’t help but address them.

1. **Terrorism**

Only lately Americans were shocked to learn about what happened on April 15, 2013 in Boston, Massachusetts, USA. On that day at the finish-line of the Boston Marathon, where people had gathered in a festive mood to celebrate the occasion, a couple of bombs exploded, turning the area into something like hell breaking loose with the death of three and wounding more than a hundred people. This is just about the latest frightening violent phenomenon that occurred which US President Barak Obama called an “act of terrorism.” Almost a dozen years earlier on 11 September 2001, one of two commercial planes hijacked by agents of the Al Qaeda leader, Osama Bin Laden (now dead), crashed into the north tower of the
World Trade Center in New York City; and another, 20 minutes later into the south tower. A third plane hit the Pentagon, the US Defense Office in Washington DC, while a fourth one crash-landed on Shanksville, Pennsylvania. President George W. Bush, Jr., then President of the US, denounced the tragic incident as “an act that horrified not only every American, but every person of every faith, and every nation that values human life.” Then he promptly declared war against global terrorism, against those who attempt to export terror including governments that support them.

Indeed, terrorist activities have been taking place since as long ago as memory can recall across the globe, causing the death and destruction, fear and trauma in so many countries including the Philippines. Numerous incidents of terrorism have happened in the country, but for lack of space let me just cite a few.

On 28 April 1949, a large group of local communist rebels led by Alexander Viernes, waylaid somewhere in Bongabong, Nueva Ecija the former First Lady, Mrs Aurora Quezon, and her entourage. They were on their way to Baler, Tayabas (now Quezon) Province, to unveil a memorial for her late husband, President Manuel Quezon. Mrs Quezon, her daughter Baby and son-in-law, Felipe Buencamino III, Quezon City Mayor Ponciano Bernardo, and eight others were killed.21

Not long thereafter, another rebel leader, Pedro Caguin, raided the capital town of Sta. Cruz, Laguna. He and his 200-man force scooped all the cash (about P87,000,00) in the provincial treasury, looted the town’s commercial area, killed the provincial warden, kidnapped several guards, and released a score of prisoners. On leaving they torched houses and destroyed a bridge.22

On 4 April 1995, elements of the Muslim Islamic Liberation Front (MILF), Abu Sayyaf Group (ASG), and Moro National Liberation Front (MNLF) “lost Command” suddenly attacked the fairly prosperous and quiet town of Ipil, Zamboanga del Sur. Firing high-powered guns indiscriminately, they looted the banks and commercial establishments, and set them on fire including other buildings and residential houses. The terrorist fled leaving the town still aflame. Some forty-three persons perished while forty seven were wounded.23

22 Ibid., pp. 397-398.  
No less scary than the above-cited occurrences but more widely known through the media coverage it induced was that which happened on 27 May 2001. Some 20 or so “kumpit”-borne ASG operators led by a certain Abu Sabaya (by whose volubility and flair for publicity he became the self-styled spokesman of the ASG) kidnapped an almost equal number of persons then vacationing at the Dos Palmas Island Resort of Puerto Princesa, Palawan, and brought them to Mindanao. Three of the victims were Americans – Martin Burnham, his wife, Gracia, and Guillermo Sobero. In the following weeks, as the kidnappers engaged military and police forces in a series of pitch battles and skirmishes some of those kidnapped were able to escape or were released on ransom, even as other persons were taken as hostage, including a nurse and mother, Deborah Yap. Meanwhile, one of the Americans, Guillermo Sobero, was beheaded reportedly on orders of Galib Andang or “Commander Robot”, that is, if he was not the executioner himself. Later in an encounter with government troops Martin Burnham and Deborah Yap were killed in the crossfire. Gracia was injured but rescued and eventually reunited with her children and relatives back in the United States. Subsequently, just about when Abu Sabaya and what remained of his men had set sail in kumpits to elude pursuing government troops, Marines and Navy contingents encountered them and killed all of them. Though not recovered, Abu Sabaya’s remains must have sunk and presumably found their way into the waiting jaws of hungry sharks.

In December 2003, “Commander Robot” was captured and wounded in a fight with government troops. One of his legs was amputated. However, it is not known what has happened to him since.²⁴

Note that not all terrorists operating in the Philippines are Filipinos. To be sure, foreign terrorists have been coming to and leaving the country to carry out terrorist mission here or abroad. Ramzi Yousef, now in US jail for his role in the bombing of the World Trade Center in 1993, was here to assassinate the Pope while the latter was visiting in the Philippines, but failed. So also did two other most wanted foreign terrorists stay in the Philippines for quite a while. They were (1) Hambali, the number 2 or 3 man in the Al Qaeda terrorist attack network of Osama Bin Laden, now in US custody; and (2) the already deceased Fathur Roman Alghozi, an Indonesian who was responsible for most of the bombings in Metro Manila, a demolition man of Al Qaeda and an important personality in the Southeast Asian terrorist network, Jemaah Islamiyah (JI). Note, further, that many MNLF, ASG and MILF followers had had terrorist training in Afghanistan and/or Pakistan that was conducted by CIA agents. They were being trained there for possible employment while Afghan insurgents were battling the pro-Soviet Afghanistan government of

²⁴ Ibid., 7-8.
Babrak Karmal’s regime in the 1980’s.\textsuperscript{25}

From these violent and dreadful incidents that did happen and continue to happen, a couple of lessons can be derived. One is appreciation of the transnational character of terrorism. The other is recognition that terrorism is a clear and present danger to national security, human security and public safety; and therefore has to be treated not with kid gloves but with all seriousness. And probably a good measure to eliminate or at least reduce to insignificance this danger is to create an international mechanism through which law enforcement and security agencies world-wide are made to function in a sustained, cooperative manner.

2. \textit{Transnational Crimes}

There are other crimes transcending national borders and having the effect of threatening national security and human security, although some of them may not be as dire as terrorism. Nonetheless, it is believed, they are such a major concern of security that they need to be addressed at any rate.

They have come to the fore and developed fast, largely as a result of globalization. The effect of globalization, as practically everybody knows, has been the shrinking of the world, figuratively speaking. The traditional barriers in trade and commerce as well as those usual protective restrictions imposed by states in the exercise of their sovereign powers, like levying import duties, immigration, etc., have been relaxed to an appreciable extent. Consequently, there has been a greatly increased and accelerated flow of people, goods and services, and even money, too. And, by way of harmless exaggeration, if indeed the world has contracted into the size of a pea it is all because of a most important development: the dramatic and rapid advance and expansion of technology, especially in the fields of information, communication and transportation.

Michael Wesley, in his essay “Transnational Crime and Security Threats in Asia,”\textsuperscript{26} listed seven basic types of transnational crimes.

\begin{itemize}
\item[a.] Violent Religious Radicalism and Separatism

Militant fundamentalist movements, Islamic in particular, have long been

\footnotesize\textsuperscript{25} Ibid.
in existence in Asia although they may not have been waged as intensely as in the latter half of the 20th century. Muslims in the Philippine South (Mindanao and Sulu) and those in Southern Thailand have since become assertive of their Islamic identity to the extent that they have become separatists or secessionists, violent and radical. It is their claim that they haven’t been receiving a fair deal from their respective Christian and Buddhist governments. Consequently, so they further aver, they have become marginalized. This, indeed, is true. The modernizing efforts of the Philippine Republic since its inauguration in 1946 were not as much addressed to Mindanao, specifically to where the Muslims are concentrated, as in Luzon and the Visayas, which are Christian populated, There was thus a lopsided development. In my book “History of the Armed Forces of the Filipino People,” I wrote:

... Meanwhile, people from Luzon and the Visayas continued to migrate to Mindanao, obviously in search of the proverbial greener pastures, this time in greater numbers. Businessmen, national and multinational alike, found it a lucrative place to invest in and, so, plowed money there. The Muslims thus felt threatened of their geographic and resource endowments, as well as their culture and, with Manila perceived to be uncaring, they developed the conviction that they were merely being treated as second-class citizens. They probably felt theirs was a case of tyranny of the minority by the majority. But since the majority happened to be Christian and the minority, Muslim, the feeling of being taken for granted by the former had taken a religious color, making the issue all the more sensitive. In short, a history of political, economic, and social inattention provided a good explanation why the Muslims became alienated and finally decided to rise in arms not merely to protest but to secede.27

Between then (1968, year when the Muslim Independence Movement began) and now, a span of 45 years, much of the proverbial water under the bridge had flowed. So much blood, sweat and tears has been shed. The ruin, damage and destruction are still very much in evidence. But now the light at the end of the tunnel seems to be emerging. Lately the government and rebel peace panels agreed to come to terms. After the wealth-sharing, power-sharing, and normalization issues are ironed out a final agreement is expected to be forged. It is hoped that this will result in an ultimate closure of the problem of the Philippine South so that the blessings of peace and development can be brought to bear on the long–suffering Filipino people over there.

b. People Smuggling and People Trafficking

A great number of the population in developing countries live in poverty and the gap between the rich and the poor is widening. This is true to many Asian countries and the Philippines is no exception. For while we gloat over what is said to be a rosy economy, even as some rich countries are reeling from the downsides of their economy, the reality is the benefit occurring from such a rosy, if robust economy does not trickle down to the eating pads of the poor Filipinos who constitute about 30% of the population.

Thus, they have to extricate themselves from their wretched condition, move out to other countries and get a job there. However, this is easier said than done. Countries the world over have protectionist policies. They have stringent laws especially on immigration and employment. So if they have to seek entry at all – as indeed they find it a compelling need – the poor migrants have to resort to any means, fair or foul. Herein lies the opportunity that people smugglers and people traffickers capitalize upon. Smugglers facilitate movement of people across borders in a surreptitious manner, in violation of the law. Traffickers are those engaged in some trade or transaction that is illegal in nature.

It is bad enough that those smuggled are charged exorbitant fees which, because of their difficulty in raising money to pay for them, could result in their being kept by the smugglers in some sort of servitude or under conditions amounting to indentured labor. What is worse is – especially women – they become easy prey to “coercive exploitation.” Almost always they are thrust into the sex industry.

Although smuggling and trafficking people are crimes, they may not be that threatening to national security. For that matter, many states do not seem to manifest keenness in adopting measures to curb them. For one, movement of people, legally or not, has a way of abating population pressure – and the pangs of impoverishment, if you will. For another, the huge volume of cash being remitted by overseas workers has proved to be a big shot in the arms of the national economy, as in the case of the Philippines. But be these considerations as they may, it can’t be gainsaid that these crimes, these illegal if nefarious activities, render violence to human decency. They pose a serious disturbance to societal stability. They are so revolting they need to be reined in.

c. Illicit Drug Producing and Smuggling

Valued for their soporific and hallucinogenic qualities that not only induce
sleep but soothe the mind and emotions, hemp plants like marijuana, cannabis and hashish have been cultivated and used a long time ago. For example, the hashish which is chewed, smoked or drunk for its narcotic and intoxicating effects, was used by the “Assassins”, members of a secret society founded by Hassan Sabah of Persia (now Iran) in the 11th century. They operated in small bands to ensure mobility and surprise, terrorizing the kings and rulers of Persia and Egypt. Before hitting their target they had to go through the ritual of taking hashish which conditioned them to fantasize about the sensual pleasures awaiting them in heaven, thus inducing them to be even more fanatical in carrying out their mission. The crusaders called them “assassins” (from the word “hashishin”) and were suppressed by the Mongols in the 13th century.28

In the latter half of the 19th century, during the scramble for concessions in China by the Western Powers, as explained in the first pages of this article, the British had to wage war against China to open itself to the opium trade. The drug was sourced from then British India (now India and Pakistan) and Afghanistan as well. Also, widely written about is the “Golden Triangle” formed by parts of Myanmar, Laos, and Thailand which up to now has been the main producer of heroin.

Nowadays, with the manufacture of synthetic drugs greatly facilitated by advanced technology, the production or cultivation of hemp plants seems to have been overshadowed by the former. This doesn’t mean that marijuana, for example, is no longer a “hot item.” It still is but now what appears to be the users’ preference are the artificially made amphetamine-type substances (ATS) which are as potent as any narcotics, like “ecstasy.”

That ATS can now be mass-produced in situ (right inside the very area where it is sold) suggests its being made conveniently available to a steadily growing number of clientele – the urban poor, students, young professionals, personnel of the movie industry and even the young members of rich families. In other words, the ease of manufacturing large supplies of the synthetic drug just where users and potential users live goes along well with the ever increasing demand for it.

Notwithstanding the widely-known goings-on of the illicit trade, however, dangerous drug authorities are hard put to do their task of detecting, monitoring and apprehending those engaged in it. One reason is ATS production and distribution allow for so much flexibility. Another is the seemingly emerging culture of acceptability that ATS finds in some sectors of society. Still another is its corrupting

influences over many an anti-drug enforcer. And so if there is great difficulty in bringing the menace to controllable levels one is constrained to think of its deleterious implication on the nation’s health and societal stability, to say nothing of the national economy. Indeed, the illicit drug trade poses a great challenge and has to be met squarely.

Additionally, there is the incidence of smuggling: the importation or exportation of goods and commodities secretly in violation of the law. Although penalties in the form of fines and/or imprisonment are suffered by those who commit it, still there are always smugglers around. Individuals, groups of individuals, syndicates and even government officials are in it. The reason is the handsome, very handsome profits that it yields.

Among the ASEAN countries, the Philippines is probably where smuggling is most rampant. Largely because of its extended coastline all sorts of goods and commodities are illegally brought in – rice, corn, garlic, fruits, and other agricultural crops, processed or canned foods, fabrics and wearing apparel, cosmetics, household appliances, electronic gadgets and toys, motor vehicles including motor cycles, firearms and other military weapons, etc. Indeed, there has been quite an array of “hot” goods flooding the Philippine market; name it and you have it.

So alarming is smuggling that some media people, possibly those who are patriotic, real honest, or those who have no “take” from it, are minded to denounce the illegal trade from time to time. In fact, only lately the Bureau of Customs was put to task why so many vans of rice were taken in via the “daan” (path) which is not “matuwid” (straight).

In any event, smuggling goes on and on. Apparently, a fool-proof measure has yet to be contrived to stop it. And the injurious effect it has on the nation’s economy and ultimately on the nation’s security hangs like the sword of Damocles on the head of Juan dela Cruz.

d. Money Laundering, Fraud and Extortion

These are crimes perpetrated across borders which can be identified as a type. They prop up, enhance or accelerate other transnational crimes and security threats. They are some of the less desirable outcome of globalization made possible through the communication and information possibilities of the computer.
Money laundering is the act of disguising the true nature as well as the source of illegal or secret funds or profits usually transmitted to a foreign bank or routed through a complex network of intermediaries. Among other factors, they are facilitated by the inflow of volumes of funds being invested and the large quantities of money being remitted by overseas workers.

Aside from the ease and efficiency provided by computerization, fraudulent passports complete with visa stamps made available by skillful document forgers have been helping much to facilitate money laundering activities. In Asia these fake papers are obtained primarily in Bangkok, Thailand or possibly elsewhere in Cambodia or Laos.

Likewise, with the use of the computer-internet, fraudsters find it easy to commit identity theft and fabrication, availing of the internet chat rooms to steal identity information. Of course, it is not only identity information that is being stolen but intellectual property as well. Besides, the internet offers thieves the opportunity to inflict spiteful damage or harm to business firms and countless PC users unless they “come across” or pay extortion money. Claimed to be the best example is the “Love bug” virus that originated in the Philippines in 2000, which caused losses amounting to millions of US dollars. (Reportedly, the originator was taken to the USA where he got a ready, high paying job in one of the security-sensitive government agencies).

e. Prostitution, Pedophilia, Child Sex Tourism, Pornography

These are illegal and punishable acts which for want of a better term may be classified as crimes against chastity. They do not adversely affect the national economy and societal stability directly. However, they are so tied up with and thus have an exacerbating effect on the more harmful crime types and threats to security. Prostitution, pedophilia (sexual desire in an adult for a child), child sex tourism, and pornography (obscene writings, drawing, photographs, etc., which are mostly without artistic quality) are the new practices that the sex industry feeds upon. The more extensive and intensive they are undertaken the greater the industry booms, thanks to globalization and the internet. What the latter does are the following:

a. Facilitating the distribution of and access to increasingly specialized markets in sexual services and pornographic materials;
b. Enabling customers to avoid the social stigma of involvement;
c. Facilitating expansion of marketing possibilities; and
d. Paving the way for users of child pornography on the internet to transition
to child sex tourism.

The sex industry is definitely linked with transnational threats because of its (a) heavy reliance on people trafficking and the exploitation of the indentured labor system, (b) encouragement of drug use among prostitutes and their customers, and (c) role in the spread of sexually transmitted diseases.

f. Piracy, Violent Robbery, Kidnapping and Extortion

Maritime piracy usually accompanied by kidnapping and ransom is not a monopoly of the Somalis who prey upon oil tankers sailing across the high seas fronting their country. Here in Southeast Asia such illegal violent acts at sea are virtually a historical tradition. More than half of the world’s maritime trade and commerce passes through the sea lanes between the Indian Ocean and Northeast Asia. Naturally, the region has become a veritable and lucrative place for piracy, in particular the archipelagic countries of Indonesia, the Philippines and even Malaysia. A number of seaside towns dotting the northern shores of Indonesia as well as the maritime southern frontiers of the Philippines seems to have made piracy a way of life. Pirates, of course, are not only active in these areas. They are also found plying the Sulu Sea (Sunda Strait) and the Strait of Malacca.

Nonetheless, the region appears to have not been giving much thought to curbing piracy, implying that it does not endanger the economy, much less the security of the peoples there.

g. Illegal Resource Exploitation

Southeast Asia is a resource-rich region. It has a great wealth of natural resources which has been exploited and continues to be exploited in more illegal ways than otherwise. Much of its area which used to be thickly forested and heavily wooded is now denuded by loggers who, it appears, couldn’t care less about the ill effects of their propensities. Floods and other natural disasters, for the most part due to forest denudation, have caused so much damage to life and property. Loggers’ activities have been contributing to global warming. Miners, too, are deserving of blame. Not only have they been extracting as much of the ores – gold, silver, iron, aluminum, etc. Also, the wastes of their mining operations have found their way to the rivers, creeks or streams; and now they are as dead as they are polluted heavily.
The region is gifted with rich fishing grounds but now their yields have become so depleted as to cause a great deal of concern. For this, poachers, big time and small time alike, have to be faulted. They have been very good at harvesting tons upon tons of fish. Even the reefs, some of which are in the UNESCO world heritage list, are getting destroyed by a steady stream of coral collectors. Reefs it should be noted are where fishes breed. Destroy the reef and you destroy the fishes. It is as simple as that.

There can be no doubt, then, that uncontrolled exploitation of resources gravely impairs the health of the Southeast Asian nation’s economy. It is a serious threat to their security and therefore must be addressed with equal seriousness.

3. Cybercrime

Aside from the various transnational crimes already taken up in the foregoing pages there is yet another crime which also happens beyond borders. To perpetrate it criminals use the computer-internet, a sophisticated and high technology operated electronic device.

As the term suggests cybercrime has the element or characteristic of virtual or cyberspace. It is a computer-internet activity. But the transnational crimes obtaining in the world of reality as explained above, also avail of the computer-internet to facilitate and further their operation. Could it be then that cybercrimes are just their digital versions? Possibly so, and this is why one of the biggest computer security firms --the Symantee Corporation-- may have been led into defining cybercrime as “any crime that is committed using computer or network; or hardware device.” However, there are other definitions advanced by industry thinkers and practitioners so that to date there hasn’t come out any single definition agreed upon.

Moreover, the difficulty of defining it is compounded by the fact that cybercrime is usually made synonymous to cyber war or cyber attack; and the latter likewise is being used interchangeably with cyber espionage or exploitation.

To understand cybercrime, therefore, in order that a strategy to combat it may be formulated, one has to examine its component elements. In this regard the manner of conceptualizing cybercrime suggested by Kristina M. Finklea and

Catherine A Theohary of the U.S. Congressional Research Service is instructive. The way they suggested entails some major elements and questions. Among these are:

1. Where do the criminal acts exist in the real and digital worlds (and what technologies are involved);
2. Why are malicious activities initiated; and
3. Who is involved in carrying out the malicious acts.

The connection of the virtual world to the physical or real world makes possible the locations of cybercrimes in both worlds. However, their locations in the world of reality have no replicas in the virtual world. In another way of saying, the geographic boundaries within which cybercrimes are located in the physical environment are not similarly found in the virtual world. Consequently, locations of cybercrimes in cyberspace are so indistinct there is difficulty in tracking them. Technologies made use of to perpetrate criminal acts include:

1. For example, the manner of committing the high-tech financial fraud known as point-of-scale (POS) skimming is to put a device over (or replace an existing card slot on a credit card reader or ATM. The device “relies on sophisticated data-reading electronics to copy magnetic stripe information from [the] credit card or debit card. It can capture both [the] credit card number and [the] PIN.” Then the stolen information is retrieved by physically collecting the device. Sometimes the device is so programmed as to be broadcast to the thieves through a network.

2. Another example is the personally identifiable information (PII) which is used to cash forged checks at local banks. The PII can easily be stolen. All that has to be done is remotely hack into the POS systems and then also, remotely install what is known as “key stroke loggers” so that the victims’ credit card data can be taken away at the same time that the cards are being swiped by them. Then the stolen information is electronically transferred to the fraudsters.

3. Still another example is to steal the victim’s account information and passwords, the peer-to-peer (P2P) software is utilized to search the file sharing networks. The stolen data are then used to access the victim’s bank accounts and transfer funds to prepaid credit cards in the culprit’s name.

With regard to why malicious activities are perpetrated, the reason among others could be material gain and self-gratification in doing such activities as hacking (devising or modifying computer programs skillfully), cyber stalking, online child pornography, etc.
Finally, as to the question of who is involved, cybercrimes could be committed by organized crime groups whose activities are mostly aimed at the financial services sector. It could also involve state sponsors or foreign governments interested among others in stealing data, like intellectual property and research and development highly classified information from big manufacturers and defense contractors; terrorist groups; or even individuals, like Julian Assange.

In 2012, it was reported that Assange’s whistle-blowing website “Wikileaks” published almost a couple of million U.S. diplomatic and intelligence documents, including confidential papers relating to the Iraq and Afghanistan wars. The publication projected into bold relief the “vast range” of American influence across the globe. It was claimed to be one of the largest breaches in U.S. history.

If this incident suggests how well can an individual or organized criminals in cyberspace obtain secrets – even the most-kept secrets – much to the embarrassment and harm of unquantifiable magnitude suffered by victim-states, cases of sophisticated frauds costing individuals and business firms billions of dollars committed by cyber criminals are quite many, too.

Why were the goings-on of Wikileaks not prevented from happening? We can only speculate. Perhaps the reason is lack of clear-cut definition of cybercrime as differentiated from other forms of illegal activities being done in the real, physical world, including other cyber threats; and, on the basis of which no appropriate, effective and timely counter-measure or measures were taken. It is like saying since the problem was not determined so was it not even half solved.

All this only shows the difficulty of grappling with the problem of cybercrimes – a serious threat to national security, public security and national economic security. But the bull has to be grabbed by the horns. It is necessary to remove the danger these crimes pose by adopting measures – new, modified, or varied – for the purpose. And with the adoption of such measures the need for redirecting the course of security thought becomes logical.
LIST OF REFERENCES


Integrating National Security into Philippine Regional Development Planning

Gabriel Ma. J. Lopez *

This journal article examines the security and regional development integration framework of the National Economic Development Authority (NEDA) and providing recommendations for its enhancement. The article emphasizes insurgency and secessionism in ARMM and other regions as a crucial problem hindering regional development. In its analysis of NEDA’s regional development frameworks, the article sets forth that NEDA has already mainstreamed Gender and Development (GAD) and Disaster Risk Reduction (DRR) in regional development planning. To present an enhanced regional development planning framework, the article forwards that mainstreaming the security dimensions identified by the United Nations—economic, food, health, environmental, personal, and political security—can essentially complement the existing frameworks of NEDA. The article concludes by providing specific recommendations for the improved incorporation of security issues and concerns in the regional development planning framework of NEDA.

National Security: Development of Concepts

Philippine Concepts of National Security

The concept of national security in the Philippines has evolved over the decades. In the early years, it was almost synonymous with national defense and basically referred to the protection of people and national territory/territories from external physical assault or threats (Talisayon, 1992.) Eventually, the concept of national security expanded from being just narrowly limited to national defense to include the protection of vital economic and political interests. National Security became the concern not only of the military but also of other departments and agencies as well, considering that threats to national security emanate from outside and inside (Ibid.).

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When Secretary Jose Almonte served as the National Security Adviser of President Fidel Ramos (1992-1998) the National Security Council officially defined national security “as a state or condition wherein the people’s way of life and institutions, their territorial integrity and sovereignty, and their welfare and well-being are protected and enhanced” (Almonte, 1992). This definition was expanded in 2010, under the new Aquino Administration to become “a state or condition wherein the country’s interests, its sovereignty, territorial integrity and democratic institutions, and the people’s way of life, cherished values, welfare and well-being are preserved.” (NSC, 2010) A recurring basic framework that was initiated for discussion by former Secretary Almonte’s close staff, notably former Deputy Director-General Serafin Talisayon and Assistant Director-General Francisco Mier, establishes that a Nation-State should be concerned with three basic agenda: (1) development; (2) defense and security; and, (3) governance.

He defines national security as “the creation of physical and policy environment where the national vision of having a Philippines where ‘freedom, dignity and prosperity’ is attained and the ‘nation’s core values, way of life and institutions; capacity to create and share wealth; living standards; sovereignty/territorial integrity; and strategic relationships’ are protected and enhanced.” (Private Interview with Sec. Almonte, Nov. 2010)

Related to this, the government has prioritized several strategic objectives which need to be met if the Philippines is to be secure. These are: (1) moral consensus, (2) cultural cohesiveness, (3) ecological balance, (4) economic strength, (5) socio-political stability, (6) territorial integrity, (7) international harmony, (8) global competitiveness, (9) people empowerment, and (10) solid infrastructure. These fundamental conditions contribute towards a stable and secure nation and are very important concerns and goals for development planning and public administration.

The National Defense College of the Philippines has established several fundamental dimensions of national security in its Graduate Program “Master in National Security Administration (MNSA)”: Economic, Socio-Cultural, Political, Military, Environmental, and Techno-Scientific (NDCP: NSA 209 - National Security Management Textbook, 2005). These dimensions appear to be consistent with and congruent to priority areas of interest of overall development planning.

In a PowerPoint presentation (produced in May 2005) to the NDCP Regular Class 41 in September 2005, Director Lorenzo A. Clavejo, DPA, of the Information Management Office of the National Security Council, provided explanations to the widely recognized ideal conditions of national security:
Territorial Integrity and Sovereignty – The territory of the country is intact and under the effective sovereign control of the Government.

Ecological Balance – The environment is able to support sustainable development strategies and activities for the benefit of the nation and the people who depend on it for existence.

Socio-Political Stability – There is peace and harmony among different groups of the people in the country, and mutual cooperation and support exists between the government and the people.

Economic Solidarity – The country’s economy is strong, capable of supporting national endeavors and providing its citizens with opportunities to earn and live decently, deriving its strength from the people who have an organic stake in it.

Cultural Cohesiveness and National Harmony – The citizens share the values and beliefs handed down by their ancestors and possess a strong sense of attachment to national community and harmony despite their religious, ethnic and linguistic differences.

Moral-Spiritual Consensus – There is moral and spiritual consensus on the wisdom and righteousness of the national vision and they are inspired by their patriotism and national pride to participate vigorously in the pursuit of the nation’s goals and objectives.

External Peace and Harmonious Internal Relations – The nation and the people enjoy cordial relations with their neighbors and they are free from any control, interference or threat of aggression from any of them.
Figure 1. Illustrative Paradigm for Philippine National Security, 1992
Source: National Security Management Handout, NDCP, 1992

Figure 2. Updated Paradigm for Philippine National Security, 2010
Source: Powerpoint Presentation of NSC Dir. Cyril Cusi to AFPCGSC Class 54, Nov. 2010
In a presentation in November 2005 to the Strategic Studies Group (SSG) of the National Defense College of the Philippine, SSG Fellow, Dr. Aileen Baviera of the University of the Philippines Asian Center, iterated that “Philippine (national) security must be conceptualized in accordance with the fundamental character of the country as a developing economy which is strategically located and has an archipelagic configuration.” Hence, expanding on some concepts from the document Human Security Now (Commission on Human Security, 2003), she asserts that “Philippine archipelagic security consists both of state security and human security interests….State security cannot be advanced without giving due attention to human security needs” (Baviera, 2005).

Foreign Concepts of National Security

The term “national security” became acceptable and widely used after World War II, especially among the Western Allies, led by the United States. (McLaurin, 1988) It was always a consideration in the context of threats to security, mostly from external sources arising from the many rising territorial and politico-ideological conflicts of the Cold War. Hence, it became very synonymous to the concept of (national) defense, which was predominantly focused on military responses and actions. Interestingly, US President Harry S. Truman, during his 1947 State of the Union Address, reminded the American people that “National security does not consist only of an army, a navy, and an air force….It depends on a sound economy…on civil liberties and human freedoms.” (Ibid., 1988)

Edward E. Azar and Chung-In Moon delineated four distinctive values directly associated with national security concerns in the Third World, namely: political and territorial survival, preservation of economic well-being and prosperity, organic survival of the national population, and communal harmony. (Azar and Chung-In, 1988)

The United Nations Centre for Regional Development (UNCRD) in Nagoya, Japan started to focus on human security and development (specially in the context of sub-national or regional development) since the turn of the century and millennium (2001) as a principal area of interest. Several volumes of its regular journal “Regional Development Dialogue” have featured recently the theme topic “Human Security”. Volume 22, Number 2, Autumn 2001 discusses “Human Security and National Development”, taking into account case studies of the Bicol Region in the Philippines, the Northeastern Region of Thailand, and the Yogyagarta Special Province in Indonesia. Conceptually, human security “comprises the prerequisites for economic security, food security, health security, personal security,
community security, and political security.” (Lanzona, 2001) This concept takes the welfare of human beings and their communities, rather than of the state as a whole, as the relevant measure of security. Volume 24, Number 2, Autumn 2003 highlights “Reflections on Human Security Now”, with a discussion on “Targeting Human Security and Ethical Governance in the Philippines” by Josefina S. Edralin and Cristino M. Collado. The authors cite former Philippine President Fidel Ramos’ concept of “comprehensive national security”, which was understood primarily in terms of both “defense against the armed challenges to the government and defense against the social, political, and economic threats that worked in insidious ways to undermine the security of the citizens and the nation as a whole.” (Edralin and Collado, 2003) They regarded the most significant threats to human security to include: hunger and food insecurity, crime and corruption. Volume 26, Number 1, Spring 2005 looks at “Human Security and Conflict Resolution”, featuring cases of modern conflicts that have threatened human security, including some in Africa, Central Asia, Israel-Palestine, and in Mexico. For human security to exist and thrive in a state, it must have achieved peace with its neighbors and peace among its various population groups. Hence, conflict-resolution must be actively undertaken, either through selected warfare to end the conflict, negotiated settlement including peace talks, and peace agreements that are implemented and monitored.

As far as the role of the State in national security is concerned SECURITY is considered a “public good”, i.e. a valuable collective or common good. (Loader and Walker, 2006) Being a “public good”, security has an instrumental dimension, where it serves as a “prerequisite to the effective liberty of individuals, which in turn is seen as a prerequisite to the good life, however conceived.” (Ibid.) It also has a social dimension, in that it is applicable to all members of society in the state. Finally, security has a constitutive dimension, since it is essential to the very concept or nature of “public or social good”. (Loader and Walker, Ibid.)

Development and Security

Frances Stewart of the Centre for Research on Inequality, Human Security and Ethnicity (CRISE), Queen Elizabeth House, Oxford University wrote “Development and Security” in April 2004, where she discussed the relationship between development and security, which she considers human security. The three hypothetical connections are: (1) “since human security comprises much of people’s or human wellbeing, it is logically an objective for development”; (2) “lack of human security has adverse consequences on growth and poverty and thereby on development” (Stewart 2004); and, (3) “lack of development, or imbalanced development that involves (creates) sharp horizontal inequalities, is an important
cause of conflict.” (Ibid.) Her research led to some conclusive observations that lack of development can stimulate conflict and social disorder, thereby increasing internal security threats, which in turn adversely affect the desired pace and levels of development. Therefore, in the planning for development it is only appropriate that considerations for advancing human security are taken into account and provided for.

The International Peace Academy published a report in May 2004 for its New York Seminar 2004 entitled “The Security-Development Nexus: Conflict, Peace and Development in the 21st Century”. It observes in its introductory discussions that “conflicts not only rupture a country’s development; they are often the consequence of a country’s developmental efforts.” (International Peace Academy, 2004) “Strengthening state institutions and enhancing their capacity to provide security and development based on principles of good governance” (Ibid.) contribute to successful conflict resolution and management. Likewise, “an effective, credible and accountable security sector” strengthens a stable and secure state environment for development to take place and advance, ensuring economic activities and healthy political dynamics.

In the final consideration, development and security are inextricably and symbiotically connected and related and interactive, such that one cannot prosper without the other. It is only fitting that any framework for development planning should immediately include considerations of and provisions for security.

David Simon and Carole Rakodi (Simon and Rakodi, 1990) discussed the future of prospects for regional planning in the concluding chapter of Simon’s edited compendium. They see a real need for revisiting the true nature of the State and how it acts in the interest of the citizens. There is the very basic need to contextualize (sub-national or regional) space in terms of economic, social, political and environmental realities, in order to rationalize the allocation and distribution of national resources and development activities. Also, the State must be careful about justifying the sometimes extreme exploitation (and abuse) of its resources to “promote national security and development”. (Here, there is no affirmation of the value of considering national security issues when doing regional development planning.) They called for regional development planning to be institutionalized and enhanced to accommodate the realities of globalization, on the one hand, and greater participation and engagement of local governments and organizations, on the other. There is the continuing concern for rural development and poverty alleviation, which are issues usually considered in national security enhancement.
The overall conclusion from the review of the foregoing literature, published and unpublished, is that there appears to be a real logical opportunity for development and security to be integrated in plans and actual programs and projects at the national, sub-national or regional, and local levels.

There appears to be a strong logical and symbiotic relationship between development and security. National development creates national prosperity as well as conditions for the stability and security of the citizenry, and vice versa. Thus, the more developed nations are, for the most part, more stable and secure and their citizens are better off economically than the least developed ones. On the other hand, national security allows for continuous national development and prosperity because a nation becomes continuously attractive to investors and investments from both local and foreign businesses and economic development-stimulating activities, when there are no threats or adverse conditions that would deter continuous normal business and operations. In the Philippines there has not yet been any comprehensive documentary study of regional development planning in the context of and vis-à-vis national security conditions and considerations. This investigative study supports the formal institutionalization of the inter-relationship and interactive dynamics of development and security in the Philippines.

The following model shows how the fields of governance, development, and security overlap in their common goals of promoting the well-being of the people. This framework can be considered by national security officials and professionals who carry out their tasks of safeguarding and advancing national security in the context of national/regional/local development. And, it will provide professional environmental (regional and urban) planners more understanding and appreciation of the dynamics between development and security. Hopefully, this should lead to some formal and institutionalized inclusion and integration of relevant internal security considerations in the current development planning frameworks being used by both the National Economic Development Authority (NEDA) national and regional offices, as well as local governments.
What integrates the development and security components together is Good Governance, that includes effective leadership, good planning and successful implementation of the plan. Good Governance of Development leads to Productivity and Sustainability. Good Governance with Security creates Peace and Public Order. Good Governance with Development supports Productivity and Sustainability. And, Good Governance with Development and Security enhances Prosperity that contributes to the overall Well-Being and Quality of Life of the Nation, the Region and the Local Government Area. Hence, the rationale for this succeeding framework illustration.

In order to establish the rationale for integrating national security into national/regional development planning in the Philippines, the conceptual framework (Figure 4) is used.
The traditional frameworks for development planning that have influenced the development planning frameworks of the NEDA for national and regional development and the DILG for local (provincial and city/municipal) development have focused mostly on socio-economic cum spatial development, i.e., locating, situating and distributing desired socio-economic growth and development in limited physical space over a prescribed period. However, in view of the current considerations of development and security happening simultaneously, a more realistic and logical framework inevitably must consider security realities and concerns in the official development plan document. This was something officially done by the recent Arroyo Administration in its Medium Term Philippine Development Plan (MTPDP) (Chapter 14, National Harmony: The Peace Process;
Chapter 15, National Harmony: Healing the Wounds of EDSA; and, Chapter 23, Defense Against Threats of National Security) for 2004 – 2010 and has been repeated in the Philippine Development Plan (PDP) of President Benigno S. Aquino III for 2011 – 2016 (Chapter 9, Peace and Security). What needs to be explored and proposed are practical and ready-to-undertake-processes for permanently institutionalizing security considerations and appropriate actions in the development plan and planning process.

The conceptual framework for development and security addresses the need of the military and defense establishments to end the decades-long insurgency and separatism and terrorism using the principal strategy of the current National Internal Security Plan (Bayanihan, Internal Peace and Security Plan) of WAGING PEACE.

The significance of the regional development plans is that they serve as the logical and best links of the grand national plan for the Philippines’ development to the local development plans in the provinces and cities and municipalities in the regions. They provide the regional spatial frameworks that guide and influence the growth of local governments and their areas, on the one hand, and they reflect the development aspirations of the local governments for the region and the nation, on the other.

Many of the security problems and threats are happening locally, and must be addressed at that operational level. On a collective basis, however, they cover regional or sub-regional areas and must be strategically addressed. Hence, it becomes very logical and practical to include security considerations and appropriate interventions in regional development plans for strategic reasons as well as local development plans for operational reasons.

This study is a forward step in establishing a regional development-cum-security plan in an integrated framework. It pursues the philosophy of the DAP’s development and security paradigm, which posits that development and security are intertwined and inter-related, i.e. melded. At the same time, it is congruent with the earlier advocacy of President Ferdinand Marcos to integrate and institutionalize development and security as a philosophical frame, through Presidential Decree 859 of December 23, 1975, wherein he revises Presidential Decree 107 of July 1973, which created NEDA, to include the Secretary of National Defense as a NEDA Board Member, to “ensure peace and order” for development. For unexplained reasons, PD 859 was never implemented. This advocacy is again reiterated by Presidential Order 852 of December 3, 1982, “Providing for More Effective Coordination between National Development and Security Operations”. Moreover,
he created Peace and Order Councils through Executive Order 727 of September 10, 1981, at the National, Regional and Local levels, to ensure that attention and action are focused on ensuring peace and order continuously for development.

National Security Plans

Prior to the Administration of President Gloria Arroyo, her predecessors had their own respective AFP plans to address the internal security threats of the local Communist insurgency and the Muslim separatist movement. Under President Ferdinand Marcos, AFP had OPLAN KATATAGAN. Under President Corazon Aquino it had OPLAN MAMAMAYAN and OPLAN LAMBAT BITAG I and II. Under President Fidel Ramos it had OPLAN LAMBAT BITAG III and OPLAN KAISAGANAAN. The AFP during the short presidency of President Joseph Estrada has OPLAN MAKABAYAN and OPLAN BALANGAI. All these Counter Insurgency (COIN) plans are discussed in detail in the graduate group paper of AFP Col. Arthur Biyo, Lt.Col. Augusto Gaite, Lt.Cmdr. Juario Marayag, Col. Jose Antonio Carlos Motril, and Col. Alan Rojo at the Development Academy of the Philippines in March 2011 on “THE ARMED FORCES OF THE PHILIPPINES CLEAR – HOLD – CONSOLIDATE – DEVELOP (CH-CD) METHODOLOGY: An Analytical Revisit.”

In 2001, after the September 11 bombing of the World Trade Center Twin Towers in New York by Islamic terrorists, the Arroyo Administration developed a National Internal Security Plan (NISP) for implementation in the Philippines. It basically called for a joint strategy of defense and military-police initiatives together with development and civic action in the campaign against insurgency and terrorism. It also provided for convergence areas and programs for joint defense-security and development programs, especially in suspected insurgent communities and potential terrorist lairs. The program KALAHI-CIDDS (Kapit Bisig Laban sa Kahirapan – Comprehensive and Integrated Delivery of Social Services) of the Department of Social Welfare and Development (DSWD) was mandated to provide the “real works” in a challenged setting. For some unexplained reasons, however, the NISP was never formally launched nor fully implemented. Nonetheless, it continued to be referred to, updated and interpreted by various defense and security officials.

In 2001, President Arroyo created an interim Cabinet Oversight Committee for Internal Security (COCIS), replacing what used to be known as Cabinet Cluster E during the terms of President Ramos and President Estrada. (COCIS was abolished in 2003.) During its brief existence, COCIS produced a “National Internal Security
Plan” (NISP, 2001), which advocated for the close interaction of internal security units at the regional and local levels (i.e., the Area Coordinating Centers) to link up with the regional development and local development councils where they operate. It appeared to be along the lines of the directive made by former President Marcos in 1982 (E.O. No. 852 of December 3, 2002). In the proposed NISP the NEDA Director-General was included in COCIS. COCIS was supposed to be steered by an Executive Committee, which included the Presidential Adviser for Regional Development. (NISP, 2001).

The NISP framework, which proposed a separate AREA COORDINATING CENTER, at the various levels of local government (i.e., regional, provincial, municipal/city, and barangay) was not popular among LGU officials because the approach was perceived to be strongly military, so that in a short time the plan was deactivated. Instead, the National Government opted to use the KALAHI-CIDDS framework implemented by DSWD in collaboration with local governments. In this framework, the military served a supportive role, principally to ensure peace and security.

The 2006 (second) official version of NISP circulated by the Department of National Defense (DND) advanced the BANTAY LAYA II approach to containing communist insurgency, Muslim separatism and terrorism involving a CLEAR – HOLD – CONSOLIDATE – DEVELOP strategy: CLEAR the affected areas of enemies and threats through combined military and police operations; HOLD and CONSOLIDATE the cleared areas principally through police and local government efforts; and, DEVELOP the cleared areas through the initiatives of the local governments, the various national government agencies, and the private sector and civil society.

The political offensive for resolving conflict and pursuing peace as well as the economic offensive for poverty alleviation through LGU-situated development are some of the principles and conditions of NEDA’s National Framework for Regional Development. (“Peace is a prerequisite to development.”)

To support these offensives, the National Government initiated three key programs in the e-NISP: (1) demobilization, disarmament, reintegration; (2) amnesty for rebel returnees; and, (3) human rights.

After her re-election in May 2004, President Arroyo’s re-crafted MTPDP for 2004-2010 reiterated the basic themes that were advanced in the 2001-2004 MTPDP, summarized in five major thrusts: economic growth and job creation; energy development; enhancing social justice and responding to basic needs;
improving education and enhancing youth opportunities; and, good governance and anti-corruption. It also specifically iterated strategies for pursuing national security vis-à-vis national development.

The MTPDP 2004-2010 included specifically the provision for national security considerations for national and regional development. Four chapters specifically address the promotion of national security vis-à-vis development. Chapter 14 (National Harmony: The Peace Process) addressed and sought to end the various decades-long conflicts with separatist and insurgent organizations in various regions of the Philippines, including the Moro Islamic Liberation Front (MILF) in Mindanao, the Communist Party of the Philippines and New People’s Army (CPP-NPA) nationwide, and the various Communist breakaway groups, notably the Rebolusyonaryong Partidong Manggagawa ng Pilipinas – Revolutionary People’s Army – Alex Boncayao Brigade (RPMP-RPA-ABB) in some provinces. Chapter 15 (National Harmony: Healing the Wounds of EDSA) recognized the urgent need to achieve reconciliation among the various antagonists of the past two (2) EDSA revolts, in 1986 and 2001. The unresolved and continuing political and social conflicts continue to divide the nation and make it even more difficult to advance programs for development and prosperity. Chapter 16 (Basic Need: Peace and Order) addressed the peace and order problems that prevent the advancement of economic development, notably: terrorism, criminality (e.g., kidnapping, robberies, rampant smuggling, illegal drug trading, and street crimes) and iterated strategies for how to counteract them. Chapter 23 (Defense Against Threats to National Security) focused on the reforms urgently needed by the Defense Sector to strengthen the Armed Forces of the Philippines against local insurgency and other national security threats, including external ones. This was the first time that the Philippine Government officially links “national development planning” and “national security” in its MTPDP.

The 2009 revised version of the NEDA 2004-2010 MTPDP expanded the chapters focused on promoting security and peace and order. (NEDA MTPDP 2004-2010, 2009). Chapter 14 covered the “Strategic Framework: National Peace Plan 2008-2010”. Chapter 15 focused on “Healing Divisions in Society.” Chapter 16 covered “Peace and Order”. And, Chapter 23 was directed on “Defense Against Threats to National Security.” This expansion from three to five chapters is indicative of the value and priority importance given by NEDA to Peace and Security as key factors for national development.

The PHILIPPINE DEVELOPMENT PLAN for 2011-2016 of President Aquino devoted Chapter 09 to Peace and Security. Its strategic objectives included:
• Winning the Peace through the Internal Peace and Security Plan – BAYANIHAN that promotes PAMANA (Payapa at Masaganang Pamayanan Program);
• Ensuring National Security with a strong and capable Armed Forces of the Philippines and the Philippine National Police, one of whose goals is “to support national development programs by securing and protecting critical infrastructures and facilities, and other high value projects of the public and private sector.”

One approach that the Philippine Government has engaged to address the challenge of introducing security and development in conflict-marred communities is KALAYAAN BARANGAY. The Kalayaan Barangays Program or KALAHI para sa Kalayaan is government’s national program aiming to finally put an end to the decades old problem of communist insurgency in the country and usher in peace and development in these poverty-stricken rural barangays. It is in line with government’s goal of rehabilitation and development of conflict affected areas as contained in chapter 14 of the Medium-Term Philippine Development Plan for 2004-2010 or the National Peace Plan. (OPAPP, 2006)

The program has as its ultimate goal the achievement of sustainable peace in the community following the human security framework of freedom from want, freedom from fear, freedom from humiliation and exclusion. Specifically, it sought to:

- empower the target barangays to be able to build and sustain peace and development;
- restore and strengthen formal governance institutions and maintain peace and security in the area; and
- fast-track the delivery of government’s commitment under signed final peace agreements.

For its part, the Armed Forces of the Philippines has developed approaches to address insurgency by balancing military campaigns with development initiatives, involving the cooperation of host local government officials. The fundamental principle for these counter-insurgency programs of the Armed Forces of the Philippines is the previously discussed strategy of CLEAR-HOLD-CONSOLIDATE-DEVELOP (CHCD) prescribed in the Enhanced National Internal Security Plan (E-NISP) of 2006. (Classified AFP Bantay Laya Review Report, 2007) The C-H-C-D principle calls first for the military to clear insurgent-controlled areas using armed combat, then hold and consolidate the affected community together in order for it to be developed by providing basic services and introducing income-generating activities for the residents, particularly by the local governments and

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other development agencies of national government.

It is evident in the assessments of the AFP Counter-Insurgency (COIN) Programs that military campaign (i.e., defense-security component) must always be balanced with development activities, especially to make the affected communities eventually self-sustaining and not reliant on military presence. Interestingly, the Armed Forces of the Philippines has formally included “SUPPORT TO DEVELOPMENT” as one of its seven strategic priorities. To institutionalize this commitment, it established a NATIONAL DEVELOPMENT SUPPORT COMMAND (NDSC) in September 2007. The unit undertakes infrastructure projects “as directed by the national leadership in support of national development to transform conflict-affected communities into peace and development areas through accelerated barangay-focused rehabilitation and development.” This command was short-lived and de-activated on May 3, 2012, during the retirement day of its last Commander, Maj. General Carlos Holganza.

In the context of the holistic approach and whole of government approach mentioned previously, the Philippine military takes charge of the clear and hold phases while civilian agencies of the national government as well as local government units and executives take care of the consolidate and develop phases, with the Armed Forces apparently performing a support role in such efforts.

Indeed, national security for the Philippines is closely linked with national development. The National Security Council notes that development involves the “creation of value and wealth and its distribution in a manner that motivates all to create more value and wealth on a sustained basis”. Consequently, national security pertains to the creation of the physical and policy environment that allows the creation and distribution of value and wealth. Wealth simply cannot be created where insecurity among the people persists or fear for one’s life dominates.

In December 2010 the DND, the AFP, and the NSC announced the revised approaches to security and development with the Internal Peace and Security Plan - Bayanihan (IPSP-Bayanihan) replacing the previous Administration’s E-NISP.

The previous E-NISP was characterized by a WHOLE OF GOVERNMENT APPROACH, towards addressing the decades’ old problem of insurgency with an inter-governmental cooperation for development by agencies at the national, regional and local levels. It emphasized the need to converge the activities of appropriate agencies in affected areas (those overcoming insurgency), usually clusters of barangays. It was an integration of all previous Lambat Bitag approaches of previous administrations into the Kalayaang Barangay paradigm.
The current IPSP (BAYANIWHAN) expands the previous WHOLE OF GOVERNMENT paradigm into a WHOLE OF NATION and people-centered framework, which engages not only the government and public agencies, but also includes non-government stakeholders, such as private enterprises, non-government organizations, academia, and the community. Furthermore, the PURSUIT OF PEACE is the principal strategic objective of Bayanihan. President Aquino, in his Memorandum No.6 of 2010, “Directing the Formulation of the National Security Policy and National Security Strategy for 2010-2016”, required that it “draws information from the regions, considering regional development, strategies and local security needs.” This National Security Policy “shall provide the enabling environment conducive to development.” Its major concerns include internal and external issues.

At present the AFP is undertaking a review of the IPSP in terms of its feasible implementation, specially at the local grassroots level. Some clarificatory discussions have been quietly initiated between AFP J-3 (Deputy Staff for Operations) and the Development Academy of the Philippines. Some issues that have cropped up pertain to the “Whole of Nation approach” vs the older “Whole of Government approach” of the previous E-NISP. A particular issue has to do with the mobilization and use of resources: Who is in control? Is it the Government or its NGO partners? Also, in terms of planning programs and projects, which group takes the lead, the Government or the NGO partners? In this regard, the much advanced IPSP has yet to showcase success experiences.

The “Whole of Government” Approach basically means that there is effective inter-agency collaboration from planning to implementation of the program policy actions. The “Whole of Nation” Approach is more challenging as it requires smooth and effective collaboration both among the Government agencies and Non-Government Stakeholders and among themselves. The latest adopted approach requires efficient inter-organizational/agency inter-operability, a concept and practice that was made popular by Pres. George W. Bush after the September 11, 2001 terrorist attacks on the World Trade Center Twin Towers in New York City. Inter-agency inter-operability is a sophisticated systematic process of instant connectivity and quick decision-making derived from computer systems functioning. The instant connectivity through efficient computer systems network provides decision-makers and planners with needed information to make quick decisions and plans.

Still another issue of the shift from E-NISP to IPSP is the military and police long-standing strategy of pursuing elements who are hostile to the Government and seek its destruction, namely the communist insurgents and their affiliates and the
separatist Moro Islamic Liberation Front. IPSP advocates for the more expanded use of negotiations and non-armed dialogues between the Government and the elements hostile to it. There are varying degrees of reservations by the military and the police regarding “staying passive for the peace process” even as the insurgents and separatists continue their armed operations against the Government. A particular case in point is the Al Barka incident in Basilan where 19 soldiers of the Special Forces who were undergoing special training were ambushed and killed by MILF troops.

**Integrating Security to Development Planning**

In view of the conclusive need to formally integrate security considerations into regional development planning and institutionalize the practice, it is appropriate to mainstream security then into the development planning framework and process at the national, regional and local levels. This study focuses on the regional development planning level, which serves as the key link to cascade down to the local government development plans the priorities of the national development plan. Furthermore, it is the regional development plan that integrates all of the local development aspirations in its area of coverage. Hence, mainstreaming of security is proposed with the regional development plan.

The long-running insurgency and Muslim separatist activities in the Philippines have been taking place in localities of regions, making it necessary to respond to them both locally and regionally. The reality of the Communist insurgency and the Muslim separatist activities is that they operate in regional and sub-regional fronts for strategic purposes and they conduct their political and combat activities in provinces and localities. Their local and regional revolutionary activities undoubtedly are threats to the security of the regions where their presence is strong, thereby causing challenges to actual and potential development investments, actual and planned socio-economic activities, and the region’s peace and order.

Recognizing that these security conditions are present in some, if not all, of the regions of the Philippines, mainstreaming security (focusing on addressing armed insurgency and conflicts using a basic framework) is a very practical and useful outcome of this long study.

Mainstreaming has become a practical approach for national and international programs and projects to embed and institutionalize in their existing frameworks and approaches additional considerations that have become necessary...
and relevant at a specific period, or on a continuing basis. In the Philippines, the more recent and popular causes to be mainstreamed into national, regional and local development plans are gender and development, disaster risk reduction, and climate change.

The mainstreaming of security in development plans and programs is a recent activity of the United Nations Trust Fund for Human Security (2009). It is an ambitious attempt to include considerations and provisions for comprehensive Human Security which includes: economic security, food security, health security, environmental security, personal security, community security, and political security.

In the Philippines, the mainstreaming of Gender and Development and Disaster Risk Reduction in development planning has been effected. NEDA and the National Commission on the Role of Filipino Women published in 2004 “Harmonized Gender and Development Guidelines for Project Development, Implementation, Monitoring and Evaluation” with the assistance of United Nations Development Programme and the Asian Development Bank. It was a sequel to their “Mainstreaming Gender in Development Planning: Framework and Guidelines” of 2002, with assistance from the Canadian International Development Agency (CIDA). Through these official guidelines, all development plans are enjoined to include Gender and Development considerations and appropriate provisions. For mainstreaming Disaster Risk Reduction cum Climate Change in development planning, NEDA published in 2008, with support from the United Nations Development Programme (UNDP) and the European Commission Humanitarian Aid, “Mainstreaming Disaster Risk Reduction in Sub-National Development Land Use/ Physical Planning in the Philippines” cognizant of the continuing disasters that plague the nation, especially brought about by climate change. In July 2009 the Congress of the Philippines enacted Republic Act No. 9729, “An Act Mainstreaming Climate Change into Government Policy Formulations, Establishing the Framework Strategy and Program on Climate Change, Creating for This Purpose the Climate Change Commission, and for Other Purposes”. Relevant to this is the ADB publication in January 2010 of Peter King’s “Mainstreaming Climate Change into National Development Planning – A Training Manual”.

Useful to understanding mainstreaming is NEDA’s framework to mainstream Disaster Risk Reduction and Climate Change Adaptation. It provides a clear process for integrating to the National and Regional Development Planning frameworks the now popular and much needed Disaster Risk Reduction and Climate Change Adaptation.
1. Framework for Mainstreaming Peace and Security into National and Sub-National (Regional and Local) Development Planning in the Immediate Future

Since there are already existing mainstreamed programs, in varying degrees, about Food Security, Health Security, Economic Security, Personal Security, Community Security, Disaster Risk Reduction, Climate Change and Gender and Development in the National/Regional and Local Development Plans of the Philippine, this framework for mainstreaming Peace and Security is recommended.

The mainstreaming of Security will be an add-on to the current existing frameworks for National and Regional Development Planning, namely, NEDA’s

1. Guidelines for the Formulation of the Medium-Term Development Plan and Medium-Term Public Investment Program (Prepared as a basic framework for the Philippine Development Plan of every new administration)
2. Philippine Development Planning Matrices (Prepared as a basic framework for the Philippine Development Plan of every new administration)

The proposed strategic intervention of this paper is not to create an entirely new framework that is “imposed” on the development planning framework, but rather to introduce the mainstreaming through existing entry points where the “embedding” or formal inclusion will happen. Hence, it shall not be as complicated and sophisticated like the mainstreaming of DRR. The mainstreaming of security, focusing on addressing armed insurgency and conflicts will be more simple and easier to undertake. There is a desire that the insurgency and conflict threats will sooner than later be resolved through the Government’s peace process, which is being carried out by the Government’s Peace Panel.

As a start, the Analytical Framework of AFP J2 can be adopted to evaluate the threat situation of a region, province, city, municipality or barangay. This requires a clearance from the AFP and approval of the Secretary of National Defense.

In the Guidelines for the Formulation of the Medium-Term Development Plan and Medium-Term Public Investment Program, the incumbent NEDDA Director General – Economic Planning Secretary should permanently include and require a chapter or section on PEACE AND SECURITY FOR DEVELOPMENT, that complements the PEACE AND SECURITY Chapter of the appropriate PHILIPPINE
DEVELOPMENT PLAN RESULTS MATRICES for the particular planning period, the next one being 2017 – 2022. It will be along the “GUIDELINES FOR THE FORMULATION OF THE MEDIUM-TERM PHILIPPINE DEVELOPMENT PLAN AND MEDIUM-TERM PUBLIC INVESTMENT PROGRAM, 2010 – 2016”, where one of the agenda shall be on PEACE AND SECURITY to advance continuing development and prosperity. It shall be concerned with three principal outcomes:

1. Permanent end to all internal armed conflicts involving Communists, Muslim separatists and other political insurgents, secessionists and terrorists that promotes and ensures peace in the regions;
2. Continuing public safety and order that has minimized criminality and political violence and other ethnic or cultural conflicts; and,
3. Harmonious external relations with other nations, especially our neighbors.

For practical reasons, the considerations for environmental security (i.e., disaster risk reduction and calamity preparedness) shall be included in a separate domain focusing principally on physical environmental security.

In this regard, a general framework is proposed that will permanently and continuously embed the integration/mainstreaming of security into national and regional development planning processes. Hopefully, this will also cascade down to the local development planning of local governments.
In January 1995 NEDA issued GUIDELINES FOR THE PREPARATION OF THE REGIONAL PHYSICAL FRAMEWORK PLAN, that provides, what former NEDA Secretary Cielito Habito describes as “a ready, handy reference for…regional planners.” (Ibid.) Specific interventions to mainstream Peace and Security recommended are as follows:

1. In Chapter 3.0, RPFP: Plan Formulation Process, an eleventh item, Peace and Security Situation, should be added into Section 3.2 Detailed Surveys and Planning Studies (Page 15). To be researched and shown on standard regional development planning maps are summarized fundings:
   a. Ideological conflicts and insurgency (size, location, events, etc.)
   b. Public Order and Safety (criminality, dispensation of justice, police services, etc.)
   c. Political, Cultural and/or Ethnic Violence
   d. Peace and Order Council effectiveness

   The original existing topics are: (1) Regional/sub-regional physical characteristics, (2) Population size and distribution, (3) Urbanization and settlement patterns, (4) Regional/sub-regional economy and employment distribution, (5) Land use patterns and changes, (6) Transportation systems, (7) Infrastructure facilities and social services, (8) Environmental management, (9) Physical, economic and policy constraints, and, (10) Development administration capability.

2. In its Annex B. REGIONAL PHYSICAL FRAMEWORK PLAN ANNOTATED OUTLINE, Section II. BASES OF THE PLAN (Pages 39 – 44) shall include a new Item, L. PEACE AND SECURITY SITUATION, which includes statistics and maps of the elements presented previously. A sample of the peace and security map is the map produced at J2-IRAD about the security situation in the regions.

3. In Annex C-1.1. Worksheet 1.1. CHECKLIST OF AVAILABLE REGIONAL DATA (Pages 59 – 60), replace the current Item 5 (which will become Item 6) with a new topic REGIONAL PEACE, SECURITY AND PUBLIC ORDER, featuring
   a. Ideological conflicts and insurgency-influenced LGUs, including size of insurgency forces;
   b. Criminality and disposition of justice per LGU, including crime levels and handling of criminality by the Philippine National Police and the Department of Justice systems;
   c. Political, cultural and/or ethnic violence per LGU;
   d. General activities of the Regional and Local Peace and Order
Councils, whether active and effective, inactive and ineffective

4. In Annex C-5.1, Worksheet 5.1. A SIMPLE GOALS-ACHIEVEMENT MATRIX EVALUATION TECHNIQUE’s Attachment 5.1.a. SUGGESTED GAM EVALUATION CRITERIA and Table 5.1.a. SAMPLE EVALUATION MATRIX Item 6 should focus on PEACE, SECURITY AND PUBLIC ORDER (Pages 127 – 131), posing these questions:

a. What ideological and other conflicts should be addressed and ended peacefully and what insurgent-influenced municipalities of the region should be weaned and how?

b. What widespread existing and/or continuing crimes should be addressed and solved and how? What problems of disposition of justice should be addressed and how? In what municipalities of the region?

c. What continuing organized violence (political, cultural and/or ethnic) should be addressed and solved and how in what municipalities?

An overall outcome of this new review is that the PEACE AND SECURITY goals of the region shall be logically inter-related with the other goals that correspond to other components of the UN Human Security framework. PEACE AND SECURITY shall correspond to the STATE SECURITY aspects of the Human Security Framework.

2. Institutional Changes for Mainstreaming Peace and Security in Development Planning

A. The NEDA Board should be expanded to include the Secretary of National Defense as a bona fide member, congruent to the rationale of President Marcos’ PD 859 of 1975 and to ensure that security and defense matters affecting and contributing to development are continuously considered by the planners at the national and regional and local levels.

B. At the regions, the close interaction of the Regional Development Council and the Regional Peace and Order Council should be permanently institutionalized to ensure the enhancement of development and security there. For this reason, it is appropriate that the NEDA Regional Director, who serves permanently as the Regional Development Council Vice Chair, be a permanent member of the Regional Peace and Order Council. In turn, the sitting RPOC Chairman shall be a permanent member of the
Regional Development Council.

C. At the local levels, the Executive Officer/Director or Administrator of the Local Development Council shall immediately sit as a permanent member of the Local Peace and Order Council. At the same time, the Local POC Head shall sit as a permanent member of the Local Development Council.

3. Conceptual Framework for Mainstreaming Security in Development

Taking into account the mainstreaming frameworks and processes prescribed in NEDA’s new frameworks to mainstream Gender and Development and Disaster Risk Reduction in development planning and development plans, the following conceptual framework is offered for consideration and adoption, the details of which for implementation will be the focus and function of a future study.

**Figure 5.** Proposed Conceptual Framework for Integrated and Comprehensive Development and Security Plan (National, Regional, Local)
The methods for integrating and mainstreaming can be derived from the current NEDA Guidelines for mainstreaming Disaster Risk Reduction and Climate Change Adaptation. In addition, the analytical framework of the UN Trust Fund for Human Security and the AFP Analytical Framework for Assessment of Area Security Threats are very useful to determine priority problems and consequent solutions.

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The Anthropology of National Security: TOWARDS THE DEVELOPMENT OF A NEW EPISTEMOLOGY

Chester B. Cabalza *

The Anthropology of National Security dissects the evolving ties between anthropology and the military. The development of this new epistemology originated at a time when anthropology, as a developing science, was used as a “handmaiden of colonialism” since the 19th century. Although, military power in pursuit of security interests is much older. The construction of this new discourse is relevant in the study of people, culture, and society in today’s deterritorialized world. In particular, Filipinos must acquire a culture of respected national character and national morale that are fundamental to metaphysically build an infrastructure to nationhood propounded by our great ancestors. This vision which was adequately foreseen by revolutionary generals and past leaders in our history is slowly laying a golden map to fortify Filipinos psycho-social and socio-cultural imaginings away from persistent colonial mentality. This vision of greatness must be executed in a grand manner based on the vintage designs of our great ancestors to generally inculcate a sense of pride in Filipinos of today and tomorrow.

Introduction

One of the grave contraventions of anthropology, academically translated as the study of humans, especially when it was concocted as a distinct discipline and perceptibly a product of western scholarship, is how it played with the subjugation process by western powers on their colonies. Henceforth, ties between anthropology and the military are old ones. The science originated as a “handmaiden of colonialism” since 19th century.


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much interest, notable examples of anthropology’s sub-branches are forensic anthropology, medical anthropology, paleontology, primatology, sociobiology, economic anthropology, environmental anthropology, legal and political anthropology, maritime anthropology, classical and historical archaeology, garbology, underwater archaeology, historical linguistics, and ethnology to name a few. But there is a wide gamut of anthropological ontology and epistemologies that are coupling with centuries old medieval disciplines and birthing with a new scientific body of knowledge hence.

Contrary to comprehensive subjects under the academic realm of anthropology, common people and misinformed individuals would only explicitly associate the discipline of anthropology to culture; albeit, anthropology may seemingly be deemed as the science of culture. To support the logic, a classical definition of culture was provided by Edward Tylor in 1871 as, “that complex whole which includes knowledge, beliefs, law, morals, customs, and any other capabilities and habits acquired by a person as a member of a society.”

That 19th century definition of culture explicitly highlights holism of the emerging academic discipline of anthropology; impliedly expanding its theoretical and methodological scopes in succeeding centuries as the scientific study of human culture. Henceforth, as anthropology now poses itself globally as a stand-alone scholastic and mature scientific body of knowledge on modern human’s biological and cultural aspects, at par with other social sciences and humanities, and oftentimes with hard sciences because of physical anthropology and archaeology; it has also branched out to be identified with the arching systemic study of national security.

In light of the development of socio-cultural dimension of national security in the Philippines, the curriculum that was developed by the Ad Hoc Committee of the National Defense College of the Philippines (NDCP) in 1963 which envisioned the product of the College to be “general” material in the Armed Forces of the Philippines (AFP), was primarily based on the curricula of the National War College and the Industrial College of the Armed Forces of the United States. Presidential Decree 190 bestowed the NDCP with power to confer the Master in National Security Administration (MNSA) upon its graduates. But originally, instead of the socio-cultural dimension of national security, a three-unit psycho-social foundations course was offered to virtually expose students to Philippine cultural values and the Filipino psyche.

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1 Tylor (1871, reprint 1958) p.2.
In retrospect, under the branch of social anthropology, culture and personality is one of its sub-fields that may cover the mantle of psycho-social foundations, heavily propounded by female anthropologists like Margaret Mead and Ruth Benedict during the 20th century at the height of the propagation of American school of thought in anthropology.

Ironically, in the narrative of a famous Filipino anthropologist, anthropology has been persistently defined as the study of man and the behavior of man. However, when the female liberation movement was organized, the women protested on the scope of the discipline focusing only on the study of man or simply male hegemony. To accommodate the complaint, anthropology was defined as “the study of man embracing woman” in the context of providing significance to Filipino values in terms of national security (Jocano, 1980).

In the discourse of national security, it is not surprising to learn that security in Chinese character is referred to as 安 (ān xián) from the etymology of a woman 女 (nǚ) in the house 宀 (mián). This calligraphic representation of woman in the Chinese culture hypothetically places Chinese women with high-esteem supported by Mao Zedong’s political decree, referring to them as those “holding up half the sky” in the Chinese society.

Psychology has also links to sociology and anthropology. Psychology studies the mind, mental processes, and individual behavior, including the phenomena such as perception, attitudes and values, personality and mental aberration or illness; however, socio-cultural dimension studies the broader aspect of personality development. Furthermore, sociology started as the study of the problems besetting western societies after the Industrial and French revolutions and of advanced and contemporary societies. While anthropology looks at the whole of humanity and studies various societies in different historical and geographical setting.

The common denominators of the disciplines of anthropology, psychology, and sociology when translated into the domain of national security are security interests. Interests are constructed through a process of social interaction. Security interests are defined by actors who respond to cultural factors. This does not mean that power, conventionally understood as material capabilities, is unimportant for an analysis of national security (Katzenstein, 1996).

Needless to say that from late 20th century to the second decade of the 21st century, anthropological and sociological studies are side by side, symbiotic, and

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interdependent, dominating the discourses of culture, society, and national security; hence, socio-cultural dimension may be considered as one of national security’s most important and primordial core courses, the heart and soul of national security today.

**Militarization of Anthropology**

The iota of militarization of anthropology alarms people, misjudging the history of the discipline as a *sine qua non* of colonialism and imperialism. During World War I (WWI), respected American anthropologist Franz Boas became very critical when a number of anthropologists were enlisted to assist military and intelligence community through his powerful missive, “Anthropologists as Spies,” charging that four American anthropologists abused their professional research positions by conducting espionage in Central America.

At the height of World War II (WWII), British and American colonizers sent anthropologists to their colonies to study culture, kinship, and networks of various colorful societies and ‘uncivilized’ tribes unwittingly described by often ‘racist’ and ethnocentric anthropologists (however, notice how derogatory and politically-incorrect terms were used to describe peoples and their societies in the past, as interpreted in present-day discourse). Unknown to the locals, their military tall order would be an assignment for deployment in isolated hinterlands to act as spies. Nevertheless in today’s anthropological convention, espionage entered the academic circles’ debate on whether it is ethical or not to allow scholars and scientists like anthropologists in military and intelligence operations.

For instance in the Philippines, Dean Worcester, a zoologist and an accidental anthropologist through his early scientific expeditions in the country wrote an influential book supported by texts and photographs about the Philippine Islands and the Filipinos in 1898 which paved way for his appointment as a Commissioner consecutively to the Schurman and Taft Commissions by President William McKinley, the last US President to have served the American Civil War. His controversial writings and lectures, particularly his photographs of naked tribal peoples are adamantly questioned today by scholars. On the other hand, his contentious black and white photographs were later on used to illustrate census of the Philippines. It was also preserved for scientific records but framed through the divisive racial classification and evolutionary paradigms.

Worcester was recognized as an expert in early Philippine Studies from the *etic* or outsider’s/colonizer’s point of view during his time and shaped much
the regime’s internal administration. His appointment as a high ranking public administrator during the American Insular Government in the Philippines was of great help especially in 1899 to 1902 when the Philippine-American War broke out which took more lives of American soldiers than during the American-Spanish War in early 1898. His stint as Secretary of Interior from 1901 until his resignation in 1913, oversaw a number of government bureaus on agriculture, forestry, government laboratories, health, mining, weather, and the Non-Christian Tribes which was later renamed as the Ethnological Survey of the Philippines Office. He remained a controversial American administrator during his tenure and expressed his strong stances to perpetuate the US responsibility to ‘civilize’ its brown colonial subjects.

As a classical practice, anthropologists sent on mission would by chance, marry local/s as part of their rapport and immersion in the community during their fieldwork. To cite an example, H. Otley Beyer, the father of Philippine anthropology and archaeology, did marry an Ifugao ethnic had for his fieldwork. Beyer was interested strictly in typological and distributional studies based on culture-historical contexts; he had also strongly shaped or influenced the academia, especially in the track of peopling of the Philippines through his pioneering yet controversial migration theory, later on debunked by local and foreign anthropologists (Bellwood and Chang, 1995; Jocano, 1998; Solheim, 2006) working on the same area of research interest and study.

Two prominent female anthropologists, Ruth Benedict and Margaret Mead, shared sphere of influence and expertise after their influential, popular, and best-selling writings to reverberate the role of anthropologists in high-level policymaking as their grit for cross-cultural policy recommendations were observed at war time. Ruth Benedict, then Head of the Basic Analysis Section of the Bureau of Overseas Intelligence of the United States’ Office of War Information (OWI), advised President Theodore Roosevelt by the time Japan lost the war to the US in WWII, not to dethrone the emperor of Japan to allow the continuity of the divine monarchy of the Rising Sun.

Margaret Mead for her part, headed the National Research Council’s Committee on Food Habits. This committee applied anthropological methods to problems of food distribution and preparation in war-affected countries. During WWII, anthropologists used the techniques they had developed in small-scale societies. By gathering information from immigrants to the US, as well as from published sources and films, they studied culture “at a distance.” Such research was used to guide government and military policy, to further cooperation among wartime allies, and to plan for a postwar world. Similar studies continued after the
war with the Research in Contemporary Cultures project, which was led by Mead after Ruth Benedict’s death in 1948.4

Instances of archaeological shenanigans in pursuit of fascist principles of German-Austrian supreme ideals were also perpetuated during the Second World War when Adolf Hitler stringently commanded his team of archaeologists to fabricate artifacts and excavation sites to uphold and underscore the make-believe “Aryan” race. At that time, a breed of highly-trained and specialized anthropologists called Nazi archaeologists prevailed in Germany, as they were espoused to rapid scientific and technological advances aimed at attaining hegemonic power in Europe and across the Pacific. On the other hand, the same strategic maneuvering was outdid by Saddam Hussein during the Gulf War, as he tried to annex Kuwait to his former country’s glory using archeological and anthropological foundations inspired by the Mesopotamian civilization, with present-day Iraq as cradle of the early recorded civilization in west Asia, in which tiny oil-rich Kuwait is only a part of it.

Furthermore, strategic value of vernacular language was also used during wars like when the US Marines had to protect Navajo code talkers in Saipan during World War II. As a practice, top diplomats, United Nations translators, commissioned scholars, and military strategists learned languages of war-torn countries for diplomatic and strategic purposes; or trendsetting in the evolving dominance of major languages for defense, diplomacy, and trade in the global arena. Since the rise of the west, French, Dutch, German, Spanish, and English are used for major transactions in all facets of negotiations in the world; but because civilization-state China is fast resurging, evidenced by its unprecedented and tremendous economic success, emerging political sphere of influence, and increasing soft power or cultural global clout, now Chinese Mandarin is arguably posed to challenge English as the world’s lingua franca in the future.

The epistemologies on linear or cyclical social evolution and ethnological research like the rise of bands, tribes, early cities, civilizations, nations, states, and from primitive to complex structure of societies appealed much to more classical anthropologists, sociologists, and other thinkers of 19th century as they postulated their own tried and tested theoretical frameworks and concepts, inspired by 18th century Enlightenment period in Europe (Marx and Engels, 1845; Spencer, 1860; Tylor, 1871; Morgan, 1877; Durkheim, 1895; Boas, 1911; Freud, 1913; Mauss, 1922).

American, British, and French schools of thought observing the changing structural functionalism of modern societies founded their own concepts and fields of expertise with the influx of their own academic followers and distinct methodologies that certainly shaped early and mid-20th century prisms of thinking (Kroeber, 1919; Boas, 1920; Weber, 1922; Radcliff-Brown, 1922; Radin, 1927; Mead, 1928; Sapir, 1929; Benedict, 1930; Evans-Pritchard, White, 1943; Murdoch, 1950; Conklin, 1955; Steward, 1955; Mills, 1959; Fried, 1960; Malinowski, 1961; Leach, 1962; Douglas, 1963; Levi-Strauss, 1962; Rappaport, 1967; Tyler, 1969; Geertz, 1973; Chagnon, 1968; Harris, 1975).

Seemingly, that generation of scholars and scientists triggered eruption of substantial debate and controversy on questions pertaining to culture, society, and science under the framework of “nature versus nurture,” but now there are discourses of twining “nature and nurture,” encompassing various issues relating to family, adolescence, gender, social norms and attitudes that certainly sparked the fluidity of academic freedom by the brilliant minds of above-mentioned intellectuals as they are continuously and prominently cited today by young scholars and social scientists through their ground-breaking ethnographic and revolutionary research works.

Important anthropological methods proposed by Franz Boas adapted for keen strategic academic analysis to present and future studies on culture and society include historical particularism that requires the anthropologist to describe the particular characteristics of a given culture with a view toward reconstructing the historical events that led to its present structure. On the other hand, cultural relativism is an attitude that society’s customs and ideas should be viewed within the context of the society’s problems and opportunities. Each culture possesses its own particular traditions, values, and ideals. Albeit, these cultural methods have had critiques to further accept the propinquity of its usage to current research on society and culture. Therefore, if historians seek to establish the chronology of events, on the other hand, anthropologists seek to show the interrelationship between events and document cultural and social patterns in them.

Meanwhile, clash of civilizations of the east versus the west, *ad infinitum*, drew syntheses from great thinkers in post-world wars and post-Cold war to the deterritorializing nature of the 21st century currently pre-dominating socio-cultural dimension of national security (Said, 1978; Hartman, 1983; Fukuyama, 1992; Macridis, 1992; Huntington, 1992; Baldwin 1993; Wendt, 1999) and today more mushrooming topics on deconstruction, gender, globalization, human security, post-9/11, post-modernism and other potent and extensive narratives on the importance of culture and society in magnanimous ways beyond (Derida, 1967; Toffler, 1970;

There are four strengths of anthropology that can be related to the object of study of national security. These are universality, integration, adaptation, and holism. Anthropological discourses are very comprehensive yet the study is similarly universal because all of us belong to one dominant single human species today called *Homo sapiens* based from human paleontology and biological evolution. Whatever kinds of tribe, ethnic group, citizenship, and nationality one belongs, anthropology will certainly study issues and threats on peoples in the purview of national security. Integration plays a vital role into the study of anthropology of national security because all aspects of life in all societies are interwoven to form a social whole. Foreign powers and relations are also interrelated to global-local (glocal) *vis a vis* local-global cultures or cultural hybridity of regimes and norms. More so, adaptation needs to be studied in the anthropology of national security for the reason of massive influx of migration and diaspora around the world and how adaptation to various environments affects culture and society. For instance, in the great Indus civilization, climate change and patterns of monsoon season certainly affected its rise and fall. For this reason, empires and kingdoms may also rise and fall due to the strengths and weaknesses of its military power. Lastly, holism which is the thrust of anthropology has influenced the study of national security because of its multi-disciplinary approach whereby one studies panoramic phenomena using different bodies of knowledge.

All in all, the lexicon of social evolutionary process in anthropology’s militarization has a tinge of ‘Otherness’ that substantially affect the wide ranging discourses of national security issues. Temptation to ascribe to exoticism of knowledge in the ambit of identity, ethnicity, historicity, locality, and universality in the ongoing narratives of hegemonic power of culture should in certain ways face ethical accountability by global actors and major producers of knowledge that may destabilize cultural and social norms or world order. Dependency on who provides critical narratives and body of knowledge based from solid theoretical frameworks and concepts must be scrutinized contentiously to lessen ethnocentrism or intended biases towards ‘other’ cultures and societies especially now when truth has become subjective and descriptive in post-processual ways.
The Anthropology of National Security

In the current academic program of the MNSA, the socio-cultural dimension of national security, is the first module taught from the six core subjects of the program, following the acronym of PESTEM (political domestic and international, economic, socio-cultural, techno-scientific, environment, and military but more focused on defense and security sector) of national security.

Socio-cultural dimension of national security covers the basic concepts of culture, values, change, perception, attitudes, motivation, and personality. These concepts provide NDCP students/scholars with operational and high-level definitions and understanding as these relate to national security. The module also emphasizes the importance of the interrelationships between and among disciplines and modules.\(^5\)

To calibrate the strategic value of socio-cultural dimension of national security, I redesigned the module with an aim at providing NDCP students/scholars an in-depth knowledge and rethinking of Philippine society and culture and to become critical in their analysis using various perspectives in its implications to national security. The course gives a general and holistic survey of the major cultural, social, historical, political, and economic processes in the country through an examination of rapid changes in Filipino values and character.\(^6\)

Contents and contexts of the course contain approaches mainly from anthropology and sociology, but also complemented by the disciplinal scope of history, humanities, psychology, gender studies, public policy, Asian, international, and security studies - again in the purview of national security. Thematic and topical discussions ranging from pre-historical, chronological events, and future discourses on society and culture from various levels of analysis in local, regional, and global developments are inclusively compacted in the module.\(^7\)

Furthermore, there are four units/approaches in the course content of the socio-cultural dimension of national security. The first unit of the module introduces students/scholars to digested theories and concepts of anthropology and sociology in relation to national security. The second unit delves on pre-historical and archaeological findings that will critically help students/scholars understand our country’s infrastructure to nationhood and civilization. The third unit focuses on various regional groupings in Asia-Pacific to closely understand different peoples

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\(^7\) Ibid.
and our neighbors’ culture and society from ancient to contemporary periods and major socio-cultural security issues in their respective regions. And the fourth unit presents special topics that have impact on culture and society not only in the Philippines but also in other parts of the world, as well as issues on global scale. These eye-opener thematic issues selected timely for social and cultural discussions and debates may be relevant in the study of the socio-cultural dimension of national security.8

As to the methodology, anthropology’s most important contribution in the academe and the scientific community is the use of ethnography. Ethnographic method is a descriptive narrative of culture and society. Anthropologists are highly encouraged to do fieldwork using participation-observation (PO) and key informant (KI) methods, but those who are not fit to doing these methods are labeled as “armchair anthropologists”. In the realm of national security, soldiers and military officers who get deployed on the ground get to see the realities of various peoples’ culture and society. Their first-hand experiences and information could be more useful in their analyses of the actual happenings on the ground in contrast to simply relying on perceptions from secondary reading materials.

In the discourse of national security management, field visits are imbedded in the module, namely: Sub-national Security Development Studies (SSDS) and the Regional Security Development Studies (RSDS). These activities, although it may be too short in time, might be equated with fieldwork and participation-observation through rapid assessment, key informant interviews, and secondary data gathering and analyses. Hence, national security depends on the accurate perception of realities within the country itself and the various countries in its region, and the ability to develop and effectively pursue a strategy that meets the demands of these realities.9

The SSDS is a field visit to selected regions in the Philippines where the students/scholars interact with important and influential individuals and groups in the subject areas to identify strategic issues, challenges, and opportunities for development and security areas. The annual activity is also aimed at strengthening the academic learning process by translating theoretical concepts of national security into the practical aspects by relevant exposure to the field and actual events. This is to discuss, agree on, and propose possible solutions or courses of action in responding to the perceived security and development issues and opportunities using appropriate tools and approaches learned in class.

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8 Ibid.
9 Ibid, pp.2-3.
On the other hand, the RSDS is one of the activities that will round off the students/scholars’ experiences by providing them with a chance to witness first-hand and at close march the actual interplay of national security dimensions in an international context. This will allow students/scholars to gather information which may serve as basis for the formulation of recommended policies and strategies relative to the Philippine national security issues vis a vis the target country. It is an avenue to interact with national security managers of the target country and to see how their national interests and objectives are determined and protected. This is to broaden national security perspective and development capacity in addressing national security problems objectively with facility and competence. This also serves to provide first-hand knowledge of the situation on the ground, identify problems in the actual operational setting, and validate our own existing interests and objectives by recommending measures to further enhance the same.\textsuperscript{10}

But today, there is still a sharp divide between academia and the military in the broader application and conceptualization of national power. A case in point is the 2007 American Anthropological Association (AAA) board resolution expressing “disapproval” of anthropologists working in Afghanistan and Iraq, through Pentagon’s pilot project in 2005 named Cultural Operations Research, popularly known Human Terrain System (HTS), arguing it as an “unacceptable application of anthropological expertise.”\textsuperscript{11}

Anthropologist Montgomery McFate, however, believes that what social scientists bring to the military is in some cases a deep expertise on the specific area of interest. Anthropologists working for defense and security sectors bring a fresh perspective and a methodology for research and analysis that benefits both the military and the local civilian population in the area of operations. Therefore, anthropologists should be involved in developing “military applications of cultural knowledge.”\textsuperscript{12}

Harsh criticisms by anthropologists were formulated to negate the controversial program. The Network of Concerned Anthropologist wrote to the US House of Representatives in 2010 asking Congress to stop government support for the HTS and cancel plans for its expansion. That year, Professor Hugh Gusterson vividly renounced the HTS stating that, “the Pentagon seems to have decided that anthropology is to the war on terror what physics was to the cold war...asking an anthropologist to gather intelligence.” Same sentiment was shared by Marshall

\textsuperscript{10} SSDS and RSDS booklets, p.1-2.
\textsuperscript{12} Ibid.
Sahlins in 2011 about the HTS as “manipulating local culture, imposing on them, transforming anthropologists into spies, and putting people you work with at risk.”

The Heart and Soul of National Security

Redefinition of national security outside of plainly defense or military security must transcend to include the security of ideas – this is the security of the abstract forms that sometimes play as powerful forces that elevate our cohesive national interests (Jocano, 1980).

I deem that to achieve a robust national security, Filipinos must acquire a culture of respected national character and national morale that are fundamental to metaphysically build an infrastructure to nationhood propounded by our great ancestors. This vision which was adequately foreseen by revolutionary generals and past leaders in our history is slowly laying a golden map to fortify Filipinos’ psycho-social and socio-cultural imaginings away from persistent colonial mentality. This vision of greatness must be executed in a grand manner based on the vintage designs of our great ancestors to generally inculcate sense of pride in Filipinos of today and tomorrow.

One of the great insights in boosting our infrastructure to nationhood is the deep awareness of our unstained ancestry and past glory prior to foreign colonization of our country. Archaeologists are making waves right now in excavating beneath our lands to unveil mysteries of our past. Physical and cultural heritage are unearthed to unleash our national identity and national character. Discovery of the Callao man approximately dated 67,000 years ago, or presumably even older, strengthens our strong Darwinian national identity that will masquerade our inferiority complex since colonization period.

The discovery of the earliest hominid in the country showcases that we have much older beginnings and culture compared to some of our neighbors in the region. It also elucidates our concept of our national identity as a Filipino people. Our ancestors etched the path of our earliest beliefs, philosophies, and way of life. As recourse, our history should be re-written in pursuit of stronger national character and morale.

Paleoanthropology conscientiously played, and will continuously be helpful, in the construction of racial nationalism. A case in point is the Peking

man, scientifically named, *Sinantropus pekinensis*. Albeit today, there are debates on the peopling and origins of the Chinese people. Some experts conceive of the “yellow race” as the initial distinction while probing on the concept to skin color of the Chinese people compared to other Asians. Strategically, Chinese thinkers would debunk the monogenic (single origin) hypothesis of African-originated early hominids and modern humans.

Instead, a tough sinocentric view of the genesis of the world through the paleontological discovery of the Peking man warrants a powerful Chinese brand of patriotism that had been handed down from generation to generation. This kind of cultural ideology and harmonious spirit in pursuit for a unified political objective had led many Chinese people to believe that their mytho-historical imaginings and continuous nationalism had preserved the world’s oldest continuous civilization-state.

The political role of archeological and paleoanthropological finds prove that these scientific discourses can be made as tools for grandiose architectural construction of racial nationalism that had been alive since pre-semi-colonial times in China. Even in today’s theatrical stage of international political hegemony, given the resurging power of China in the world today, great scientific discovery, even when missing fossils like the Peking man’s skullcaps, can be used for soft power strategies. Indeed, to cement China’s greatness as a civilization-state, it requires unifying myths, symbols, and memories from relics of prehistory and origins in search of the human past.

This propaganda based from scientific discoveries is a potent example of building a stronger national identity and national character of which our country may opt to set as an example while learning from older civilizations like China. Thus, the Philippines has equitable fossils to mount a stronger national identity and national character, abruptly, mixed with stronger narratives of colonialism – of three hundred years in the convent, fifty years in Hollywood, and four years in the arsenal. Consequently, descriptive accounts of the discovery of the Callao man by anthropologists and archaeologists are objective and reliable. What becomes questionable is the interpretation made by historians of these data.

By way of making the socio-cultural dimension the heart and soul of national security, it affirms the proverbial tone of “an army without culture will not win a battle.” Capitalizing on education is one of the great ways to leapfrog and become a developed country. Educated citizens and peoples of societies become smart and respected as they respond to challenges of their countries and resolve problems through their innovative and powerful ideas courtesy of great education.
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Ananda Devi Domingo-Almase *

Introduction

The “subject of security”¹ is substantial, but nevertheless subtle for its complex and contextual nature. Security is thought about as the condition of being free from fear and sure of the future, a subject that is of much concern in scholarly discourses not only in International Relations but also in Public Administration. But the concept of security, both as a theme and a discipline, is subject to perceptions, deliberations, and even tensions in the academe and the political realm. What security really means to individuals, institutions, and nations is determined by different interpretations and situations which bespeak of security administration as

¹ Contemporary security studies, particularly in the APCSS, have adopted the provocative phrase, “the subject of security,” in setting the agenda for discourse on emerging security dynamics brought about by globalization and democratization in the Asia Pacific.

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essentially political and culture-bound. In international efforts towards security sector development, discussions on its principles and priorities in different political and cultural settings make the subject of security naturally contestable.

That security is a highly “contested concept” was put forth by scholars who gathered multiple perspectives and policy imperatives on how security is to be seen, satisfied, and strengthened. The controversy stems from different worldviews in the academe on the focus and scope of security. Two definitions of security arise from its multidisciplinary study. One sets a realist standpoint of defending the state and its institutional apparatuses. The other proposes a broadened vista of protecting and enhancing human lives in all dimensions. Owing to its popular appeal, the latter perspective is adopted by idealists as a policy principle for democratic governance and peaceful global order.

The widening and deepening of the concept of security came about as nations—denouncing the horrors of war and totalitarianism—pledged to build

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2 Ruiz wrote that a fundamental rethinking of security as well as a reconstitution of its practices necessarily include the political dimension at the center. By ‘political’, he meant understanding the dynamics of three elements: culture, democracy, and governance. [See Lester Edwin J Ruiz, “The Subject of Security is the Subject of Security: APEC and the Globalization of Capital,” *Pacifica Review* 9, no. 2 (1997), 3-17.]

3 Security sector development, otherwise known as security sector reform, is defined by the Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD) as transformation of the roles, relations, and administration of security actors and institutions in a manner that adheres to principles of democratic governance. The security sector is comprised of the military, police, coast guard, customs authorities, paramilitary forces as core security actors; and, the executive, legislature, and civil society as security management and oversight bodies. [See Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development, *The DAC Guidelines: Helping Prevent Violent Conflict* (Paris, France: OECD, 2001), 38.]


8 The notion that there has been a widening and deepening of the concept of security was discussed in Rouben Azizian and Justin Nankivell, “Security Sector Development” (Course Overview, Advanced Security Cooperation Course 2012-1, Asia Pacific Center for Security Studies, Honolulu, Hawaii, 2012).
a just, peaceful, and progressive world through diplomatic and cooperative
endeavors. The Human Development Report (HDR) of the United Nations
Development Programme (UNDP) in 1994 redefined “security” as a condition and
as a guiding policy with a human face. Specifically, the HDR identified threats to
human security under seven categories, which include: (1) economic security; (2)
food security; (3) health security; (4) environmental security; (5) personal security;
(6) community security; and, (7) political security.\(^8\)

In theory, the non-traditional approach of human security calls for a
“win-win solution” of promoting the well-being of society with no cost to human
lives. This is contrary to a realist game of war that aims for victory by inflicting
great loss on the part of the enemy. United Nations Secretary General Kofi Annan in
1999 viewed “security” as a condition that can be understood meaningfully in non-
military terms and democratic peace. According to him, security “must encompass
economic development, social justice, environmental protection, democratization,
disarmament, and respect for human rights and the rule of law.”\(^9\)

Despite the reinvention of the concept of security in the approach of the
21st century, critical thinkers warn against its obscure meanings and leanings
if this is to be translated in actual policy, especially by a conservative state.\(^10\)
Understanding the subject of security is crucial in defining a security problem and
devising appropriate policy to address it. Ideally, the desired definition must be one
which points to people as the fundamental focus of security in the new century,
instead of the state as the traditional locus of defense in the bygone era of real and
imagined war.\(^11\) But whether this holds true for all democratic nations today is a
rhetorical question that, nonetheless, calls for serious attention by security thinkers
and policy administrators.

In a modest attempt to contribute to the security debate, this concept
paper looks into the contents of a national security policy in a developing country
that is faced with complex internal and external threats. Specifically, the paper
discusses the principles, promises, as well as politics of the 2011-2016 National

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1994), 24-25.


\(^10\) Ibid., 15.

Development Reports: A Review of Experiences and Current Debates” (occasional paper, Hu-
man Development Report Office, United Nations Development Programme, New York, USA, April
2006), 3.
Security Policy (NSP) in the Philippines. These are analyzed in the context of the socio-economic and political conditions within which the administration envisions the NSP to work. The analysis uncovers some predicaments and impediments which underlie the complex environment of the NSP.

Lastly, this study reflects on the meaning of security as a concept discussed and debated in the scholarly community, and as a course of action promoted and administered in the country. On the whole, the review of the components and complexity of the NSP offers a critical framework of understanding its dynamics and problematique, which could help in a comprehensive policy analysis by lawmakers, public administrators, and academics.

The 2011-2016 National Security Policy: Unraveling the Arguments Behind its Contents and Intents

The Contents of the NSP

The National Security Policy or NSP in the Philippines was crafted in 2011 as a political statement that binds the year-old presidential administration to fulfill its “Social Contract” with the people until the end of its term in 2016. Promulgated through Memorandum Order No. 6 by President Benigno S Aquino III, the NSP was said to be a reaffirmation of his campaign promise to promote the people’s welfare through democratic governance. The NSP, with the title of “Securing the Gains of Democracy,” presents four focal areas of concern by the current administration, which are as follows: (1) good governance; (2) delivery of basic services; (3) economic reconstruction; and, (4) security sector reforms.

Taking the NSP as his personal legacy, President Aquino promised to bring forth the “ways of democracy” by laying down a “people centered document” that shall provide a conducive environment for peace and security in the country. He emphasized in the NSP that the Filipino people deserve the best from government as they are the “greatest resource for a progressive and prosperous Philippines.” To note, this appears to be in line with the principle reinforced in the 2010 United Nations Human Development Report (UNHDR) with the theme “The Real Wealth of the Nations: Pathways to Human Development.”

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13 Ibid.
The focus on the people as the center of national security is substantiated by the enshrinement in the NSP of the President’s “Social Contract with the People.” Presented under the topic of “Foundations of National Security” in the NSP, the Social Contract outlines a plethora of objectives, which include the following: (1) transformational leadership; (2) job generation; (3) education; (4) reproductive health care; (5) impartial justice system; (6) execution of the rule of law; (7) food security; (8) capacity-building for the poor; (9) economic competition; (10) protection for overseas Filipino Workers; (11) merit and fitness in government service; (12) professional bureaucracy; (13) gender equality; (14) peace and development in Mindanao; (15) urban development and welfare development; and, (16) sustainable use of resources.\(^{15}\)

The NSP states that the aforementioned objectives of the Social Contract are attuned to the seven elements of national security. The elements include: (1) socio-political stability; (2) territorial integrity; (3) economic solidarity; (4) ecological balance; (5) cultural-cohesiveness; (6) moral-spiritual consensus; and, (7) peace and harmony. Military defense, which is a core component of national security, is conspicuously written off as one of the elements in the NSP.

Following the presentation of the ideological foundations of national security in the first part of the NSP is an overview of the security landscape in the region and of the external and internal threats to the Philippines. Among others, the NSP identifies tensions with China in the West Philippine Sea\(^{16}\), transnational crimes, terrorism, and arms build-up in Asia as external threats to the country.\(^{17}\) Its internal security environment, on the other hand, is described as being confronted by a host of complex threats against the government and the people. Foremost among these are the protracted armed conflicts with the communist insurgents and Muslim separatists. Other internal threats to Philippine security include terrorism, criminality, graft and corruption, political violence, natural disasters, pandemics, and poverty.\(^{18}\) To address all of these, the NSP outlines general courses of action to strengthen public institutions, protect the environment, combat terrorism, engage in regional cooperation, and modernize the armed forces.\(^{19}\)

\(^{15}\) Ibid., 5-6.

\(^{16}\) President Aquino, through Administrative Order Number 29 dated 5 September 2012, renamed the South China Sea as the “West Philippine Sea.” The said Order came following a stand-off with China on the contested sea.


\(^{18}\) Ibid., 15-23.

\(^{19}\) Ibid., 24-30.
The Arguments on the NSP

The NSP purports to uphold a re-founding of the concept of national security, and the use of non-traditional approach for human security. It must be taken into account that the latter calls for a reorientation of traditional military policies that proved to be unworkable in neutralizing complex threats to human development. At the outset, the apparent shift in security thought in the NSP can be construed in the conspicuous omission of the military dimension in the enumerated elements of national security. The absence of this core element, however, appears to be interesting or rather intriguing as military defense is essentially and explicitly included in contemporary praxis of national security administration. As such, the non-military characteristics of national security in the NSP can be taken either as a novelty in reframing security thought, or as a controversy in renaming traditional practice of national security in the Philippines.

Notably, the promotion of human security has not been without misgivings in the face of internal insecurities that result from poor governance in weak states. Owing to the all-inclusive panorama of human security, a dilemma may arise in pushing for conventional military strategy to justify the goals of human development. It must be noted that “human security” takes on a different meaning in the 2007 Philippine Human Security Law or Republic Act 9372, which provides the legal framework for counter-terrorism by the forces of government. Human security, in this case, pertains to securitizing the state and the people from threats and acts of terror. But the all-out campaign to preempt and prosecute suspected terrorists is criticized for its tendencies to transgress human rights for the price of security.  

Nonetheless, the state has to exercise its basic function to provide security as well as its inherent authority to criminalize terroristic activities. In order for an anti-terrorism strategy to be effective in guarding “human security,” the former must be built on public trust, rule of law, judicious oversight, and democratic processes. These are the important foundations which legitimize the use of military force as well as intrusive intelligence by the state in a move to protect its people against terrorism. But in countries where governance is perceived to be weak, the employment of state violence loses legitimacy and ascendancy to protect the people from harm. It is in this context that the idealists promote the human security approach as safeguard against a dysfunctional or “failing state” that is seen as the

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The adoption of the human security framework, as a fad in democratic public administration, calls for good governance in order for the NSP to fulfill the Social Contract of the President with the people. With this, there is a need for concrete and coherent policy actions that will reconstruct a problematic status quo and put the welfare of the people at the center of the security agenda for real. Human security in a democracy must be pursued in the NSP not only as a popular ideology but as a strategic plan of action with budgetary priorities as well as accountabilities. The NSP, to be more than a political banner of the President, must be able to build a solid foundation for a sustainable policy environment for human development beyond his term.

No doubt, the general principles of democracy and human security, which the NSP upholds for the Filipino people, are undisputable. But the reality and complexity of how government will go about taking courses of action, allocating resources, and administering programs to achieve human security are controvertible. An understanding of idiosyncratic issues and problems in the enduring state of affairs in the country is thus needed in order for a comprehensive policy on national security to be well-grounded, credible, and convincing. The analysis of the NSP document unravels inherent arguments in its intents of promoting human development in the Philippines.

The Policy Environment of Philippine Security: Understanding the Context and Complexity of the NSP

The Security Context

The security environment in the country was described by the Philippine Human Development Report (PHDR) in 2005 as being confronted by two of the world’s longest running armed conflicts—the Moro secessionist movement in Mindanao in the southern part of the country, and the communist insurgency in several provinces. The PHDR noted that the military solution by government fell short of addressing complex causes of armed conflicts. The reasons underlying insurgency were explained to be rooted on social injustice, political marginalization, lack of education, want of livelihood opportunities, as well as non-implementation of land reform. The PHDR also reported that the protracted insurgency in the country had affected 91% of its provinces from 1986 to 2004, resulting in mortalities, social

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disruption, economic degeneration, and chronic poverty.²²

In a period when a powerful nation like the United States (US) campaigns against transnational terrorists to guard peace and progress, the Philippines continues to battle local insurgents in poverty-stricken provinces to make way for development. The reality of armed insurgency as major threat to national security in the country was reinforced in 2010 by Banlaoi in “Philippine Security in the Age of Terror: National, Regional, and Global Challenges in the Post-9/11 World.” From a critical perspective of national security, Banlaoi saw the long-drawn insurgency as a complicated symptom of a political malady that was ingrained in Philippine society. His study pointed to social exclusion and economic marginalization as root causes of armed uprisings in the country,²³ a view that had also been expressed in the PHDR in 2005.

The persistence of internal armed conflicts in the Philippines was also accentuated in 2012 by Cruz, former defense undersecretary for legal and priority concerns, in “Security Sector Reform: Philippine Perspectives on Defense Transformation.” Cruz discussed the causes and effects of armed insurgency that characterized most prominently the security problem in the country. Conflict zones in Muslim provinces in Mindanao were taken as quintessential settings of security crisis. High poverty incidence and other dismal economic indicators in insurgency-affected areas showed that these variables bred more conflict, a condition illustrated by Cruz as a vicious cycle of continual degeneration.²⁴ To note, poverty incidence in the Philippines remained 27.9% in the first quarter of 2012, suggesting that the “jobless economic growth” in the country did not trickle down to the poor. Provinces affected by armed conflicts scored the highest incidences of extreme poverty with 41.5-68.9% in the same year.²⁵

²³ Banlaoi, Philippine Security in the Age of Terror, p. 17.
²⁵ Despite economic growth rates impressed over the past six years, the Philippines has not improved its poverty rate. According to the Asian Development Bank (ADB), Philippine economy has only managed to produce a “jobless growth” fueled mainly by consumption, remittances from overseas Filipino workers (OFWs), and business processing outsourcing industry. Among the regions, the Autonomous Region of Muslim Mindanao (ARMM) had the highest poverty rate of 46.9 in 2012. [Riza T Olchondra, “PH poverty unchanged,” Inquirer (Manila) 24April 2013, p. A1.]
Notably, the PHDR in 2009 had underscored that the quality of politics and public institutions determines the fate of human security, a perspective informed by the principles of Public Administration.\textsuperscript{26} Given the state of governance in the country, it can be seen that the means of getting to the ends of internal security is already complex, even before government can address a host of external threats, such as dealing with territorial disputes with China and other countries in the West Philippine Sea.

On the whole, the NSP indubitably emanates from a dilemma where dysfunctions in the administration of public institutions persist, as threats arising from poverty, armed conflicts, violence, and territorial issues exist. Whether these confounded problems will ease in the remaining term of the President who condemned most of these as remnants of the past political regime, is the question behind the celebrated promulgation of the NSP. A critical look into the complex socio-economic and political milieu in the Philippines helps in comprehending the security threats that thwart human development goals in the country. From this perspective, the purported logic behind the political rhetoric of the NSP stands under scrutiny.

\textit{The Presidential Addresses on Security}

As the most influential policy leader and agenda setter, the President assumes the principal role of defining the security issues of the day, initiating crucial policies to Congress, and administering mechanisms by which perceived problems must be addressed. To accomplish this role of a policy manager, the President delivers messages to Congress and the nation for crucial funding and political backing.\textsuperscript{27}

President Aquino, in his first State of the Nation Address (SONA) in July 2010, expressed hope that peace and progress will be realized in insurgency-affected provinces through good governance. The newly elected President was confident to give the Filipino people renewed faith in democratic processes that will promote


\textsuperscript{27} The role of the President as chief legislator and policy leader was discussed in the pioneer study of the evolution of administrative thought in presidential rhetoric in the Philippines from the 1935 Commonwealth establishment to contemporary government. [See Ananda Devi Domingo-Almase, “Saga of Administrative Thought: An Analysis of the State of the Nation Addresses and Speeches of Philippine Presidents, 1935-2006” (Dissertation, National College of Public Administration and Governance, University of the Philippines, Diliman, Quezon City, 2007), 24.]
transparency, public accountability, and equitable development. His firm resolve to shun the crooked road impressed a transformational leadership that guards against corruption and places the people at the center of his administration. At an opportune time for political rehabilitation, the President expressed his commitment to engage in political negotiations or “honest dialogue” with rebel groups in a bid for peace.

President Aquino’s peaceful approach to end the armed rebellion became his rallying principle to ensure growth and development in affected provinces. The primacy of a political resolution over military action was a clear policy statement of the President in his first SONA in 2010. As he stated:

We face two obstacles on our road to peace: the situation in Mindanao and the continued revolt of the CPP-NPA-NDF. Our view has not changed when it comes to the situation in Mindanao. We will only achieve lasting peace if all stakeholders engage in an honest dialogue: may they be Moro, Lumad, or Christian.

...It is difficult to begin discussions in earnest if the smell of gun powder still hangs in the air. I call on everyone concerned not to waste a good opportunity to rally behind our common aspiration for peace. Our foundation for growth is peace. We will continue to be shackled by poverty if the crossfire persists. (Underline provided.)

The realization of the policy statement made by the President depended on crucial legislations that were explicitly pronounced in the SONA during the opening of Congress. In order to meet current security demands and challenges, President Aquino urged legislators to amend the National Defense Act of 1935. The reference to national security in his SONA was capped by his express desire to develop and relocate military headquarters by partnering with local and foreign investors. Other priority bills sought by the President pertained to greater accountability in the public bureaucracy, as well as to ensuring the safety of witnesses and whistleblowers.

Notwithstanding the promulgation of the NSP on 7 July 2011, the President in his SONA on 25 July 2011 neither mentioned the NSP as his overarching

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28 See English version of the State of the Nation Address of His Excellency Benigno S Aquino III, President of the Republic of the Philippines, Session Hall, House of Representatives, Batasan Pambansa Complex, Quezon City, 26 July 2010.

29 Aside from the National Defense Act, the President also called on Congress to enact the Fiscal Responsibility Bill, Procurement Law, Anti-Trust Law, Whistleblower’s Bill, and Witness Protection Program.
framework for national development, nor the term “human security” as a populist principle in security discourse. Instead, he articulated his staunch position to defend and protect the national territory as his only reference to the topic of “security.” President Aquino articulated the following in his address to Congress in July 2011:

Speaking of security, does enhanced security not also enhance our national pride? There was a time when we couldn’t appropriately respond to threats in our own backyard. Now, our message to the world is clear: What is ours is ours; setting foot on Recto Bank is no different from setting foot on Recto Avenue.

At times I wonder if the stories about some of our past stand-offs are true—that when cannons were aimed at our marines, they could only reciprocate by cutting down a coconut tree, painting it black, and aiming it back. True or not, that time is over. Soon, we will be seeing capability upgrades and the modernization of the equipment of our armed forces... We do not wish to increase tensions with anyone, but we must let the world know that we are ready to protect what is ours.30 (Underline provided.)

It can be seen from the preceding statements that the emphasis on military modernization departed from the more comprehensive theme of human security in the NSP. In this SONA, the President’s penchant for power politics, military capabilities, and relative advantage resembled a realist perception of external threats. That a sovereign state “act(s) out of pride and the feeling of being put down,” as International Relations scholar Donnelly put it,31 was in fact the articulated rationale of the President for the modernization of the Armed Forces of the Philippines (AFP) for national security.

In his talk about security, President Aquino reported in his 2011 SONA that the acquisition of state-of-the-art vessels, aircrafts, and weapons for the military, police, and other uniformed personnel were underway. Along this line, he was proud to note that the enhanced capacity of law enforcement agencies had resulted in increased efficiency and effectiveness of arrests, convictions, and prevention of crimes in the previous year. He also reported improvements in the morale and welfare of soldiers and policemen due to programs implemented by government to cater to their particular needs, such as housing facilities.

30 See English translation of the State of the Nation Address of His Excellency Benigno S Aquino III, President of the Republic of the Philippines, Session Hall, House of Representatives, Batasan Pambansang Complex, Quezon City, 25 July 2011.

31 Jack Donnelly, “Realism” in Burchill et al., Theories of International Relations, p. 42.
In the same address, the President attributed the foregoing reforms in the security sector to effective administration. It must be recalled that security sector reform is one of the four key elements of the NSP. The prominence given by the President to forging that key in the SONA thus alluded to the primary agenda behind the NSP. From the perspective of government that administers policies, institution-building and modernization are the most urgent and practical concerns in national security.

The principal agenda of developing the Philippine military was sustained by President Aquino in his third SONA in July 2012. Focused on defense, the President did not speak on a fundamental rethinking of “national security” even as a political rhetoric. The non-use of the term “human security,” as the very principle espoused in his NSP, was compensated, nonetheless, by his pronouncements on education, health, job generation, and overall welfare of the people in other items of the SONA.

Despite the comprehensive scope of security as critical thinkers reconstruct it, the subject of security remains a matter of national defense in a country poised to protect itself from internal and external threats. This was evident not only in the topic of security in the SONA, but also in the reported proportion of the expenditure requirements for social services to the budgetary cost for military modernization. In describing at the outset the state of the nation in 2012, the President presented the following fiscal dilemma to Congress:

We were left with little fiscal space even as debts had bunched up and were maturing. We were also left a long list of obligations to fulfill: A backlog of 66,800 classrooms, which would cost us about 53.44 billion pesos; a backlog of 2,573,212 classroom chairs, amounting to 2.31 billion pesos. In 2010, an estimated 36 million Filipinos were still not members of PhilHealth. Forty-two billion pesos was needed to enroll them. Add to all this the 103 billion pesos needed for the modernization of our Armed Forces.  

In accord with the above-cited priority list in the first part of his SONA, President Aquino reported that his administration had already allocated 28 billion pesos for the AFP Modernization Program only in his one year and seven months in office. Taking pride in this accomplishment, the President said the allocations can

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32 See English translation of the State of the Nation Address of His Excellency Benigno S Aquino III, President of the Republic of the Philippines, Session Hall, House of Representatives, Batasan Pambansa Complex, Quezon City, 23 July 2012.
outmatch the 33-billion-peso budget for military modernization in the last fifteen years. According to him, if Congress were to pass the new AFP modernization bill, which sought to extend the defunct military modernization law of 1995, government would be able to allocate 75 billion pesos more for defense within the next five years.\textsuperscript{33}

The President tried not to overdraw emphasis on military aggrandizement by rationalizing this course of action as an assurance of peace and protection for the country. As he stated in his SONA in July 2012:

\begin{quote}
We are not doing this because we want to be an aggressor, we are not doing this because we want escalation. This is about keeping peace. \underline{This is about protecting ourselves}—something that we have long thought to be impossible.\textsuperscript{34} \textsuperscript{[Underline provided.]}\end{quote}

President Aquino’s report and rhetoric in his SONA in 2012 underscored the crucial role of a capable military force in securing the nation in an environment where threats are real. It must be recalled that in his first SONA in July 2010, the President’s notion of peace had been related mainly to political and developmental means of resolving internal armed conflict, especially in Muslim Mindanao. The seeming shift in thinking to military security in his succeeding SONAs in 2011 and 2012 revealed a more realistic position that political influence has more power when backed up by a capable military, especially in international relations. On the whole, the President impressed a state of the nation whose source of security lies in building up the armed forces to defend the state, defeat the enemy, or deter aggression by militant groups, whichever course of action is appropriate. To note, the Philippine military by law remains as the lead actor in counter-insurgency operations with the national police only playing a support role.\textsuperscript{35}

In accord with the priority agenda of the President, Congress in December 2012 passed Republic Act (RA) 10349 allowing the AFP to continue upgrading its assets and capabilities until 2027 or in another fifteen years. President Aquino, in his address during the 77\textsuperscript{th} founding anniversary of the AFP on 21 December 2012, expressed pride and confidence that the newly amended AFP Modernization Act will ensure the development of a stronger military. With this, he assured the AFP

\textsuperscript{33} Ibid.

\textsuperscript{34} Ibid.

\textsuperscript{35} See Section 3 of Republic Act 8551, otherwise known as the Philippine National Police Reform and Reorganization Act of 1998, which provides that the police shall only play a support role of information gathering in counter-insurgency functions of the Armed Forces of the Philippines (AFP) “except in cases where the President shall call on the PNP to support the AFP in combat operations”.

of an initial budget of P75 billion in the first five years of the implementation of RA 10349. The President also announced the acquisitions of modern sea vessels, sophisticated fighter jets, and state-of-the-art weapons system for the major services of the armed forces.

The Executive Agenda on Security

Despite the promotion of the human security principle in the NSP, Philippine security translates to development of national defense, particularly of the armed forces. The Department of National Defense (DND) released in July 2012 a white paper on “Transforming the Department of National Defense to Effectively Meet the Defense and Security Challenges of the 21st Century.”36 The defense white paper presents two major thrusts for DND, which are defense mission and defense transformation. The first pertains to the fulfillment of the DND mandate to guard the country against internal and external threats, while the other pushes for the development of military defense.

In the pursuit of national security, the DND administers the Philippine Defense Reform Program (PDR) that is geared towards improving materiel, technological, and professional capabilities of military personnel. Corollary to the PDR is the Philippine Defense Transformation (PDT) that is also focused on developing the organizational capabilities of DND in order to be “fully mission capable” by 2028. Through the lens of the DND, security challenges now and in the future are seen as continuing traditional threats which require efficient and responsive armed forces.

The organizational interests of DND form primarily the national agenda for peace and security. The Philippine Development Plan (PDP) 2011-2016, which lays down the priority agenda of the current administration, defines and confines security concerns in the domain of the military along with the police. This can be seen from the five legislative priorities of the Executive to attain the “peace and security” component of Philippine development. Topping the priority list was the bill which sought to extend the AFP Modernization Act that had self-terminated in 2011 after its 15-year implementation program. Other proposed measures for peace and security in the PDP are the enactments of the National Defense and Security Act, the Philippine Maritime Zones Law, the Philippine National Police

The legislation in 2012 of the extended AFP Modernization Program or Republic Act 10349 assures the military of special budgetary allocations apart from the annual appropriations to DND that gets the third largest chunk of the national budget. With this, the AFP Modernization Act may be construed as a clear and real policy priority in attaining national security in the Philippines.

What Security Really Means in the Philippines

The National Defense College of the Philippines (NDCP) defines “national security” as having six dimensions: (1) political; (2) economic; (3) socio-cultural; (4) science and technology; (5) environment; and, (6) military. These key dimensions make up the curriculum or more specifically, the titles of the subjects in the Master in National Security Administration (MNSA) Course of NDCP. In line with this multidimensional perspective is the National Security Council’s (NSC) promotion of national security as a general state or condition wherein the people’s well-being, their cherished way of life, democratic institutions, territorial integrity, and national sovereignty are protected and enhanced. This comprehensive definition of national security is adopted in the NSP and made as the ideational foundation for the promotion of human security in the said policy document.

What national security really means in the Philippines is elusive in its attempt to be comprehensive. The catch-all definition of the NDCP and NSC, for whatever principle and purpose this may serve, evades capture as a subject of analysis in the praxis of security administration. But the fact that security is referred to as “national security” by the executive already sets out the real meaning and leaning of the term in policy formulation and implementation.

From a Public Administration perspective, “national security” is qualified as a public good whose enjoyment by individuals in a sovereign nation does not deprive fellow citizens from equally benefitting. It must be taken into account that the “publicness” of national security stands not for the exclusive benefit of individuals or particular groups, but for the general well-being of a people as a nation. This means that while the welfare of the people is integral to national security, the latter is more concerned with the state of the nation as an aggregate whole. The primary interest on the security and survival of the state is demonstrated by the fact that individual liberties and sectoral concerns can sometimes be sacrificed,

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when necessary, for the greater good. Critical thinkers in the post modern genre of security thought would label this conservative view as unpopular, but national security proponents today will rationalize it as still primordial.

Security, from a national perspective, is geared towards protecting and enhancing the welfare of a nation state, the latter of which comprises the essential elements of governmental entity, territorial integrity, and citizenry. This view of national security, one that is confined to a sovereign country, is fundamental for traditional leaders at the helm of nation-building. This is especially warranted in a country whose insecurities stem primarily from protracted insurgency, political rifts, and brewing tensions with neighboring countries on territorial claims in the West Philippine Sea.

But for countries that take pride in truly enjoying the gains of democratic peace, the focus of security is turned towards enhancing individual rights and sustaining human development in all its dimensions. The human security principle entails giving greater value to social welfare through increased expenditures on education, health, and economic opportunities; rather than to military modernization through arms build-up. These are the concerns of human security as the priority in democratic nations that are secure of their economic conditions, political institutions, national unity, and territorial integrity.

In the Philippines, the NSP theme of “securing the gains of democracy” actually means securitizing human development through security sector reform or SSR, particularly military modernization. Apparently, the professed reorientation of

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38 In her analysis of presidential addresses in the Philippines, Almase described the first period of administration from 1935 to 1944 as having the dominant theme of “Call for Self-Sacrificing Citizens in the Service and Defense of the State.” This emerged from the speeches of President Manuel L Quezon during the Commonwealth government, and President Jose P Laurel during the Japanese occupation. During this period of authoritarian administration of the two Presidents, the principal concern for the security and survival of the state required the inculcation of patriotic principles that demanded for the service and sacrifice of citizens.

In the era of war, the emphasis on the good of the state and not of the individuals became the fundamental principle espoused by Quezon and Laurel. While the basic principle of promoting the public welfare was also propounded during their presidencies, the primary objective of building a strong State and ensuring its existence in the face of internal and external threats preceded everything else, even individual good and liberties. Almase argued in her dissertation that this principle of protecting the state was the indigenous Filipino administrative thought that was unexplored and understudied in the Westernized literature of Philippine Public Administration. [Almase, “Saga of Administrative Thought,” 88-91.]

national security in the NSP is a false impression in a country whose army continues to fight chronic insurgency in the midst of poverty and corruption.

Cruz, in writing on the Philippine perspective on SSR in 2012, presented a causal loop modeling to explain the causes of underdevelopment in the Philippines and the courses of action that are needed to address the problem. In his framework of analysis, he explained that government can be effective in administering the rule of law, delivering basic services, and ensuring human security, if peace and stability are attained. The precondition for peace and security was regarded to be dependent on the neutralization of armed conflicts by the security forces of the state. Following the logic of this argument, the recurring theme of “state-building” was taken as the primary interest of government before it can proceed to its task of social, political, and economic development. As Cruz wrote:

When a substantial level of stability is achieved, there is a chance for state-building to be given due attention once again. State-building entails strengthening institutions, enhancing democratic processes, working towards sustainable socio-economic and cultural development, and ensuring that security institutions make citizens feel safe and secure. As the negative cycle is arrested and a positive cycle is begun, the interrelated elements of State-building are addressed. (Underline provided.)

The foregoing viewpoint alludes to a traditional security thought in a country that strives to build institutions and defenses to quell threats to national security. To combat the illegal use of force by insurgents, the employment of state violence was deemed as only necessary. National security was argued to be under jeopardy if the defense department is unable to beef up its security apparatus to be “fully mission capable.” Cruz’s conceptual model suggested that the inability to fulfill this mandate would embolden insurgency, leading to greater incidence of violent conflicts. Thus, to end the negative cycle, the need to reform and strengthen the security sector was put forward by government as a priority agenda for national development.

Given the enveloping security scenario, the propaganda of human security in the NSP seems to be anchored on building up the institutional mechanism that will deliver development outcomes. In this case, capacity building and modernization of government bureaucracy, particularly of the military, are earnestly sought. The latter

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40 Cruz, “Security Sector Reform,” 56.
41 Ibid., 57.
42 Ibid., 51.
is even more wanting as the administration strives to gear towards external defense in a region where military build-up determines a precarious balance of power. The disposition of the Philippine government as a sovereign state to strengthen its national defense defines in policy the meaning of “national security” that is coated in the academic fad of human security in the NSP.

Conclusion

The challenge for the 2011-2016 National Security Policy or NSP is how to actualize in the present state of affairs its professed principles of human security, and how to sustain these beyond the President’s term should they work out today. Continuing with the status quo may appear to be convenient for an administrative leadership with limited time, as revolutionizing systemic practices engenders high political risk. One reason why a government may not take the risk for policy reconstruction could be the stark reality of scarce resources. This is especially true when allocations of limited national budget already incite high political tension and corruption; and when massive debt servicing, which is tucked in the black box of legislation, eats up the largest chunk of public revenues every fiscal year.

Albeit competing budgetary demands for human security needs, President Aquino—as the chief agenda setter, was able to muster congressional support for the new Armed Forces of the Philippines or AFP Modernization Act of 2012. Aside from addressing threats to the country, the extended modernization of the armed forces was said to respond to the demand for security sector reform or SSR in democratic governments in Asia. It must be taken into account, however, that contemporary literature on SSR posits that the effectiveness of the security sector is not defined by arms capability, but by the quality, transparency, and accountability of political institutions and democratic mechanisms under which a capable military operates.43

Moreover, to ensure that human development is realized, idealist proponents of SSR advocate for a realignment of expenditures from military hardware to social and economic services. This guards against excessive military expenditures

43 Mark Sedra, The Future of Security Sector Reform (Ontario, Canada: The Center for International Governance in Innovation, 2010), 16.
that reduce resources for development needs,\textsuperscript{44} an advocacy that jibes well with the policy principle of “social bias” in Public Administration. Social bias, which is synonymous to “social justice,” pertains to budgetary allocations that favor agricultural development, safeguards for the environment, and safety-nets for the poor. But while the bias for social welfare is demanded as a policy priority in democratic governance, the inclination for military upgrade, on the other hand, is taken as a fundamental necessity in national security administration.

Invoking national security to build up the military was what Buzan, a British Emeritus Professor of International Relations, described in 1991 “as a political tool of immense convenience” for policy leaders. According to him, the use of national security rhetoric is a power-maximizing strategy of political and military elites who want to gain control over resource allocations and domestic policies.\textsuperscript{45} This perception could perhaps explain how the politically powerful construct of “national security” was able to bolster the immediate enactment of the extended military modernization law in the Philippines.

It is worthwhile to note that the prominence given to national security as a principle and to military build-up as a policy is out of use in addressing unconventional threats to human security. In the quest for an ideal world, “security” is re-founded by constructivists as no longer referring to the security of nation-states, but to the security of individuals whose nationalities are irrelevant in common and non-exclusive humanitarian concerns of the international community. Examples of these emerging security concerns are food scarcity, epidemic diseases, water security, natural disasters, climate change, as well as transnational crimes and terrorism—which make states cooperate and relax their exclusive national interests. In addressing threats that transcend national borders, “human security” and “comprehensive security”—instead of “national security”—have been adopted as the more appropriate policy themes in regional discourses.

The comprehensive approach to security becomes a matter of cooperative concern in a community of nations in the new century. The Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN), in its blueprint on establishing the ASEAN

\textsuperscript{44} Nicole Ball, “The Evolution of the Security Sector Reform Agenda,” in Mark Sedra (ed) The Future of Security Sector Reform (Ontario, Canada: The Center for International Governance in Innovation, 2010), 30.

See also Geneva Center for Democratic Control of the Armed Forces, “Security Sector Governance and Reform” (backgrounder series, DCAF Research Division, Geneva, 2009), 11.

\textsuperscript{45} For Wolfers, the use of the term national security by policy makers and military strategists is both attractive and deceptive. In practice, this connotes a struggle for power that is “dangerously self-fulfilling.” [See Barry Buzan, People, States, and Fear: An Agenda for International Security Studies in the Post Cold War Era (Boulder, Colorado: Lynne Publishers, 1991), 6, 9, 11.]
Political Security Community (APSC) for 2015, defines “comprehensive security” as having “the interwoven relationships of political, economic, socio-cultural and environmental dimensions of development.” The comprehensive approach prefers peaceful settlements to resolve conflicts as it renounces aggression and armed offensives in the region. It must be noted that this broader perspective of security does not constitute the military dimension that is essentially a component of national security administration. From an international standpoint, “national security” is national security with explicit reference to protecting the exclusive interests of an egoist state, rather than to promoting the common interests of the regional community.

It must be taken into account that the current literature in Security Studies maintains the realist ontological view of “national security” as the use of military capabilities by a sovereign state to protect itself. Omand, British professor and author of “Securing the State: National Security in Contemporary Times,” in 2012 defined national security as “an objective reality such as freedom from foreign intrusion.” In his book, he presented “a modern approach to security” that bears clearly a conventional military strategy that has endured in the post-modern security discourse. His strategic approach to promote “national security” has three primary components, which include: (1) mitigation of future circumstances; (2) management of risks; and, (3) employment of efficient and reliable intelligence.

While the administration of national security focuses on the protection of the state by itself, the need for good governance was emphasized in the employment of military force. This very principle is important in national security administration as articulated succinctly in Omand’s writings below:

My argument, in a nutshell, is that good government will always take the task of ‘securing the state’ at the top of its priority. With security comes confidence, economic and social progress and investment in the future. But good government also recognizes, as the 14th century frescoes show, that security needs the active support of the public and thus the right relationship between justice, civic harmony, wise administration, fortitude, prudence and other virtues to which the wise ruler and government should aspire. (Underline provided.)

46 Association of Southeast Asian Nations, Roadmap for an ASEAN Community, 2009-2015 (Jakarta, Indonesia: ASEAN Secretariat, 2009), 6.
48 Ibid.
49 Ibid., 2-3.
The demands for legitimacy and public accountability accentuate the primary obligation of a good government to build up its military defense for national security. Good governance, therefore, is the great challenge to defense transformation in a country that is in need of military modernization to quell insurgency, but lacking of sufficient resources to provide human security. The problem of bad governance and corruption makes even more complex the dilemma of balancing competing demands for peace, security, and development.

What does the subject of “security” actually mean in the Philippines? It means obviously “national security” in real terms even if this is idealized in the NSP as a comprehensive human development framework for the country. What the prospects would be for the NSP are grounded on the present state of affairs, enduring social structures, traditional practices, and confounded security threats in the Philippines. One only needs to look into the complex socio-economic and political environment surrounding the NSP in order to understand the problematique of the publicized policy on national security with a Social Contract until 2016.

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CHAPTER II

Security Sector Reform: Way Forward for Democracy and Development
Security Sector Reform:
WAY FORWARD FOR DEMOCRACY AND DEVELOPMENT

Rodel A. Cruz *

The study of Philippine security sector reform entails a close inspection of the case of Germany & Japan—two great powers which were redefined from their martial past. To better understand and develop some thoughts on the development of our security sector, the author looks into some historical insights from the said countries. This paper discusses the rise and fall of Germany and Japan, and eventually, delves into the Philippine experience, during and after the Martial Rule. It also includes noteworthy events and mechanisms which led to the beginnings of security sector development and transformation. This paper highlights that the Philippine nation is currently in a state of reform and this reform is a continuing process. It is time to build on this momentum and on the current favorable political climate to achieve substantial development in our security sector.

Historical Insights

Santayana found value in looking back before looking forward when he wrote: “[t]hose who cannot remember the past are condemned to repeat it.” Indeed, the ebb and flow of historical antecedents provide valuable insights on the evolution of human thought and behavior throughout human existence. It teaches lessons on how the transformation of intellect and actions of man translates from the individual to the collective, from man to State, as Hegel saw it. History provides no absolute rules even as it offers compelling parallelisms. At the very least, it provides context to better understand the present as we continue to divine our future.

It is for this reason that Security Sector Reform in our country is presented with a view of historical antecedents of two (2) case studies: Germany & Japan, great powers that dominated Europe and Asia militarily, faced humiliating defeats and emerged redefined from its martial past. It is submitted that historical insights

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from these examples can help better understand and develop some thoughts on the way forward for security sector reform in our own human polity.

*The rise of Germany & Japan*

Since German unification, attained by force of arms in the late 19th century under Otto Von Bismarck, Prussian military thought has played a prominent role in the development of military thinking and the way military organizations have been structured and managed. At its peak, the influence of Prussian military thinkers went beyond the confines of defense and security and influenced political and social thought, in general.¹

Germany embraced the progress provided by the industrial revolution and grew exponentially during this period.² With a preeminent martial culture, it became the dominant European military power surpassing its rivals. It was, after all, a society that had a strong affinity with the warrior spirit.³ It was in this milieu of unprecedented growth that thoughts of Imperial Germany emerged. The imperialist ambitions were fueled by the belligerence of its military thinkers and strong racial overtones drawn from the currency of Darwinian thinking at the time.⁴

Halfway around the world, a similar transformation was taking place.

Japan had just emerged from its feudal isolation that featured a succession of military clans governing fiefdoms. Centuries of isolation kept the warrior spirit strong in Japan as samurai warriors loyal to their Shoguns repelled Mongol hordes on its shores and repelled Western intrusions. They paid allegiance to the Tokugawa military dynasty and notionally professed loyalty to the emperor.⁵

Swords soon gave way to rifles and canons but the samurai spirit remained strong.⁶ The Meiji Restoration, the resurgence of the notion of a Japanese nation,

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¹ Gat, Azar. “A History of Military Thought (From the Enlightenment to the Cold War),” Oxford University Press (2001), at p. 314
² Between 1870 and 1914, Germany’s population grew by 66%. Compared to France, Germany was producing 6 times more coal and 3 times more pig iron to fuel its industrialization between 1910 and 1913. Germany surpassed the industrial production of Britain by 1913. At the time, it was fast becoming as strong as Russia and France combined. (Ibid., at pp.342-343)
³ Ibid, at p.325
⁴ Ibid, at p.347
⁶ Ibid., at p.5.
and the opening of Japan in the mid-19th century coincided with the industrial revolution that ushered an unprecedented period of growth. Japan soon had resources to support a robust military organization and make investments in weaponry. It was thus that the Japanese Imperial Army was organized drawing inspiration from the samurai culture embodied in the bushido or the way of the warrior.

Throughout the sweeping changes taking place in the 19th century, Japan’s martial culture remained a strong foundation for the emerging nation. The overlap between the military and government remained prevalent. Aritomo Yamagata, who argued for the establishment of a national force, played an important role in the ensuing military transformation. Having spent time in Berlin, Yamagata was deeply impressed by Prussian success against the French. Yamagata brought home with him strong Prussian influences not only in organizing an efficient military but also in shaping the relationship between the military and the State. Prussian military officers were invited to teach in the Japanese General Staff College, including Major Jacob Meckel. Together, Yamagata and Meckel, prepared the nascent Japanese Imperial Army for the dominant role it was to play in Asia.

After its initial success in the Korean peninsula and after dealing with the declining Chinese military a humiliating defeat in the First-Sino Japanese War, Japan sealed its standing as the new regional power. It also marked the beginning of its imperial ambitions. When the Russians fell in the hands of the Japanese in 1904, even Germany took notice and admired the Japanese warrior spirit that allowed its armies to overcome the superior numbers of their adversaries.

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7 Following the 1868 Meiji Restoration, Japan gradually transitioned from an agricultural (primarily silk and cotton farming) to an industrial economy between 1885 to 1940. During the same period, the Gross Domestic Product (GDP) of Japan was growing faster (1.96%), on the average, than the US (1.53%) and Britain (1.10%). By 1939, manufacturing and mining accounted for 34% of the GDP with agriculture accounting for just 15%. It has been suggested that “[A]n identification of industrialization and financial development with nationalism and military power directed growth in Japan along a path different to Southeast Asia’s.”

8 By the end of the turn of the century (1896-1903), Japanese military spending virtually doubled and constituted, on the average, about 40% of its national budget. (Harries, op.cit., at page 65)

9 Harries, op.cit., at page 7

10 Ibid., at page 48

11 Ibid.

12 Ibid., at page 61

13 Gat, op.cit., at page 349. In fact, to arouse the German martial culture, Moltke even sarcastically offered placing Germany under the protectorate of Japan if materialism prevails and the dream of a German Empire is drowned by a consideration of its cost. (at page 355)
As Germany and Japan became regional powers by the beginning of the 20th century, the lines between government and the military organization became more and more blurred. The determination of national policy became closely interlinked with military imperatives at the dawn of the age of imperialism.\textsuperscript{14}

\textit{The fall of Germany & Japan}

As in most cases, one’s fall happens a lot quicker that its rise.

After becoming predominant powers in Europe and Asia, the march of Germany and Japan towards the establishment of continental empires seemed ineluctable.\textsuperscript{15} The years leading up to World War II and those that immediately followed presents the starkest picture of how the military organizations of Germany and Japan reached their peak of power and influence only to be followed by their sudden and decisive decline.\textsuperscript{16}

Coincidentally, the role of the military in the politics and society of Germany and Japan increased as democratic institutions declined on their march towards world domination.\textsuperscript{17} Political and military leadership fused in varying degrees, as the world was pushed to the edge of a war of unprecedented scale. Their military organizations became more opaque growing less and less accountable for their decisions yet more and more involved in national life. A large part of the national economy served the growing requirements of the military. Personality cliques developed as leadership was placed in the hands of favored individuals.

After the dust of the World War II had settled, their militaries were roundly defeated and their military leaders faced the consequences of their actions. The fundamental laws of both nations were re-written by the victors to restore the rule of law instead of men. A key feature of the pacifist constitutions of Germany and

\textsuperscript{14} The end of the Weimar Republic in Germany coinciding with the economic crisis ushered by the depression in the 1930s saw the rise of Nazi Party and the ascent of Adolf Hitler. In Japan, after the Meiji Restoration, “the army had been hardly distinguishable as a separate force in government, so great was the overlap of military and civilian leadership. The civilian government included many figures with military rank, past and present, xxx.” (Harries, \textit{op. cit.} at page 56).

\textsuperscript{15} Because of Japanese interests in China, Japan and Germany fought on different sides during World War I. Doubts, however, were expressed on Japan’s resolve to fight against the Germans as British allies had invariably more casualties than the Germans and were said to have been treated worse than German captives. (Harries, \textit{op. cit.} at page 10 et seq).

\textsuperscript{16} Harries, \textit{op. cit.} at page 193.

\textsuperscript{17} See footnote 14.
Japan were the demilitarization of both nations and the imposition of controls on the use of State violence.\textsuperscript{18} The military organizations of both nations later reemerged with redefined roles and renewed trust and confidence of the people.\textsuperscript{19}

\textit{Philippine Experience}

To a limited extent, it may be argued that historical parallels may be drawn from the historical antecedents provided by Germany and Japan on the one hand, and the Philippine experience, on the other.

Following similar patterns, the power and influence of the security forces (primarily, the military and police) in domestic politics reached its peak during martial law and the role they played in ending it. During this period of “militarization,” the military dominated various aspects of the national life and entrenched itself within the ruling elite, like the military did in Germany and Japan.\textsuperscript{20} The well-documented abuses committed by the ruling factions within the military during martial law resulted in fundamental changes in the 1987 Constitution meant to help ensure that the nation does not suffer the same experience again, following the same trends as the pacifist constitutions of Germany and Japan. The challenge that lies ahead is to see our military emerge from its past, become credible institutions that enjoy the trust and confidence of our people and a source of pride for our nation.

\textsuperscript{18} Germany and Japan were both demilitarized after World War II through limits on the role of their respective military written into their pacifist constitutions. Germany slowly remilitarized when Germany joined the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) but the role of the Bundeswehr formed in 1955 was to be strictly defensive. It was only in 1966, that role of the military in Germany became more pronounced and eventually participated in missions abroad. \url{www.time.com/world/article/0,8599,1906570,00.html}
\textsuperscript{19} The Cold War resulted in West Germany rearming itself and aligned itself with NATO while East Germany aligned itself with the Warsaw Pact countries. In the meantime, Japan’s pacifist constitution held even as the Japan Self Defense Force (JSDF) was formed in 1954 for self defense purposes. It was only in 2007 when Japan established its Ministry of Defense (MoD). The JSDF, initially involved only in humanitarian missions, subsequently engaged in more frequent military exercises with its allies. This development appears to be in reaction to rising threats from China and North Korea. Notably, Japan’s “remilitarization” follows the same pattern as Germany’s. (See footnote 18)
1. Martial Law

Before martial law, the Philippines had one of the best-equipped military organizations in the region. With the regular flow of funds coming from the rentals of the US Bases, its military capabilities surpassed most of its neighbors. However, martial law eroded our security institutions and left lasting legacies in its wake.

The dark years of martial law taught us that authoritarian regimes thrive as democratic institutions are deliberately weakened. The rule of law was subverted. Checks and balances in the exercise of governmental power were lost. Power was centralized in the hands of the autocrat whose continued rule constituted an open invitation to challenge. Necessarily, the autocratic regime depended heavily on the use of State violence to suppress challenges.\(^{21}\)

Consequently, a substantial part of the fruits of the national economy was channeled to support security forces. It was lavished with financial support by a repressive regime dependent on them for continued control of the populace. Its leadership eventually became beholden, loyal and accountable only to the regime. This eroded and eventually destroyed military professionalism.

An opaque and oppressive regime characterized by the absence of transparency and accountability bred corruption that eventually seeped into the security institutions that receives substantial financial support from the government. Even where capabilities of security forces remained strong despite a declining national economy, security institutions, in reality, became weak. Though they remained effective in performing their missions, they were no longer accountable to the public they were supposed to serve. The military ceased to be a corporate body of professionals that served the interest of the society it is sworn to protect. Its leadership was placed in the hands of officers loyal to the regime resulting in the rise of personality cliques. Policies became personal instead of institutional. Democratic civilian oversight was lost.

What came out of this symbiosis is an opaque security system placed beyond the control of democratic institutions. The security apparatus eventually became a tool for suppression of dissent and a crutch for the maintenance of power. It engendered fear among the populace. As a result of the erosion of the rule of law, our people felt threatened by a capable security sector that was supposed to protect them. Human security was in constant peril even in places with a veneer of State stability. The Philippines was not alone in this experience under a constitutional dictatorship. Other autocrats came to power throughout the region out of fear of the domino principle after Southeast Asian countries fell one after another to a series of communist revolutions.

The effects of this condition often last. Today, martial law legacies continue to plague our security sector decades after the fall of the dictatorship. The impact of the martial law era on civil-military relations in our country has been widely discussed. However, an examination of the reasons why martial law legacies have lasted as long as they did remains lacking.

2. Post Martial Law

Ironically, the military that propped up the dictatorship played a pivotal role in the deposing it in 1986. Power was handed to a civilian revolutionary leadership that ushered the gradual restoration of democratic institutions. However, the role played by the military in regime change also had negative consequences as the nation transitioned into democracy. Coup attempts and mutinies came one after another waged by segments of security organizations still possessed of substantial capabilities. Military intervention was justified under the constitutional edict that the AFP “is the protector of the people and the State.” This gave rise to calls from

22 See: Cruz, Rodel A., “Security Sector Reform: Philippine Perspectives on Defense Transformation” in “Transformation: A Security Sector Reform Reader,” (INCITEGov: 2012), at page 49, et seq. The discussion in this paper is culled from a chapter in the cited book. It offers a pedestrian view of some antecedents and actions that followed, for contextual purposes only. It is not represented as a comprehensive scholarly presentation and analysis of historical events and is, therefore, open to dispute.

23 The military again played a crucial role in another regime change involving the ouster of President Joseph Ejercito Estrada on charges of corruption in 2001. Curiously, both instances when the military played a crucial role in supporting popular uprisings that brought about regime change in 1986 and 2001 were followed by corruption scandals rocking the military leadership. Both also gave rise to coups and mutinies. Does this indicate that the prominent role the military plays in regime change tend to give those who eventually take the helm of our military organizations a false sense of entitlement such that they view military funds as part of the spoils?

24 Section 3, Article II of the 1987 Constitution.
civil society for the military to go back to barracks. It also rekindled suspicions against the military that lingers in some sectors of our society until now.

In 1992, Fidel V. Ramos was elected President. Before becoming President, he was Chief of the Philippine Constabulary and played an instrumental role in the 1986 fall of the dictatorship. Some of those who helped engineer his rise to the presidency saw in him the fusion of civilian mind and military discipline – one who can serve as a timely antidote to the military adventurism that wrought havoc to a national economy already ravaged by the dictatorship.  

Shortly after assuming office, an amnesty was declared to give a second chance to those who took part in episodes of military adventurism in the previous decade. A peace agreement was later concluded with the Moro National Liberation Front (MNLF) in 1996 while peace talks with the communist insurgents continued. Relative peace and stability was attained coinciding with the pendulum swing in the global economy that favored emerging economies in Asia. These conditions fostered a short-lived economic resurgence.

In the meantime, capability gaps within the military began to show. In 1992, the US military bases were closed down as the treaty for the extension of the lease on these facilities was defeated in the Senate. Funding that sustained military capability drawn from annual rentals of approximately US$200M was lost. This gave rise to the idea of converting AFP military camps to commercial use to generate funds for military modernization and capability upgrade. The AFP Modernization Act was passed. Unfortunately, the 1996 Asian financial contagion stalled attempts to modernize the AFP and slowed down economic growth. Consequently, capability gaps within the military continued to widen.

The succeeding administration opted to wage an all out war in Mindanao in response to renewed challenges from secessionist groups. The increase in operational tempo further exposed the widening gaps in our military capability. From one administration to another, corruption in the military (that was commonplace in our well-funded security organizations under martial law) persisted at a time when our security institutions have already become emaciated due to declining budgets. Scarce resources for the frontlines were siphoned off at the headquarters by corrupt military fund managers. Young company commanders fresh out of the military academy sent to the frontlines suffered the consequences of lost capabilities and

25 Curiously, after the World War II, the US similarly elected a former military officer into the White House: Dwight Eisenhower. Numerous individuals with previous careers in our security institutions, all graduates of the PMA, have likewise been elected into the Philippine Senate and House of Representatives and often dominate legislative deliberations on security issues.
missing funds – a far cry from the spartan comforts they enjoyed in the Philippine Military Academy (PMA). These conditions later provided the spark for a failed mutiny led by young officers. Later, a corruption scandal unprecedented in scale rocked the military leadership. What used to be spoken in whispers in military circles came to full public view confirming the allegations of the mutinous few.

From a broader policy standpoint, civilian leadership failed to provide the military with a comprehensive National Security Policy and the National Security Strategy that flows from it. The absence of a coherent and forward looking security policy framework led to a patchwork of efforts to address security challenges that were difficult to sustain. As a result, internal security threats remained unresolved and martial law legacies continued to afflict our defense and military organizations.

All told, despite the restoration of democracy, security sector reform was not pursued in earnest resulting in poorly equipped security organizations that remained prone to corruption and constantly grappling with challenges to professionalism. Worse, in the absence of effective democratic civilian leadership and oversight, segments of the military occasionally became threats to our individual and collective security.

3. The Beginnings of Transformation

a. Davide and Feliciano Commissions

Initial attempts at defense transformation drew inspiration from various sources. The reports of the Davide Commission\footnote{Named after former Supreme Court Justice Hilario Davide, Jr. the commission was formed, initially in December 1989 by Administrative Order (AO 146) and later by Republic Act No. 6832, to conduct a thorough fact-finding investigation of the failed coup d’etat of December 1989 and to recommend measures that would prevent the occurrence of similar attempts in the future. The inquiry yielded a 743-page final report that included specific recommendations for reforms. (See: http://www.pcij.org/HotSeat/davidereport.html)} that looked into military adventurism in the years that followed the fall of the dictatorship culminating in
the failed coup of December 1989 and the Feliciano Commission\textsuperscript{27} that studied the failed mutiny of young officers in July 2003 provided detailed anecdotal evidence of the malaise that plagued the defense and military organizations. Both reports highlighted the importance of democratic civilian control over the military.

\textbf{b. RP-US Joint Defense Assessment}

The outcome of the 3-year RP-US Joint Defense Assessment (JDA)\textsuperscript{28} delved into the systemic causes of the problems identified in the testimonies given during the fact-finding inquiries of the Davide and Feliciano Commissions. From

\textsuperscript{27} Named after retired Supreme Court Justice Florentino P. Feliciano, who headed the fact finding commission that looked into the July 2003 “Oakwood Mutiny,” the recommendations in its final report were culled from testimonies given during its hearings. They were mostly aimed at addressing such issues as graft and corruption in the AFP as well as personnel concerns including housing, salary and career development. Specifically, the recommendations included the following: (a) addressing the AFP Retirement, Separation and Benefits System (RSBS) and procurement problems; (b) providing adequate funding to upgrade the capabilities of the AFP; (c) Improving the AFP medical services; (d) strengthening the records system for the personal data of soldiers and dependents through computerization; and (d) addressing housing problems of the AFP personnel. (See: http://www.newsbreak.ph/2011/03/07/feliciano-commission-report/)

\textsuperscript{28} From 1999 to 2003, Philippine and United States (US) defense and military planners and analysts conducted a series of assessments with respect to the capability of the AFP to perform its essential missions, including internal security operations (ISO), territorial defense, disaster relief and humanitarian assistance, search and rescue, maritime security, support to national development and support to regional and global initiatives. In October 1999, the JDA began as a policy level discussion between the Philippine Secretary of National Defense (SND) and the US Secretary of Defense. In the same year, the assessment process formally commenced under the Philippine-US Defense Experts Exchange, where a delegation from the Philippine Department of National Defense (DND) went to the US Department of Defense (DoD) to explore ways to undertake a joint AFP capability assessment. In 2000, the AFP, together with Subject Matter Experts (SMEs) from the US Pacific Command (PACOM), conducted a qualitative capability assessment, which yielded an initial JDA report in 2001. The following year, a more comprehensive and quantitative assessment was conducted, which included an initial Notional Plan. On 12 September 2003, the JDA was completed with an updated Notional Plan. Thereafter, the JDA Planning and Implementation Group (JDA-PAIG) was created to implement the JDA recommendations. Pursuant to DND Department Order No. 183 dated 13 October 2003, the JDA-PAIG was tasked to “facilitate the effective implementation of the 2003 Joint Defense Assessment” in order to enhance Philippine defense capabilities and assist the modernization of the AFP. Under the supervision of the Office of the President, the JDA-PAIG was tasked to develop a Plan of Action and Milestones (POA&Ms) that would serve as the roadmap for the implementation of the JDA recommendations. Thereafter, the responsibility of implementing the JDA recommendations was subsequently delegated to the DND. The Philippine-led and US-assisted JDA falls within the context of long-standing Philippine-US relations. The status of the Philippines as a Major Non-NATO Ally (MNNA) opens opportunities for expanded security assistance from the US. The AFP reform programs therefore become a crucial link to access these benefits and privileges, to culminate in an overarching improvement of Philippine defense and security capability.
a business standpoint, the JDA served as a management audit that established baselines and pointed out key areas where improvements may be made to effect lasting and fundamental changes in the organizations. As a comprehensive assessment of our defense capabilities, the JDA provided an objective diagnosis of deficiencies in the AFP. It likewise identified capability shortfalls and their root causes, which should be addressed through force restructuring, systems improvement, automation and legislation, among others. The JDA concluded that the capability of the AFP to execute its missions was rated as generally Minus (-) Partial Mission Capable, a vital indicator of the critical condition of our military’s capability to perform its various mandates that was largely attributed to systemic deficiencies within our military organization. Overall, the JDA identified 65 key and 207 ancillary areas of concern. All these were distilled into 10 key recommendations that became the focus of initial attempts at introducing systemic improvements in our defense and military establishment through the Philippine Defense Reform (PDR) program.

c. Transforming while Performing

Compounding the challenges was the fact that transformation had to take place while the military continued to perform its duties in addressing current and emerging security threats. Meanwhile, AFP modernization remained in limbo and capability gaps continued to widen. It did not help that the priority list for capability upgrade was incoherent and seemingly the product of lobbying instead of sound strategic planning. In any case, the national economy was not strong enough to provide needed investments in capability upgrade for the military. Some civilians holding the purse strings remained suspicious of our military that once used its capability to suppress public dissent during martial law and waged coups and mutinies thereafter. In fact, the 1987 Constitution put a cap on defense spending mandating that the defense budget must not exceed the education budget. The corruption scandals in the military did not help either. Understandably, calls for increased defense spending were met with a tepid response if not utter indifference.

d. Policy Baselines

The absence of a comprehensive policy framework coupled with an outdated charter for the defense and military establishment found in the 1935 National Defense Act (and a scattering of various laws and decrees enacted after

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29 Military capability planners spoke in whispers about “supplier driven” capability intentions. This indicates that defense contractors or suppliers and their powerful civilian and military backers may have had a role in shaping the determination of priorities under the AFP Modernization program.

30 Section 5(5), Article XIV of the 1987 Constitution
it) highlighted the neglect of the civilian leadership to provide policy guidance to our defense and military organizations. Given this, broad policy guidelines had to be drawn and distilled from the fundamental law itself. The 1987 Constitution provides, among other State Principles, that the Philippines is a democratic and republican State. Sovereignty resides in the people and all government authority emanates from them. The Philippines renounces war as an instrument of national policy. It adheres to the principle that civilian authority is, at all times, supreme over the military. The AFP is the protector of the people and the State. Its goal is to secure the sovereignty of the State and the integrity of the national territory. The Government may call upon the people to defend the State and, in the fulfillment thereof, all citizens may be required, under conditions provided by law, to render personal military or civil service.

31 Compared with various laws establishing policies pertaining to the Philippine National Police (PNP) (See footnote 28), policy baselines for the AFP are generally outdated. Section 2, Article II of the 1935 Constitution provides: “The defense of the State is a prime duty of government, and in the fulfillment of this duty all citizens may be required by law to render personal military or civil service.” This provision was reproduced, almost verbatim, in the 1973 Constitution. The statute implementing this constitutional principle is Commonwealth Act No. 1 enacted on December 21, 1935 otherwise known as “The National Defense Act.” A related statute, Commonwealth Act No. 430 enacted on May 31, 1939 created the Department of National Defense (DND), charged with the duty of supervising the national defense program of the country and given executive supervision over those bureaus, offices, and services which the President may determine to be properly under its jurisdiction. It also authorized the President to effectuate, by executive order, the organization of the DND. Pursuant to the foregoing authority, then President Manuel L. Quezon issued Executive Order No. 230 issued on October 31, 1939 organized the DND effective November 1, 1939. The 1987 Constitution reiterates the duty of the Government to defend the state and preserved the doctrine of compulsory military and civil service existing in the 1935 and 1973 Constitutions. Thus, Article II, Section 4 states: “The prime duty of the Government is to serve and protect the people. The Government may call upon the people to defend the State and, in the fulfillment thereof, all citizens may be required, under conditions provided by law, to render personal, military or civil service.” The constitutional mandate of the Armed Forces of the Philippines (AFP) under civilian control was expressly stated, thus: “Civilian authority is, at all times, supreme over the military. The Armed Forces of the Philippines is the protector of the people and the State. Its goal is to secure the sovereignty of the State and the integrity of the national territory.” These constitutional principles are reiterated in Executive Order No. 292, otherwise known as the “Administrative Code of 1987”. Under EO 292, it is a declared policy of the State that “the defense establishment shall be maintained to maximize its effectiveness in guarding against external and internal threats to national peace and security, and provide support for social and economic development” [Title VIII, Book IV, Subtitle I, Chapter 1, Administrative Code of 1987].

32 Section 1, Article II of the 1987 Constitution
33 Section 2, Article II of the 1987 Constitution
34 Section 3, Article II of the 1987 Constitution
35 Section 4, Article II of the 1987 Constitution
Democratic civilian control over the military is expressed in our Constitution through, among others, the Commander-in-Chief clause,\textsuperscript{36} the doctrine of qualified political agency that empowers the SND in defense management, the power of the Commission on Appointments to confirm military appointments from the rank of colonel or captain in the navy,\textsuperscript{37} and Congressional powers of appropriation and oversight.\textsuperscript{38} Various laws were also passed to hold the military accountable before civilian courts for various offenses to complement the military justice system.\textsuperscript{39}

While policy guidelines were not well established at the time the beginnings of transformation were taking place, the scope for needed improvements was vast. Even as the situation risked imprecise approaches towards reforms, the target for improvements remained broad enough not to miss.

\textbf{Moving Forward: Security Sector Reform \& State Building}

\textit{In Search of Identity: The Security Sector}

A patchwork effort at transforming our security sector will not yield the comprehensive results that will help us attain desired levels of human security and State security. Efforts at transforming our military and defense establishment can only go so far in this regard. Other aspects of the security sector must be covered by a sweeping effort at genuine social transformation.

To achieve this, it is beneficial for the security sector to establish its own sectoral identity within the context of our broader society. Indeed, security is not synonymous to defense. Security is a far broader concept than defense. In the same manner, security and justice are not the same but neither is subordinate to the other. Thus, security sector reform encompasses a broader effort of which defense transformation is a key part.

In the absence of a clearly defined and relatable identity, its relevance as a sector will be lost as it fights for attention in a nation still fraught with martial law legacies. There should be no doubt that security sector reform is a key issue of governance that must be addressed in all its facets and in all its components with greater urgency as part of State building.

\textsuperscript{36} Section 18, Article VII of the 1987 Constitution
\textsuperscript{37} Section 16, Article VII of the 1987 Constitution
\textsuperscript{38} Section 29, Article VI of the 1987 Constitution
\textsuperscript{39} See: Republic Act No. 7055
For a better understanding of the security sector, it is essential to know the actors involved as well as the linkages and complementary relationships between and among them. Following are overlapping groups of actors in an indicative list adapted to our local context:\(^{40}\)

- **Core Security Actors**: armed forces; state militia or paramilitary forces [e.g. Citizen Armed Force Geographical Units (CAFGU)]; constabularies, intelligence and security services (both military and civilian), police and other law enforcement agencies [Philippine National Police (PNP); National Bureau of Investigation (NBI); Philippine Drug Enforcement Agency (PDEA); Philippine Coast Guard (PCG)]; border management officers: immigration officers, customs officers, border guards; local security units, civil defense forces, national guards, community security forces or village watch organizations (*Barangay Tanods*)

These core security actors are allowed by the State to use violence in the performance of their mandates, to enforce law and order, or provide the state with information to enable it to make decisions on issues affecting security, including the effective use of violence to achieve societal goals. In exchange for the right to bear arms and gather intelligence, they are required to surrender some of their civil rights.

- **Management and Oversight Bodies**: the Commander-in-Chief, the National Security Council and other national security advisory bodies, Executive Department, Department of National Defense (DND), Department of Interior and Local Government (DILG), Congress and its committees, Department of Foreign Affairs (DFA), customary and traditional authorities, financial management bodies such as the Department of Budget and Management (DBM), local government executives, regional security coordinating councils, People's Law Enforcement Boards, National Police Commission (NAPOLCOM), civil society organizations

These management and oversight bodies play different roles at various levels to ensure democratic civilian control over and enforce accountability among our core security actors.

- **Justice and the Rule of Law**: judiciary, justices, judges, magistrates, arbiters, mediators, alternative modes of dispute resolution, Sharia courts, Department of Justice (DOJ), National Prosecutorial Service (NPS), Public Attorneys Office

\(^{40}\) List adapted from the OECD DAC Handbook on Security Sector Reform
(PAO), lawyers, criminal investigative bodies, probation workers, jail and penology officers, pardons and parole officers, the ombudsman, human rights commissions, customary or traditional justice systems such as the *Katarungang Pambarangay* (village councils or community justice providers) and tribal councils, civil society organizations

The criminal justice system is a subset of this group. This consists of the law enforcement agencies, judiciary, prosecution service, lawyers, jail and penology officers, probation workers, pardons and parole officers, oversight institutions and community justice providers.

- **Non-Statutory Security Forces**: liberation armies [Moro National Liberation Front (MNLF) and Moro Islamic Liberation Front (MILF)], guerilla armies, private security companies, political party militias [e.g. the New People’s Army (NPA)], organized armed groups [Abu Sayyaf Group (ASG) and Rajah Sulaiman Movement (RSM)]

The linkages between various actors within the security sector make up the security system. In turn, the security sector functions as a system of interrelated systems. In general, there are smaller sub-systems functioning within the security system. These are the following:

- **Criminal Justice System** [e.g. law enforcement agencies, judiciary, prosecution service, lawyers, jail and penology officers, probation workers, pardons and parole officers, oversight institutions and community justice providers]

- **Intelligence System** [e.g. National Security Council (NSC); National Security Adviser; National Intelligence Coordinating Agency (NICA); Intelligence Service of the AFP (ISAFP); AFP and PNP Counter-Intelligence; Criminal Investigative Bodies (PNP/NBI/PDEA/PCG), Executive and Legislative Oversight Bodies, Cabinet Security Cluster, Select Congressional Committees, Think Tanks, Strategic Analysts]

- **State Security System** [e.g. Statutory Forces, intelligence services, border management systems, oversight institutions]

Clearly, the transformation needed entails positive changes not only among the men and women in uniform but also the civilians tasked with responsibilities towards them. Thus, it is essential that security sector reform be viewed from the broader perspective. Indeed, any discussion of Security Sector Reform within the context of democracy and development brings it within the concept of **State**
State building which entails strengthening institutions, enhancing democratic political processes, working towards sustainable socio-economic and cultural development and ensuring that security institutions make citizens feel safe and secure. A view of State building focuses on the following key components:41

- **Governance.** A responsive and accountable government that effectively and efficiently addresses the needs of its people provide the governance needed for the society to flourish. Hence, governance may be viewed both in reference to the social institutions and their functions, as well as the processes that yield the desired outcomes for the polity. Central to this is the establishment of **Rule of Law** and respect for **Human Rights** that must be constantly nurtured.42

- **Basic Services.** Improved governance frees up more resources for basic services that can be delivered by a responsive government with focus given on our marginalized sectors.

- **Economic Reconstruction and Sustainable Development.** With less strain on resources caused by waste and corruption, economic reconstruction and development can take place particularly in previous conflict areas that can become productive growth centers. With peace and order, some level of prosperity becomes possible with residents becoming stakeholders in their respective communities. The national economy eventually benefits from more areas of production emerging. A sustainable positive cycle emerges.

- Building and strengthening democratic institutions and processes have a chance to take place in an environment that fosters it. **Security Sector Reform** can be pursued with focus on democratic civilian control over the armed forces.

  Security Sector Reform describes a process of assessment, review and implementation as well as monitoring and evaluation led by national authorities that has, as its goal, the enhancement of effective and accountable security for the State and its peoples without discrimination and with full respect for human rights and the rule of law.43

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41 See: Speech of Senator Benigno Simeon C. Aquino III, Makati City, 22 April 2010 during his campaign for the presidency of the Republic of the Philippines


It entails, among others, an empowered civil society that understands the workings of the security sector and helps in enhancing the ability of a society to attain security for both the State and the individual. The end goal is to have a security apparatus functioning as a protector of society and not acting as a threat to it. This results in desirable levels of security from disorder, crime and violence that is fundamental to reducing poverty and for sustaining political, economic and social and cultural development.

**Way Ahead: Institution Building & Capability Build-up**

Having seen the broader picture of Security Sector Reform as part of State building, the discussion now returns to a narrower focus on the transformation of our military and defense establishment.

It may be argued that the transformation of the military, as part of broader efforts at State building, gets a needed boost now that the military institution is transitioning from internal security operations towards territorial defense. With some traction gained in the peace process in Mindanao and the communist insurgency making itself more and more irrelevant, the focus of our military is gradually shifting towards addressing our external threats, particularly in the West Philippine Sea. As opposed to internal security operations that pit the military against non-statutory forces composed of citizens of the same State resulting in issues raised against “a military that is at war with its own people,” external security challenges tend to stoke nationalistic and patriotic sentiments, making it less challenging to rally government and public support behind the military’s capability intentions. Continued economic growth and prudent government spending in the last few years also allowed more public funds to be channeled towards its much needed capability upgrade without much public opposition.

In this on-going transition, it is essential that institution building should not be left behind. The current focus on acquiring new platforms and weaponry to establish a minimum credible defense posture should not detract from the need to introduce improvements in the institutions involved in defense management. Capability upgrade and institution building must go hand-in-hand for the transformation to be complete and substantive. Pursuing one without the other allows corrupt individuals (both civilians and military) to take advantage of the situation. Without systems that promote efficiencies and accountability to prudently handle renewed cash flows for new defense contracts the temptation for corruption increases. Paying mere lip service to institution building and defense reform can yield a more capable military in the short term but an organization that can easily
backslide to a checkered past riddled with corruption and abuse.

In either case, the interest currently being shown by our society and our government leadership to address the needs of our military can readily be lost. A corruption scandal rocking the defense and military establishment at this point, particularly in regard to financial management and defense acquisition contracts, will be a major setback in the transformation effort. As shown in the past, it takes decades to recover the trust and confidence that our defense and military organization now enjoys. Following are some areas that deserve attention in the ongoing transformation that is taking place under conditions that are highly conducive for reforms:

• **Increasing Civilian Capacity for Defense Management** – Put very simply, strategic policy is traditionally the domain of civilians while operations and tactics are the domain of the military professionals.\(^{44}\) Recognizing the need to infuse competent civilian leadership in the defense establishment, a proposal was made in the past to rationalize the DND structure and organization. The proposal followed the issuance of Executive Order No. 366 dated October 4, 2004 authorizing the preparation of rationalization plans for all national government agencies. In gist, the DND proposed to the Department of Budget and Management (DBM) the creation of 101 new positions for civilians in the DND distributed among various functional areas. The intent was to create a competent corps of civilian defense professionals trained to perform particular functions.

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“A minister of war need not have a detailed knowledge of military affairs, and soldiers often make poor ministers. The military viewpoint will inevitably, of course, interact with the political objective, and policy must take into account the means at its disposal. Clausewitz voices the military warning to the statesman to note carefully the limits of his military strength in formulating goals and commitments. But in the end, policy must predominate. Policy may indeed ‘take a wrong direction, and prefer to promote ambitious ends, private interests or the vanity of rulers,’ but that does not concern the military man. He must assume that policy is ‘the representative of all the interests of the whole community’ and obey it as such. In formulating the first theoretical rationale for the military profession, Clausewitz also contributed the first theoretical justification for civilian control.” (The Soldier and the State: The Theory and Politics of Civil-Military Relations, at p.58)
as part of overall defense management. Through the proposed rationalization plan, the DND incorporated opportunities for enhanced staff development that focuses on developing a highly professional civilian work force that will run the different defense management systems. The rationalization plan also recognized the need to infuse new blood into our defense organization to keep it dynamic and ensure the constant synergy of civilian and military minds in charting the future direction of the defense and military establishment. It may be timely to revisit this initiative on boosting the civilian personnel complement of the DND given similar efforts currently seen in our border management agencies such as the Bureau of Immigration and the Bureau of Customs.

• Establishing an Active Constituency Supportive of Security Sector Reform
  – There is a unique opportunity presented by our external threats that can be harnessed to promote an active constituency that is supportive of security sector reform. Understandably, the transformation of our security institutions will not be complete unless corresponding positive changes take place among civilians who interact with them. After all, it must be acknowledged that it was a civilian dictator who utilized our security organizations to suppress dissent and

45 Chuter, David and Cleary, Laura R. “Civilians in Defence” in the book “Managing Defense in a Democracy” (Cranfield University: 2006) states:
“Civilians can represent the wider picture, because they also stand as surrogates for the voter, the taxpayer and the citizen, as well as trying to interpret the desires of the elected political leadership. x x x. This is especially important in countries where the civilian head of the department, rather than its political leader, is responsible to Parliament for the way the money is spent.
As a consequence, if civilians are properly trained (on which more below) they act as an important buffer and reality check for the military. There can easily be a disconnect between technocratic military, accustomed to detailed and complex presentations of technical issues, and a political leadership which thinks in headline terms and tends to not to read documents more than a few pages in length. This can easily produce a situation where the political leadership is frustrated at the complexity and formality of the advice they are receiving, where even a routine briefing of a minister takes hours of rehearsal; and the military in turn feel that a lot of the work they do is ignored or unappreciated. A properly organized cadre of civilian experts can help here by assisting the military to produce what the political leadership wants, as well as explaining what the military can do and what the problems are.” (at p.82)

46 As the DND withered under martial law, civilian defense bureaucrats gradually lost much of the capability to fulfill its roles in relation to the military. The DND became increasingly dependent on the AFP GHQ and military officers seconded to the DND even on matters of strategic policy including the preparation of the defense budget. Some within our military began to see the DND as a mere surplusage in the bureaucracy. Today, around 352 civilians occupying permanent positions in the DND are given the task of managing AFP – the largest bureaucracy in government with the authority to use violence to enforce policy. To make matters worse, the military leadership has not provided a Table of Organization for the handful of officers seconded to the DND. This dissuaded competent mid-level military officers from joining the DND as time spent there adversely affected their promotion. As a result, the synergy between civilian perspective and military technical competence and discipline declined even further.
left lasting martial law legacies. In the years that followed, civilian leadership unfortunately failed to provide informed and consistent oversight over the security apparatus. Various reasons which include unfamiliarity with security issues, sheer indifference, or corruption within civilian oversight bodies allowed “military syndicalism” to take root and flourish.\(^\text{47}\) A continuing challenge is the continuing wariness of well-meaning civilians over the security institution that had been opaque for a long period of time.

In the last few years, it seems that we have already reached a point where the question is no longer whether our security professionals are ready to engage civilians in a discussion of security sector reform and other security issues. It has become a question of whether civilians are ready to engage security professionals in an informed discussion on the matter. Officials of the Executive Branch, particularly those involved in oversight bodies within the security sector, public spending and development planners, members of Congress who have no ties to or past experiences dealing without security institutions, civil society groups, as well as media need to be fully acquainted with the issues affecting the security sector and the approaches to intelligently address them. Civilians need to become better informed of security issues and participate in a constructive engagement with security officials in government for there to be a synergy of civilian and military thinking in collectively addressing our security challenges. In the end, a realistic goal is to establish a constituency, both in the public and private sectors, actively engaged in and supportive of security sector reform.

**Prudent Budget Preparation & Execution** – The budget is arguably the single most potent tool in the exercise of democratic civilian control over the

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\(^{47}\) Samuel E. Finer wrote:
“The military is jealous of its corporate status and privileges. Anxiety to preserve its autonomy provides one of the most widespread and powerful of the motives for intervention. In its defensive form it can lead to something akin to military syndicalism – an insistence that the military and only the military are entitled to determine on such matters as recruitment, training, numbers and equipment. In its more aggressive form it can lead to the military demand to be the ultimate judge on all other matters affecting the armed forces. x x x.” (**op. cit.**, at page 47)
See also: Chuter and Cleary, **op. cit.**, at page 82 which pertinently states:
“Finally, in the absence of a strong civilian cadre, there will be a tendency for senior military officers to become politicized in a way which is potentially unhelpful in a democracy. If the senior military are continually asked for advice on issues which are, bound to be sensitive politically, there is a risk that they will compromise their professional integrity as a result.”
As has been said, policy without funding is mere rhetoric. Military professionals often say that no soldier will dare cross a line on the sand drawn by a logisticians. This is a fitting metaphor that highlights the importance of resources and sustainment in the success of any military undertaking and the very existence of the military organization itself. Under our Constitution, the power of the purse over the military is exercised through annual appropriations passed by Congress on the basis of submissions of the Executive Department emanating from the Department of National Defense (DND), all composed of civilians.

While the defense and military establishment blazed the trail in budget preparation and resource management through the issuance of the very first Defense Planning Guidance (DPG), prudence in budget preparation and execution must be sustained through, among other means, a system of checks and balances. No effort must be spared in establishing and maintaining adequate financial controls given the fresh flow of funding for the military and past experiences of waste and corruption in the procurement and disbursement of public funds.

• **Supporting a Local Defense Industry** – Decision makers, who hold the purse strings, have always viewed defense spending as a cost center. For this reason, obtaining needed funds for capability upgrade is always a struggle. It’s time to turn the paradigm and make the case that defense spending is actually an investment in our nation’s future. The goal is to link defense spending as a percentage of the annual Gross Domestic Product (GDP) of the country, as most developed countries do.

48 Through the years under martial law, we saw a departure from a unified defense budget. From a single Key Budgetary Unit (KBU), various KBUs arose within the defense establishment. This inconspicuous shift had a profound and lasting impact on our instruments of civilian control over the military. In a democracy, the head of the defense establishment serves as the civilian intermediary between the military and our civilian political institutions. Such is the case when the military seeks appropriations from Congress. With the abolition of Congress during martial law that led to a President ruling by decree, a civilian intermediary was no longer needed since the military leadership had direct access to the Commander-in-Chief, who singlehandedly controlled the nation’s coffers. The DND was reduced to become the Office of the Secretary of National Defense (OSND) in the annual General Appropriations Act (GAA). This had deep repercussions in the relationship between the civilian Secretary of National Defense (SND) and Chief of Staff of the Armed Forces of the Philippines (CSAFP). The budget split eventually led to the atrophy of the DND that needs to be reversed. This coincided with the rise of the AFP General Headquarters (GHQ) and the increasing role of the CSAFP even in matters beyond the military sphere. At some point, despite the unequivocal legal doctrine of qualified political agency (which in gist states that members of the Cabinet serve as alter egos of the President such that the SND is the alter ego of the Commander-in-chief), quarters within the military questioned whether the SND is part of the chain-of-command. The ruling autocrat encouraged this thinking to further consolidate loyalty of the military leadership to him and gain a firmer and more direct grip over the entire military.
One way to achieve this is to funnel some of our defense spending towards domestic industries that create local jobs. This induces an economic cycle that feeds itself. It also shows in concrete terms the undeniable linkage between development and security in a manner yet to be seen in our country. Not only is this approach more sustainable, it also promotes a truly self-reliant defense posture. It is submitted that a local defense industry is essential to a truly modernizing military.

**Intelligent & Coherent Policy Development & Execution** – Due to wide gaps in policy and capability, the target has been difficult to miss. Moving forward, however, the choices that lie ahead become tougher even as the challenges become more complex. To meet these challenges, there must be sound intellectual investments made towards this area that will yield a highly trained and motivated civilian and military cadre of professionals that will assume the task of policy development, execution and oversight. This should include, as an initial outcome, the development of a well-conceived, comprehensive and pragmatic National Security Policy and other strategic-level policy documents that must be subjected to periodic reviews.

One area in need of urgent intellectual investments is in regard to our engagements with great powers, both allies and adversaries. Given stark realities in our capabilities, this has become necessary given the growing external security threats that we face. A clear strategy in all our engagements, founded on a clear definition of our national interest, must be developed to guide defense diplomacy and ensure that it is lock-in-step with the employment of other instruments of State power towards our common goal of defending our national territory and patrimony.

**A New National Defense Act** - To institutionalize the benefits of the transformation process, the DND and the AFP proposed a draft National Defense Act that was submitted to the Congress in 2006. The draft bill was the product of consultations conducted in various camps throughout the country. The bill intended to update Commonwealth Act No. 1, otherwise known as the National Defense Act (NDA) that was enacted in 1935. The original defense charter has become outdated and needed to be updated to suit and better respond to the changing times, particularly in the manner by which democratic civilian

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49 In the 1840s, the Tokugawa Shogunate, wary of threats from the West, focused on the acquisition of military technology and began rudimentary weapons manufacturing. By the 1880s, following the Meiji Restoration, Japan was already mass-producing its own artillery and rifles. (Harries, op.cit., at pp. 8 and 34) Some historical accounts show that Philippine Revolutionaries tried to source weapons from Japan as they waged their revolt against Spain, only to end up as victims of fraud.
control over the military is exercised. Clearly, as repeatedly pointed out here, defense transformation cannot be complete without corresponding reforms in the civilian institutions that manage and oversee our military as well in the policy framework within which they operate.

Written into the proposed NDA were comprehensive, institutional and systemic improvements introduced under the PDR and various AFP-wide reform programs. It also updated national defense policies, principles and concepts; stabilized key leadership positions in the AFP; strengthened discipline and professionalism in the military; and promoted the morale and welfare of men and women in uniform.

An important provision in the draft bill is the establishment of fixed terms for key positions in the AFP, such as the Chief of Staff, Vice Chief of Staff and Commanders of the Major Services to stabilize the military leadership and ensure the continuity of programs. The proposed bill also expressly included of the SND in the National Command Authority and the chain-of-command to remove any unfounded doubts. The bill likewise emphasized the need for a professional corps of men and women in uniform that is insulated from partisan politics and provided the needed safeguards to achieve this goal.

The initiative towards a new institutional charter can help ensure the continued implementation of the reform agenda and bring about a stronger organizational identity for our defense and military institutions. Through the proposed new charter for the defense and military establishment, an indelible blueprint for the strengthening of our institutions was presented to Congress in hopes that the direction of the transformation process that has begun becomes irreversible. Unfortunately, until now, the bill has yet to be enacted into law. It may be worthwhile to revisit this initiative.

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The foregoing does is obviously a comprehensive list. Nevertheless, the list focuses on essential areas where investments can go a long way.

**Democratic Civilian Control over the Armed Forces**

Ensuring democratic control over the armed forces is central to the transformation of our security sector. As aptly stated: “If democracy is to survive and flourish in today’s world, it must strike a balance between controlling the armed forces and ensuring their effectiveness. This is often easier said than done.”

Within a democracy, there are some traditional mechanisms where civilian control is manifested such as in the following: definition and limitation of the mission, limitations on the size of the military, budgetary controls, constitutional and legal limitations, culture of professionalism and other societal norms, as well as a free press. Underlying all these is the need for civilians to be sufficiently acquainted with issues affecting the military in order that the employment of said mechanisms will yield the desired results for society.

**Continuing Transformation**

Fortunately, our nation is currently in a state of reform instead of a state of crisis. The current political leadership has fostered an environment conducive for security sector reform. The political leadership has repeatedly articulated an agenda for reforms in key security agencies and the same rhetoric has seeped into key policy documents. Recent choices for positions of leadership in the military seem to reflect a premium given to those with a reformist orientation. Fortunately,

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52 Ibid., at p.24, et seq.
53 See: Cleary, op. cit., at p.34
54 See: Speech of Senator Benigno Simeon C. Aquino III, Makati City, 22 April 2010 during his campaign for the presidency of the Republic of the Philippines. The current Internal Peace and Security Plan (IPSP) also manifested a paradigm shift in efforts to address our internal security challenges by introducing a whole-of-nation approach with security sector reform as a key component: “For the military, [Security Sector Reform] SSR is operationalized by adhering to the principle of democratic control of armed forces. It emphasizes that the military must adhere to democratic principles, such as transparency and accountability. The national government has given the broad policy strokes to initiate efforts to attain the ideals of democratic control of armed forces.”

"Due priority shall likewise be given to clearing the ranks of the military of corrupt practices and involvement in partisan politics. Emphasis will also be given to ensure the insulation of the military from partisan politics".
most of those currently holding key positions of responsibility in the military previously worked on and provided inputs in the blueprint for transformation, as junior officers. New thinking in the development of policies also seems to be encouraged. Coalitions are being mobilized to support the direction set, as in the case of the passage of the law extending the AFP Modernization Act.

It is time to build on this momentum to achieve more transformation milestones under this favorable climate fully aware that reform is a continuing and never-ending process. The current political climate allows for these measures to take root within our security institutions, as transformation remains a work-in-progress. Thus, along with capability upgrade, considerable attention (and not just lip service) must be given to development of needed “software” which includes the establishment of systems, processes and policy guidelines in defense management, acquisition of needed expertise in various areas, reinforcement of professionalism within the ranks, more positive and substantive engagement between civilian and the military on security issues, among other things, to ensure that our security sector provides stability and security of our State and our people that underwrites development and progress in our maturing democracy.

LIST OF REFERENCES


Speech of Senator Benigno Simeon C. Aquino III, Makati City on 22 April 2010


The 1987 Philippine Constitution, art. II, sec. 2.

The 1987 Philippine Constitution, art. II, sec. 3.

The 1987 Philippine Constitution, art. II, sec. 4.

The 1987 Philippine Constitution, art. VI, sec. 29

The 1987 Philippine Constitution, art. VII, sec. 16.


The 1987 Philippine Constitution, art. XIV, sec. 5, par. 5.

Tristana Moore, “Will Germany’s Army Ever be Ready for Battle?,” Time World, June 27, 2009, www.time.com/world/article/0,8599,1906570,00.html
The paper examines the structure of civil-military relations in 21st century Philippine politics. It observes that contemporary Philippine civil-military relation is a partnership rather than a subordination of the military to civilian authority. This partnership is an upshot of the Arroyo Administration’s directive to the Armed Forces of the Philippines (AFP) to formulate a national military strategy focused on internal security and to spearhead the counter-insurgency campaign. The AFP pursued this partnership through its internal security operations and the Philippines’ bilateral relations with its only major ally—the United States. Despite its growing influence in Philippine politics, the military has restrained itself from taking over the reins of government. The restraining factors are: the AFP’s reluctance to expand its current functions, the Philippines’ vibrant civil society, and the Philippine-U.S. security alliance. In conclusion, it notes that the Aquino Administration’s pressing political challenge is to assert civilian control over the military by changing the context of Philippine civil-military relations. This change requires the AFP—touted as Southeast Asia’s most ill-equipped armed forces—to take a back seat in the counter-insurgency campaign, and to focus on its long overdue arms modernization program.

During his 2010 election sorties, presidential candidate Benigno Aquino III alleged that the Arroyo Administration colluded with the Armed Forces of the Philippines (AFP) in the massive 2004 electoral fraud in Mindanao and in the extra-judicial killings of political activists aligned with the left-wing Communist Party of the Philippines (CPP) and the New People’s Army (NPA). Mr. Aquino vowed to sack the military commanders linked with these anomalies. When he won three high-ranking AFP commanders prematurely retired from the service so as not to strain, supposedly, the uneasy relationship between the newly-elected president and the military. The purge of these ranking military officers reportedly

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demoralized the AFP’s rank and file.¹

When he assumed office on 1 July 2010, however, President Aquino began humming a different tune. His Department of National Defense Secretary, Voltaire Gazmin, promised to fast-track the long-overdue AFP modernization program. He quickly initiated a major defense plan and mobilized other sectors of the society to source funds for the ill-equipped Philippine military.² During the welcome ceremony for the incoming AFP Chief of Staff General Ricardo David, President Aquino exhorted the military to defend democracy and be at the forefront of government reform. He committed his administration to fully support the long overdue AFP modernization program.³ He ordered Secretary Gazmin to make the AFP modernization an “instrument” to strengthen the country’s military capability. Sounding like his predecessor during his first command conference as the commander-in-chief, he directed the AFP to eradicate the communist insurgency while upholding human rights.⁴ This mission, he declared, must be accomplished in three years. He also pledged to improve the living conditions, particularly the benefits, of both the AFP and Philippine National Police (PNP) personnel, and pushed for the leasing of military reservations to bankroll the AFP modernization program. In his first state-of-the-nation address, President Aquino even proposed to lease the Philippine Navy’s (PN) real estate to private commercial developers so as to raise US$100 million for the purchase of four new patrol vessels as part of the PN’s fleet modernization program.⁵

President Aquino’s pronouncements and decisions on military matters reveal his strategic gambit to maintain the civilian government’s partnership with the AFP. In a liberal democracy like the Philippines, the military is in principle under absolute civilian authority and control. The civilian authorities formulate the national security policy and determine the function of the armed forces in its implementation. However, developments at the advent of the new century have transformed the Philippine military into a coercive institution that considers itself,

¹ They were AFP Chief of Staff General Delfin Bangit, National Capital Region (NCR) Command-er Rear Admiral Feliciano Angue, and Intelligence Service of the Armed Forces of the Philippines (ISAFP) Commander General Romero Prestoza. Cf. Jaime Laude, “P-Noy Brushes Off Controversies at First Command Conference,” The Philippine Star (13 July 2010). p. 10.


politically, as an equal of the civilian government. This phenomenon originated from
the AFP’s leading role since 2001 in the government’s internal security campaign,
which has not only enhanced its stature but also cemented its partnership with the
civilian authorities in governance.

Thus, this article explores contemporary Philippine civil-military relations. It
addresses this main question: What is the context of the civil-military partnership
in 21st century Philippine politics? It also examines these corollary questions: How
did the defense policy in the 1990s facilitate the Philippine military’s assumption of
the status as a partner rather than a subordinate of civilian authority? How and why
did the Arroyo Administration foster this partnership? Will this partnership lead to
a military domination of Philippine society? And finally, what is the future of this
civilian government-military partnership?

**Anomaly in Civil-Military Relations: A Partnership?**

The study of civil-military relations focuses on the threat posed by the
military institution (the existence of a large professional army) to the popular rule
by a civilian government, and to the individual citizen’s political and civil rights.6
This challenge can be overcome by enforcing “absolute” civilian control of the
military that could be effected through a series of constitutional check and balances,
and by promoting professionalism in the military. Samuel Huntington’s The Soldier
and the State (1957), Morris Janowitz’s The Professional Soldier (1961), and
Samuel E. Finer’s The Man on Horseback (1976) tackled this thorny issue. These
works centered on the democratic control of the armed forces i.e., the subordination
of the armed forces to democratically elected (civilian) political authorities, who
decide on matters relative to the defense of the country.7

Mainstream literature on civil-military relations considers the liberal
democratic states as the norm. Assumedly, the civil society’s liberty and the
government’s adherence to democratic values depend on a disciplined, effected and
subordinate military--one that is focused on external, rather than domestic conflicts

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6 John P. Lovell, “Civil-Military Relations: Traditional and Modern Concepts Reappraised,” Civil-
Military Relations: Changing Concepts in the Seventies (New York; London: The Free Press and

7 For an interesting summary and discussion of the works of Huntington, Janowitz, and Finer see
Laura R. Cleary and Teri McConville, “Commonalities and Constraints in Defense Governance and
Management,” Managing Defense in a Democracy (Eds) Laura R. Clearly and Teri McConville
(London and New York: Routledge, 2006). pp. 5-6
or politics. A liberal democratic state requires civilian control or supremacy over the military. Simply put, it is the obedience which the military owes to the *civis*, the state. Civilian control or supremacy is achieved by appointing civilian politicians, instead of military officers, to positions of responsibility and by granting key decision-making powers to civil servants. It also involves the dynamic process of "negotiating and renegotiating the boundaries between military expertise and civilian oversight, within an overall framework of assured civilian supremacy." Accordingly, a democratic-liberal system with its absolute civil authority and civilian control over the military is the most appropriate political framework that developing countries should adopt. Any act in which the military breaches or challenges civilian authority or the civil society is seen as an impediment to a liberal democracy’s ability to govern. This military interference in civil affairs may lead to a garrison or a praetorian state. Hence, a militarized or garrison state is a political aberration that should be avoided.

World-wide, however, civil-military relations appear porous and anomalous as the military establishment and civilian regime have yet to determine the right balance within the existing political system. Many non-Western countries are haunted by the prospect of a coup d’état, military junta, praetorian regime, and antagonistic relationship between the military and civilian authorities. There is also much confusion about democratic governance, civil authorities, and civilian control over the military, and in the way these terms are applied in a given society. In most parts of the non-Western world, these highly nuanced political concepts and their application in governance may lead to unbalanced and strained civil-military relations.

In some states, a skilled and professional armed force is often managed by a weak state incapable of imposing civilian control. As a result, the military becomes highly politicized, and develops the ability to thwart a fledgling democracy and to effect the militarization of the civil society. Moreover, force plays a crucial role in the efforts of many non-Western states’ to achieve internal consolidation. Thus, their militaries are deployed quite freely on a massive scale in support of nation-building—especially in relations to segments of minority communities that

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11 Sapolsky, Gholz, and Talmadge, *op. cit.* p. 43.
resist “national” integration. Because of coercion’s centrality in the process of political-domination and nation-building, these militaries in several non-Western countries are not necessarily subordinate to civilian authorities.

Observing different patterns of civil-military relations in several democratizing countries in Central and Eastern Europe, and Africa, Cleary and McConville noted these anomalies: (a) a form of civil-military relations which is confrontational rather than cooperative; (b) a legislature which has the power to check the executive (and the military) in theory, but not in practice; (c) the formulation of defense policies that are either inadequate or absent; (d) civil servants who are unable to provide objective direction to decision-makers because they politicized or militarized; and, (e) distrust among politicians, the military, civil servants, the media and civil society, itself.

Confirming these abnormal patterns, Harold Trinkunas and David Pion-Berlin argued that despite widespread democratization, politicians in Latin America pay little attention and give low priority to defense policy. While economic issues and public education generate public debates in the region, civil and political societies are relatively silent on and aloof from national defense issues. Trinkunas and Pion-Berlin attributed this behavior to: (a) the historically unique professionalism of Latin American militaries that has made them suspicious of civilian authority and has imbued them with protagonist sentiment vis-à-vis civilian politicians; and (b) the absence of security dilemmas, existential threats, and arms race enabling civilian authorities to ignore defense issues without incurring great risk to national security.

Aurel Croissant and David Kuehen also saw this atypical pattern of civil-military relations in East Asia’s new democracies. In an article, Croissant and Kuehen argued that many East Asian (specifically in Southeast Asia) democracies are still plagued by military officers who continue to intervene in and influence political affairs. They mentioned that although democracy in the Philippines has survived several coup attempts, the military’s institutional power has increased

14  Cleary and McConville, op. cit. p. 8.
in ways that weakened civilian authorities.\textsuperscript{17} Thus, the Philippine government (like the governments of Thailand and Indonesia) has neither the institutional and organizational resources nor political capital to control the military. Controlling the military will surely provoke a backlash from officers disgruntled at the “meddling” civilians.\textsuperscript{18}

The notion of a civil-military partnership is an anomaly in the literature on civil-military relations (CMR). Mainstream CMR literature views the different patterns of civil-military interactions in a continuum of civilian control at the one end, and military rule or a garrison state at the other end.\textsuperscript{19} Accordingly, the continuum of civilian control is characterized by obedience rendered by the military to the civilian authority. Civilian control means the subordination of the armed forces to democratically elected political authorities who formulate the national security policy.\textsuperscript{20} The military can be consulted or ordered to provide civilian policymakers with relevant military and technical information on national security matters. However, as a general rule, the involvement of armed services in the decision-making process should be minimized. At the other end of the continuum, military rule is marked by key members of the armed services formulating all political structures, processes, and policies, and depriving civilians the decision-making prerogative.

This civil-military partnership occupies the wide gray area between the continuum’s two extreme ends. Moving to the continuum’s opposite direction, the second form of partnership allows the military to participate in the vital decision-making process pertaining to national security affairs. In this case, the military becomes an interest group and even a political-broker that can convince key decision-makers to adopt its position on national security matters. In effect, the military goes beyond its instrumentalist role, and emerges as a political actor. In such a situation, the military becomes involved not only in the implementation but also in the formulation of the national security policy.

In the narrow sense, national security policy pertains to the total preparation for war as well as the conduct of it. It deals—through clearly defined and limited objectives—with the wide political, social, and economic dimensions of national security. The formulation of the national security policy is deemed beyond the

\textsuperscript{17} Ibid. p. 196.
\textsuperscript{18} Ibid. p. 207.
\textsuperscript{20} Ibid. p. 6.
competence of the military institution, though it should offer pertinent advice concerning the strategic dimension of the problem. The question of offsetting cost, political and otherwise, and the consequent determination of political gains or liabilities of the national security policy are not only a question of civilian responsibility but also a realm where the military institution should never intrude into. In a relationship of partnership, however, the civilian authorities provide the military an opportunity to be involved in determining the priorities of the national security policy beyond its mandated function of pointing out the strategic advantage or disadvantage which might be expected to follow from a specific course of action. The military is involved in the determining how the defense budget should be spent, on conducting diplomatic relations with an ally country, and on how the military campaign should be waged. Consequently, the military limits the civilian authorities’ freedom of maneuver in formulating and implementing the national security policy.

This phenomenon of civilian-military partnership is apparent in Latin American countries as Thomas Bruneau and Richard B Goetz observed that in Latin America, civilian authorities have little of limited knowledge of national security matters. Thus, in-depth knowledge and professional mastery of organized violence enables senior military officers to challenge civilian control of national security matters. This anomalous pattern of civil-military relations occurs because: (a) disinterested or uninformed (in national security matters) civilian authorities give the military a carte blanche to deal with any national security concern (insurgency, criminality, or even external defense); (b) the military builds its own political space within this policy-making area; and, (c) the military develops a sense of parity vis-à-vis the civilian authority regarding national security issues. This civil-military partnership, in the long-term, can open the floodgates of further military interventions in politics. As in Latin America, this type of civil-military relations has become apparent in 21st century Philippine politics.

The Context of the Partnership—Internal Conflicts

The military’s pervasive role in 21st century Philippine politics can be traced to its primary and enduring mission—internal security. Since its independence in 1946, the Philippines has been plagued by various forms of insurgency. Thus,

for more than half a century, the AFP has concentrated its attention, efforts, and resources on containing domestic rebel movements. The first major challenge to the Philippine government and its military was the Hukbalahap (People’s Army against the Japanese) or Huk rebellion from the mid-1940s to the 1950s. Immediately following the establishment of an independent Philippine state in 1946, the unified, armed, and widely dispersed Hukbalahap insurgents posed a direct and real challenge to the government. The movement was weakened with the capture of its leaders and the return of most of its members to the government fold in the mid-1950s. Then in the ‘70s, the country experienced two separate and persistent insurgencies that have cyclically flared up and abated, resulting in more than 50,000 deaths. On the mainland of Luzon and on several Visayan islands, the Communist Party of the Philippines—National Democratic Front (CPP--NDF) and its armed wing, the New People’s Army (NPA), mounted a major rebellion that involved hit-and-run tactics, bombings against the Philippine state, and assassinations of landowners and local government officials.23

In Mindanao, meanwhile, the Moro National Liberation Front (MNLF) waged an ethno/religious insurgency to gain autonomy or independence for the island. This resistance which began with sporadic clashes between Muslim rebels and government forces developed in the mid-1970s into full-blown battles involving nearly 15,000 to 30,000 MNLF fighters against the AFP. In the late 1980s, the Moro Islamic Liberation Front (MILF), a more militant secessionist group, emerged and mobilized its forces for the creation of Muslim Mindanao, an entity separate from the predominantly Christian Philippine state.24 A breakaway faction of the MNLF, the MILF had a more pronounced Islamic orientation. Then, in the 1990s, the fairly new and notorious insurgent group, the Abu Sayyaf Group (ASG), staged several spectacular high-profile hostage seizures in Mindanao.25

More than six decades of highlighted and myopic focus on internal security have taken their toll on the AFP’s conventional capability. The military expended much resources on internal security operations to the detriment of its external defense capability.26 Its capability has stagnated because its main materiel remains

a light infantry-centered force structure geared for counter-insurgency. The AFP’s long wars against diverse insurgent groups reflect the milieu of Philippine civil-military relations, which is characterized by a weak state trying to attain an effective monopoly of coercion within its territory while undergoing the arduous process of state-building.\textsuperscript{27} Thus, force or coercion figures prominently in the state’s effort to achieve internal consolidation with the military relegated to the role of maintaining a semblance of domestic/internal security.

**Forging the Partnership**

With the overthrow of President Ferdinand Marcos during a military-led popular uprising in February 1986, the authoritarian regime’s power structure was dismantled. Policies which made the military subordinate to civilian authority were formulated. President Corazon C. Aquino demonstrated civilian supremacy over the military when she retired or transferred overstaying generals, and abolished the Presidential Security Command (PSC), and the National Intelligence Service Agency (NISA). More significantly, she re-established democratic institutions, like the Philippine Congress and an independent media, to restore basic human rights and civil governance.

The Aquino Administration also launched an intensive program of re-education and retraining to instill professional/democratic values at all levels of the Philippine military. Despite these demilitarization efforts, some AFP units repeatedly rebelled against the Aquino Administration. From July 1986 to December 1989, seven coups d’état were staged against the government. The most serious was the military putsch on 1 December 1989 when elite Marine and Army Scout Ranger units attacked the AFP Headquarters in Camp Aguinaldo, seized parts of the country’s financial center, and even bombed the presidential palace. Fortunately, the majority of the AFP top brass remained loyal to the government and the embattled Aquino Administration survived all the coup attempts. Some of these rebellious military officers later succeeded in entering mainstream politics. Again as an institution, the Philippine military was subordinated to the national legislature and local politicians. It also shifted its focus from internal security to external security after the withdrawal of U.S. military facilities from the country in

the early 1990s.\textsuperscript{28}

President Fidel Ramos continued his predecessor’s efforts “to return the military to the barracks.” He refused to extend the stint of senior military officers beyond their tour of duty. He also fostered an era of democracy and liberalism by strengthening civil society and other liberal and autonomous institutions such as the mass media, non-governmental organizations, religious groups, and political parties. These measures firmed up the social bases of democratic consolidation vis-à-vis any attempt at militarization and the return of authoritarian rule. More importantly, President Ramos took concrete steps to redirect the military from internal security to external defense when U.S. military assistance was ended in 1992 with the closure of American military facilities from the country.

To back up the country’s maritime claim in the South China Sea, the Ramos Administration pushed for the modernization of the armed forces. The AFP Modernization Law was passed in early 1995 when China had finished building structures and a helicopter pad at Mischief Reef. Posthaste, the Philippine military began developing its external defense capabilities, and planned the acquisition of multi-role fighter planes, off-shore patrol vessels, long-range maritime patrol craft, naval multi-role helicopters, coastal patrol boats, and a naval missile system.\textsuperscript{29} This shift to external defense forced the AFP to scale down its counter-insurgency campaign. Internal security operations (ISO) were transferred from the military to the newly-established and inexperienced Philippine National Police (PNP). To transform into a conventional armed forces, the AFP deactivated its village-based self-defense system, and suspended its military operations against the insurgents presuming (wrongly) that the insurgency problem would be reduced to a mere police or law-enforcement matter.\textsuperscript{30}

The Arroyo Administration, however, changed this thrust by co-opting the AFP. The partnership between the military and the civilian government started during the 2001 popular street protest that led to the ouster of incumbent President Joseph Estrada. After 11 senators voted against a motion to unseal an envelope containing incriminating pieces of evidence against President Estrada during his impeachment trial for bribery, graft, and corruption, the AFP’s withdrew its support to its commander-in-chief. This action destroyed the delicate balance between


\textsuperscript{29} Ibid. p. 6.

the civilian authorities and the military as it created the perception that any sitting/seated president could only stay in power if he or she has the AFP’s support.

When Gloria Macapagal Arroyo assumed the presidency in January 2001, she unwittingly boosted this “unholy alliance” with the military. She visited military camps, increased the benefits for military personnel, and designated retiring AFP Chief of Staff General Angelo Reyes as Secretary of National Defense. She also appointed retired military officers who helped her during the February 2001 mutiny to important government positions. When former President Estrada’s supporters laid siege to the presidential palace in May 2001, the military along with the police, suppressed the protesters. Eventually, former President Arroyo, as the head of the civilian government, became a compromised figure whose continuance in office became dependent on the support of “loyal” senior military officers in particular, and of the Philippine military in general. Finally, she ordered the AFP to formulate a roadmap for ending all domestic insurgency and to confront the three major armed threats to her fledgling administration—the communist movement, the MILF, and Abu Sayaff Group. To hold on to power, she found it expedient to link the counter-insurgency campaign with the country’s development plans and policies. This move enabled the AFP to participate in the formulation of the national security policy, and to be a key player in 21st century Philippine politics.

**Fostering the Partnership: The Focus on Internal Security**

In the late 1990s, the CPP-NPA experienced a resurgence as its armed membership swelled from 4,541 in 1995 to a high 10,238 in 2001 with the number of rebel firearms increasing from 4,580 in 1995 to 6,409 in 2001. At the start of the 21st century, party cadres and armed insurgents consolidated their existing 95 guerrilla fronts and intensified their recruitment and politico-military activities through the conduct of mass protest actions in the urban areas and armed struggle in the rural areas. Earlier in 1998, the Philippine Congress passed Republic Act 8551, which transferred the responsibility for counter-insurgency from the PNP back to the AFP. Then in 2000, the series of armed clashes with the secessionist MILF

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33 Ibid. pp. 9-10.
compelled the AFP to prioritize internal security over external defense.\textsuperscript{34}

With these renewed threats, the government channeled all its attention and resources to domestic security. In June 2001, President Arroyo issued Executive Order No. 21-S-2001 creating “A Coordinative and Integrative System for Internal Security.” This led to the formation of the Cabinet Oversight Committee on Internal Security which eventually drafted the National Internal Security Plan (NISP). The NISP prescribed the general political framework and policy guidelines for coordination, integration, and acceleration of all government actions on the insurgency problem. It committed the entire government machinery to eliminate the root causes of the insurgencies and neutralize the rebels by applying the “strategy of holistic approach.”\textsuperscript{35} This strategy required the maximum use of grass-roots intelligence, intensive coordination of all policies and actions at all government levels, and active government-civil society partnership. More significantly, the AFP was tasked with spearheading the nation-wide counter-insurgency campaign.\textsuperscript{36} In operational terms, the AFP formulated the plans for national security and briefed other government agencies on the security situation in insurgency-infested areas.

Accordingly, the AFP completed and released its \textit{2001 National Military Strategy}.\textsuperscript{37} The 36-page document detailed AFP’s priorities and plans for the early 21\textsuperscript{st} century. It called for “a focus-and-contain” policy which meant defining defense objectives by identifying priority security threats while down-playing others. It also suggested that scarce government resources be concentrated in areas where they would have a greater impact rather than spreading them thinly in many places and rendering their effect negligible or inconsequential.\textsuperscript{38} The document confirmed the fact that the communist rebels, the Muslim secessionists, and the ASG posed the greatest threat to public order and security.\textsuperscript{39} Containing armed insurgencies with finality warranted a holistic approach.\textsuperscript{40} Thus, the AFP utilized the comprehensive operational method of “Clear-Hold-Consolidate-Develop” which applied all its combat power and rehabilitation efforts on the enemy to achieve the maximum,

\textsuperscript{34} Department of National Defense, Annual Accomplishment Report 2007 (Quezon City, Department of National Defense, 2008).p. 5.
\textsuperscript{36} Ibid, p. 37.
\textsuperscript{38} Ibid, pp. 20-21.
\textsuperscript{39} Ibid. p. 16.
\textsuperscript{40} Ibid. p. 16.
In January 2002, the AFP released an Internal Security Operational-Plan (ISO) called “Bantay Laya” (Freedom Watch). Using the NISP framework, the ISO was devised to inflict the communist movement a strategic defeat within the next five years. However, this timetable was derailed by the AFP’s operations against the ASG. Thus, in 2006, the ISO was revised and it stated that after the eradication of the ASG, the AFP was to redeploy its resources to reduce the influence, membership, and number of the communist movement and to dismantle its politico-military structure. The 2006 ISO aimed to defeat the CPP/NPA/NDF by 2010.

The 2006 ISO prescribed the triad concept in which AFP units conducted simultaneous combat, intelligence, and civil-military operations in a communist-controlled or -influenced village or cluster of villages. This comprehensive strategy included legal offensive, information warfare, and developmental activities directed against the political, military, and territorial components of a communist guerrilla front. A triad operation is applied not only in the countryside but also “white areas” or urban places under communist influence. In these undertakings, the military became the microcosm of the government as it performed various civilian functions such as those of construction worker, teacher, health provider, and even a community activist. The inherent danger here was that the military might perceive the civilian government as weak, ignorant of the problem, and capable only of a supporting role in the counter-insurgency campaign. Likewise, this situation increased the military’s political and administrative power to constraint or to challenge other state institutions operating in the so-called rebel-infested territories.

The Arroyo Administration’s Bantay Laya (Freedom Watch) was patterned after the Aquino Administration’s and later, the Ramos Administration’s Lambat Bitag (Fishing Net) strategy. It deployed of Special Operation Teams (SOTs) in combination with civil-military operations. However, Freedom Watch differed in these respects: (a) Freedom Watch used the “Win-Hold-Win” tactic that involved a lengthy deployment of combat units in rebel-infested territories; (b) the AFP assumed full responsibility in the conduct of both combat operations and socio-civic/humanitarian missions; and, (c) the government concentrated most of the military’s assets and resources in the pursuit of a particular objective—the defeat of all the insurgent movements by 2010. In adopting the Freedom Watch Strategy, the Arroyo Administration bolstered the military’s role in domestic security planning and implementation, which, in effect, “makes the civilians dependent on the military’s coercive power and thus, inhibits the reduction of military prerogatives

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41 Ibid. p. 26.
42 Yap, op. cit., p. 36.
Another aspect of the partnership between the Arroyo Administration and the Philippine military was the revitalized Philippine-U.S. security relations after 9/11. Until 1992, the U.S. provided substantial financial, equipment, and logistical support to the Philippine military as part of the U.S. bases’ compensation package. The importance of such aid especially in the AFP’s capital outlay and military supply was tough to ignore or understate then, and could not be overemphasized now. When U.S. military aid dried up after the 1992 withdrawal of American military forces from Clark Air Base and Subic Naval Base, the AFP was not prepared for the consequences. With nearly 80% of the defense budget allotted to personnel cost, the Philippine government could not source the US$200 million that Washington gave annually. This amount covered about 67% of the AFP’s acquisition and maintenance cost. Moreover, the Philippine Congress, in preparing the national budget, did not provide for the AFP for losses when the Military Assistance Program (MAP) and the Foreign Military Sales (FMS) program ended. In the meantime, the AFP’s combat capability declined in the late 1990s as its aging and near obsolete military equipment, dependent on U.S. security assistance for maintenance and repairs, became unserviceable or were cannibalized for still usable parts and to reduce maintenance cost.

After the 9/11 terrorist attacks in the U.S. and the subsequent formation of a U.S.-led coalition on the war on terror, Philippine-U.S. security relations improved dramatically. President Arroyo readily supported the Bush Administration’s anti-terrorism campaign, and facilitated American temporary troop deployment in Mindanao as the second front on the war on terror. Shortly, the AFP was granted access to the U.S. military’s excess defense articles. From 2002 to 2004, Washington provided the AFP a C-130 transport aircraft, two Point-class cutters, a Cyclone-class special-forces landing craft, 28 UH-1H Huey helicopters, and 30,000 M-16 assault rifles. More importantly, it participated in several large-scale training exercises with American forces. Training exercises between the AFP and U.S. Armed Forces were focused on counter-insurgency and counter-terrorism warfare, logistics and equipment maintenance, intelligence training, and civic-military operations. The Philippine government viewed U.S. security assistance as a transitory, but

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nevertheless, an important part in sustaining the AFP’s overall combat capabilities while it waited for substantive modernization.  

The improved Philippine-U.S. security relations could be attributed to the partnership between the Arroyo Administration and the Philippine military. After 9/11, the Arroyo Administration was hard-pressed to revive Manila’s alliance with Washington. The overriding goal was to secure American support to shore up the AFP’s counter-insurgency/counter-terrorism capabilities, and to foster the military support for the Arroyo Administration. Manila’s warming up with Washington could lead to increased U.S. military assistance until the Philippine government could finance the AFP modernization program. Thus, despite opposition from left-wing and nationalist groups, the Arroyo Administration took the calculated risk of facilitating American involvement in the AFP’s military campaign against radical Islamist groups. Observing the impact of post-9/11 U.S. military assistance on civil-military partnership in the Philippines, a Filipino academic warily noted:

Renewed U.S. military assistance has not only improved the Philippine armed forces’ ability to mount an armed campaign against the Abu Sayaff... It has also exponentially boosted their capacity for civil-military operations in Mindanao with U.S. funding for humanitarian and reconstruction activities...Inadvertently, the U.S. push for broader defense reforms in the Philippines has produced a military exhibiting greater visibility in matters outside of combat (delivery of social services and infrastructure support), greater military involvement in development tasks where previously it has neither a mandate nor budget, and a more substantive military push for integration of civilian efforts with their own.  

Consequences of the Partnership

The Arroyo Administration’s 2001 directive of a holistic approach to the counter-insurgency campaign gave the AFP a blanket authority to implement a strategy of “rapid conclusion” of the communist movement by 2010. The AFP increased its operational tempo to meet the deadline by redeploying several army battalions from Mindanao to dismantle the CPP-NPA guerrilla fronts in Luzon

and in the Visayas. The 2001 directive also reflected a “pronounced military option” approach to the insurgency problem, which in turn, enhanced the military’s influence in Philippine society.\textsuperscript{47} Indeed, the AFP’s involvement in internal security operations muddled the concept of civilian supremacy in Philippine politics. It allowed the military to perform roles and functions supposedly reserved for civilian administrations. It also developed in the military establishment a critical if not a cynical view of the civilian government.\textsuperscript{48}

The counter-insurgency operations, especially in conflict-ridden areas, exposed military personnel to the general incompetence and corruption in local governance. This experience frustrated and disillusioned the rank-and-file and politicized the officers. As the spearhead of the government’s anti-insurgency campaign, the AFP restrained and modified the civilian authorities’ exercise of their unconditional supremacy over the military. Performing tasks traditionally assigned to civilian agencies, some AFP officers questioned the role of the military. They began entertaining the idea that the military might be more capable than the civilian administration in carrying out both the tasks of governance and development.\textsuperscript{49}

In hindsight, the AFP sees itself as a deserving, competent, and equal partner of the civilian authority in managing a fractious society like the Philippines. In this partnership, government officials defer to the military in defense and military matters. The AFP hopes that local government units recognize the gravity of the insurgency and the importance of national security.\textsuperscript{50}

With government agencies, the AFP identifies, implements, and monitors development projects in insurgency-infested areas. In many instances, it determines the type of civic action programs to be undertaken. The military organization participates in Disaster Relief and Rehabilitation Operations (DRRO), environmental protection and preservation, and civil works particularly through its Engineering Civic Action Program (ENCAP), and community relations program.\textsuperscript{51}


\textsuperscript{49} Office of Strategic and Special Studies, “In Defense of Democracy: Countering Military Adven-
turism,” p. 17.


\textsuperscript{51} General Hermogenes C. Esperon, Jr., “Perspective from the Military: Untamed Conflict: Ar-
Its engineering units build school buildings, farm-to-market roads, water and electrification systems, health centers, and Department of Social Welfare and Development (DWSD) shelters or centers for refugees. Its field units are involved in community development such as in forming cooperatives for ex-rebels with the assistance of the Cooperative Development Authority. Furthermore, regarding security or defense-related matters and foreign policy issues that infringe on Philippine-U.S. security relations, civilian authorities consult military officers who occupy key government post, and influencing government policy.\textsuperscript{52} Thereupon, arises the criticism that Philippine politics is rife with “military-friendly regimes” that even “encourage the influence and participation of the military in running state affairs.”\textsuperscript{53}

During the latter part of the Arroyo Administration, the AFP’s socio-civic activities expanded from the typical infrastructure projects and basic services delivery, to community organizing, and to the creation of a parallel development planning agency—the National Development Support Command (NDSC). Organized in September 2007, the NDSC assisted national development programs by establishing a physically and psychologically secure environment conducive to socio-economic growth. It undertook basic infrastructure, livelihood, and other development projects in conflict (sic-prone), underdeveloped and depressed areas of the country.\textsuperscript{54} Even school buildings, and road construction, rural electrification, and educational management were undertaken by the military without the assistance or knowledge of national government agencies.\textsuperscript{55} In essence, projects aligned with national security were given precedence over development programs of the national and local governments.\textsuperscript{56} Finally, the military wanted civilian agencies to assume specific responsibilities in counter-insurgency which is a multi-faceted security challenge that requires solutions beyond what the military can provide.\textsuperscript{57} For the military, the sustained counter-insurgency campaign was the base policy on which the national government’s peace and development agenda could be pursued.\textsuperscript{58}

\textsuperscript{52} Quilop, \textit{op. cit.}, p. 21.
\textsuperscript{53} Office of Strategic and Special Studies, \textit{“In Defense of Democracy: Countering Military Adventurism”} p. 18.
\textsuperscript{54} Joseph Raymond S. Franco, \textit{” Enhancing Synergy within the Defense Establishment,” Peace and Development: Towards Ending Insurgency} (ed) Jose G. Quilop (Quezon City: Office of Strategic and Special Studies, 2007)
\textsuperscript{56} \textit{Ibid}. p. 37.
\textsuperscript{58} Tolosa, \textit{op. cit.} p. 37.
A prolonged counter-insurgency operation, however, forced the AFP to perform non-military functions that otherwise could have been accomplished by civilian government agencies and even by non-governmental organizations. In insurgent controlled-territories, AFP units took on the functions of civilian and government functionaries. For example, a Philippine Army unit in collaboration with the Department of Education’s Technical Education Skills and Development Authority (TESDA) held a five-day food processing seminar for 356 households in a suburban area. An army battalion also conducted dialogues with high school and college students to prevent them from being recruited by local communist cadres. Army units also extended medical services, livelihood training, and information drives on drug abuse and communist infiltration to many informal settlers in the depressed areas of Metro Manila. The military also headed the Kalayaan Barangay (Freedom Village) Program, a multi-agency enterprise aimed to transform communist-influenced villages into development areas through “high-impact, short-gestation” public work projects like the construction of school buildings, medical centers, and access roads. In this program, the Department of Education and the Department of Public Works and Highway pooled their resources and empowered the Philippine military, through its engineering units, being in-charge to implement various development projects. Doing these mundane civilian tasks, according to an AFP policy paper “caused a number of AFP personnel and officers to lose sight of their traditional role of external defense, thus making them feel that the military can be a viable replacement for the civilian authorities and encourage them to intervene in politics.”

Affirming this view, a senior AFP officer wrote:

… the involvement of the military in internal security and socio-economic roles…reveals the weakness of civilian leaders and institutions and enhances the military’s belief that it should govern society itself…the deployment and continued involvement of the AFP in (counter) insurgency particularly in taking non-traditional roles where other civilian institutions should take the lead role encourages a politicized military.

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60 Ibid. p. 129.
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From Partnership to Domination?

Indeed, the AFP’s assumption of a leadership role in the government’s counter-insurgency/terrorism campaign, and its conduct of civic-military operations have made it a viable partner of the civilian government in 21st century Philippine politics. Former AFP spokesperson Colonel Tristan Kison succinctly articulated this relationship in the aftermath of the aborted 2006 military mutiny: “We [the military] are one of the strong pillars holding the nation. If we break, the nation will collapse.”64 A ranking AFP officer similarly observed: “…the Philippine military has evolved into an institution which no longer subordinates itself unconditionally to its commander-in-chief…”65 Unfortunately, the AFP’s partnership role, as well as the mutinies staged by junior officers in July 2003 and January 2006, has made the Philippine democracy fragile and uncertain. These developments have generated the widespread impression that the Philippine military deems it rightful to intervene in politics and that the civilian government has limited capacity to constrain it from doing so. Another ranking AFP officer cautioned in 2005: “Without any correction measure…and respect to the concept of civilian control, [civilian] administrations will then continue to face serious challenges posed by or from its own military.”66

Undoubtedly, the AFP has evolved into an influential actor in the Philippine government. Whether this has fostered a popular belief that the military is capable of governing in the strife-ridden Philippine society is another matter. Although exerting a powerful influence vis-à-vis the civilian authorities, the AFP has been restrained by three factors from wrestling the reins of governance from civilian leaders. These inhibiting factors are the following:

a) Recognition that in taking over the government, it will be incapable of constructing an acceptable and viable political framework for governance and national development. Exposure to the society because of its counter-insurgency and civil-military functions has indeed led to the politicization of the AFP. However, it has also familiarized the military to the country’s socio-economic problems that it knows it cannot solve alone. Further military involvement in other functions beyond its core competence in the use of organized coercion against internal armed threats will strain its limited resources, thereby making it less efficient and effective in its vital function (counter-insurgency). This situation could also lead to a division among its officers and demoralization within its ranks;

64 Besson, op. cit. p. 12.
65 De Leon, op. cit. p. 10.
66 Ibid. p. 10.
b) Awareness of the civil society’s countervailing power. The Philippines has a long tradition of democratic representation with a very active and robust civil society. Although the civilian government seems fragile and susceptible to military influence, it has not yet experienced a major political crisis. The military takes into account that there is still a strong opposition, both in the civilian government and civil society, against any authoritarian rule in which the military will play a central role. Moreover, the Philippine military is very much aware that its clout and involvement in the national economy is more opportunistic and less regularized, making it extremely dependent on the civilian government for resources through the annual defense appropriation; and,

c) Any attempt of the military to overthrow and replace the civilian government will adversely affect the country’s relations with its only strategic ally—the U.S. This will lead to the automatic termination of the much needed American military assistance to the AFP that will worsen its current logistic woes.

Thus, for the meantime, the AFP is content with its partnership with the civilian government. Clearly, it could not simply supplant the civilian government and it is best for it to be concerned with the coercive aspect of 21st century Philippine politics. A defense analyst quipped: “Ideally the AFP’s involvement in governance encompasses both the national and local levels. This could be construed as the AFP taking over the government. Let it be clear that the AFP has no intention of running the government.”

Changing the Context of the Partnership

Currently, the insurgent movements engross the AFP. In the immediate future, however, it will face the ubiquitous Chinese naval presence in Philippine territorial waters and greater assertiveness in the Spratlys. China’s heavy-handed approach to the South China Sea controversy started when the Philippine government passed Republic Act No. 9522 or the Philippine Baseline Act. Shortly after President Arroyo signed the bill into a law in March 2008, China deployed a fishery patrol vessel, and in the following month, sent six more patrol vessels


For a detailed study of China’s growing assertiveness with regards to its territorial claim over the South China Sea see Clive Schofield and Ian Storey, The South China Sea Dispute: Increasing Stakes and Rising Tension (Washington D.C.: The Jamestown Foundation, November 2009).
allegedly to curb illegal fishing in the disputed area. These moves manifest China’s belligerent efforts to consolidate its jurisdictional claims, expand its naval reach, and undermine the positions of other claimant states through coercive diplomacy.\textsuperscript{70} Hence, with China’s assertiveness in the South China Sea, the Philippines urgently needs to develop the capability to protect its vast maritime borders and its territorial claim over some islands in the Spratlys.

The AFP’s shift from internal security to territorial defense has gained momentum with the ascendancy of Benigno Aquino III to the Philippine presidency. On several occasions, President Aquino has vowed to pursue the modernization of the AFP. Taking the cue from the president, a joint DND-AFP task force formulated the AFP “Long-Term Capability Development Plan.”\textsuperscript{71} The plan requires the appropriation of Php421 billion (an estimated US$8.5 billion) with the lion’s share going to the Philippine Air Force (PAF) and the Philippine Navy (PN) instead of the Philippine Army. Of this budget, Php200 billion (an estimated US$4 billion) is earmarked for the PAF’s acquisition of multi-role and lead-in fighter planes, surface attack aircraft, and long-range reconnaissance planes. It also envisions the PN obtaining multi-role attack vessels, off-shore patrol craft, and even surface-to-surface and surface-to-air missiles. Specifically, it rationalizes the upgrade of the PN’s materiel for “joint maritime surveillance, defense, and interdiction operations in the South China Sea.”\textsuperscript{72}

This thrust of the AFP is highlighted as well in the new AFP Internal Peace and Security Plan (ISP)—Oplan \textit{Bayanihan} (Operational Plan Community Spirit). The plan acknowledges the AFP’s lack of capabilities to perform its mandated task of guarding the Philippines’ extensive maritime borders and ensuring its security from even the remotest possibility of external aggression.\textsuperscript{73} It provides a three-year transition period within which the Philippine military will develop the capabilities necessary to undertake unilateral defensive operations against external armed aggression.\textsuperscript{74} The government’s long-term goal is to establish a modest but “comprehensive border protection program.” This program is anchored on the


\textsuperscript{71} Office of the Deputy-Chief-of-Staff for Plans (J-5), DND-AFP Thrust for Capability Upgrade: The AFP Long-Term Capability Development Plan (Quezon City: Camp Aguinaldo, 2010).

\textsuperscript{72} Ibid. p. 8

\textsuperscript{73} AFP General Headquarters, Armed Forces of the Philippines, \textit{Armed Forces of the Philippines Internal Peace and Security Plan} (Quezon City: Camp General Aguinaldo, 2010). p. 8.

\textsuperscript{74} Ibid. p. 13.
surveillance, deterrence, and border patrol capabilities of the PAF, the PN, and the Philippine Coast Guard that will extend from Philippine territorial waters to its contiguous and exclusive economic zone (EEZ).\(^{75}\)

In October 2011, the Secretary of National Defense released a Defense Planning Guidance (2013-2018) for restructuring the AFP to a “lean but fully capable” armed forces essential in the maintenance of Philippine territorial integrity and maritime security. It envisages the development of an effective force projection capability to monitor the country’s territorial waters and EEZ. It provides the following measures:\(^{76}\)

a) Reduction of infantry and marine battalions and the redirection of limited financial resources to key priorities such as theater mobility, close air-support, air-surveillance, and air-defense.

b) Acquisition of naval assets for off-shore patrol, strategic sea-lift, and accompanying base support system and platform to sustained the deployed maritime assets;

c) Development of the AFP’s long-range maritime air patrol and surveillance through the acquisition of assets for long-range maritime air patrol, and accompanying base support system; and,

d) Reactivation of the Philippine Air Defense System (PADS) through the acquisition of air surveillance radar and a squadron of air defense/surface attack aircraft to provide air defense coverage over areas of high concern.

In its first 17 months in office, the Aquino Administration spent Php33.596 billion (US$387 million) to boost the AFP’s internal security and territorial defense capability.\(^{77}\) According to Secretary Gazmin, the DND-AFP signed a 138 defense contracts that will be implemented in the next five-years to improve the AFP’s force protection, maritime surveillance, transportation, and combat support system.\(^{78}\) Former AFP Chief-of-Staff Lieutenant General Jessie Dellosa (of the

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Philippine Army), promised to support the AFP’s shift to territorial defense. His major areas of concern include: the full implementation of the Internal Peace and Security Plan; organizational reforms to ensure fiscal transparency within the military establishment; strengthening the AFP’s territorial defense capabilities; and modernizing the PN to enhance maritime security in the West Philippine Sea.\textsuperscript{79} Then in January 2012, the DND revealed the reduction in the number of army and marine battalions to channel resources as well as personnel to current priorities such as maritime security and territorial defense.\textsuperscript{80}

The Aquino Administration’s pronouncements and efforts to modernize the AFP are perceived not only to appease the military but also to transform the context of 21\textsuperscript{st} century Philippine civil-military relations. Giving the AFP the necessary equipment, technical expertise training, and role for external defense will arrest its involvement in domestic politics. In such a situation, military officers and soldiers need to train and upgrade their skills, expertise, and capability in territorial defense instead of discharging constabulary functions, and undertaking socio-economic activities.\textsuperscript{81} Although contribution to national development, implementing socio-economic projects to support counter-insurgency operations prevents the Philippine military from pursuing its primary task of confronting external threats. To ensure the return of what Samuel Huntington called “objective civilian control over the military” in 21\textsuperscript{st} century Philippine politics, the Aquino government has acknowledged that:

\begin{quote}
...The infusion of new combat equipment would pave the way for better appreciation of service members of their role in society. Operating advanced military equipment requires specialized knowledge and training. A military preoccupied with the technical aspects of soldiery would be less inclined and interested to dip its hands in political issues...\textsuperscript{82}
\end{quote}

\textsuperscript{81} See Raymond Jose Quilop, “East Meets West: The Concept of Liberal Democracy and the Role of the Military,” in Globalization, Democracy and the Philippine Military. p. 29.
\textsuperscript{82} Office of Strategic and Special Studies, \textit{op. cit.} . . 33-34.
Conclusion

A political legacy of the Arroyo Administration is a military that regards itself a partner, rather than a subordinate of the civilian government. The previous administration, threatened by urban unrest, courted the military for political support, and assigned it to formulate a national strategy to address internal security concerns. In the process, the military was tasked with spearheading the campaign against domestic armed threats, and revitalizing the country’s alliance with the U.S.

The crucial challenge to the Aquino Administration is to restore civilian control over the military that has become politicized and too confident of its role as an equal partner in Philippine politics. This goal can be achieved by changing the context of 21st century Philippine civil-military relations. It involves diverting the focus of the military from leading the counter-insurgency campaign onto developing a credible territorial defense capability. These are clearly Herculean tasks for any government considering the insurgents’ resilience in the past, and the enormous resources involved in modernizing the ill-equipped AFP. Nonetheless, relegating the Philippine military to playing a subordinate role will make it more responsive to the duly elected leaders’ political direction and control. This, definitely, will ensure that stability and dynamism of Philippine democracy for the next generation of Filipinos.

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CHAPTER III

Security Threats and Challenges in the Country in the 21st Century
Current Terrorist Groups and Emerging Extremist Armed Movements in the Southern Philippines: Threats to Philippine National Security *

Rommel C. Banlaoi **

In this current millennium, the Philippines continues to be bedeviled by multiple security threats and challenges emanating from internal and external as well as traditional and non-traditional sources. Most of these security threats and challenges are old ones. But they recur in a new security landscape.

The complex interplay of the whole panoply of these sources makes these threats and challenges so complicated to surmount. A more circumspect understanding of these threats and challenges is essential in the formulation and pursuance of a more nuanced security policy and strategy.

Internally, the resilience of various non-state armed groups (NSAGs) continues to pose a threat to the country’s political security and stability. These NSAGs refer to the post-cold war remnants of the new People’s Army (NPA), residual armed factions of the Moro National Liberation Front (MNLF), lawless elements of the Moro Islamic Liberation Front (MLF), militant members of the Bangsamoro Islamic Freedom Fighters (BIFF), the Al-Qaeda inspired followers of the Abu Sayyaf Group (ASG), and the shadowy Moro Army Committee (MAC) and the Khilafa Islamiya (KI). The Involvement of NSAGs in many criminal activities as well as acts of terrorism and violent extremism complicate the multifaceted nature of these security threats. This paper identifies current terrorist groups and emerging extremist armed movements operating in Mindanao as threats to Philippine national security.

* This paper is culled from Rommel C. Banlaoi, “Violent Extremism in the Southern Philippines: Emerging Trends and Continuing Challenges” (Research project commissioned by the Council for Asian Transnational Threats Research in 2012); Rommel C. Banlaoi, “Crime-Terrorism-Insurgency Nexus in the Philippines” (Paper delivered at the International Conference on National and Regional Security: Countering Organized Crime and Terrorism in the ASEAN Political Security and Community organized by the German-Southeast Asian Center of Excellence for Public Policy and Good Governance, Thammasat University, Bangkok, Thailand on 19-20 September 2012); and Rommel C. Banlaoi, “Terrorism in Asia and the Philippines: An Assessment of Threats and Responses 11 Years After 9/11” (Paper Delivered at the National Conference of the Philippine Historical Association in cooperation with the National Commission for Culture and the Arts and the National Historical Commission of the Philippines held at the University of Iloilo, Iloilo City on 21 September 2012).
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Introduction

In its Country Reports on Terrorism published in May 2013, the United States Department of State claims that the Philippines remains to be threatened by acts of terrorism and violent extremism by non-state armed groups (NSAGs) involved in insurgency, banditry and other illegitimate violent activities. The Report states that in the Philippines, “terrorist acts were generally limited to criminal activities designed to generate revenue for self-sustainment, such as kidnapping for ransom or extortion, but members of terrorist groups were suspected to have carried out several bombings against public and private facilities.”1

Thus, countering the threat posed by terrorism and violent extremism is a formidable challenge not only for law enforcement and other concerned government agencies but also for the wider society of citizens who are often times victims, casualties, and collateral damages of criminal, terrorist, insurgent and violent extremist activities. This paper describes some current terrorist groups operating in the Southern Philippines. It also presents some emerging extremist armed movements engaged in various acts associated with violent extremism.

These current terrorist groups and emerging extremist armed movements pose tremendous threats to Philippine national security in both traditional and non-traditional sense. They pose traditional security threats because they challenge the sovereignty of the state and the territorial integrity of the Philippine republic. They also pose non-traditional security threats because of the involvement of these groups in maritime piracy, international terrorism, smuggling and trafficking of arms, drugs and persons, as well as other violent criminal activities like kidnap-for-ransom and extortion.

Current Terrorist Groups

Though the Philippines has many armed groups engaged in various acts of terrorism, only two groups have usually received the label of terrorist organizations: the Abu Sayyaf Group (ASG) and the Jemaah Islamiyah (JI). The termination of peace talks with the National Democratic Front (NDF) in April 2013 has recently placed the New People’s Army (NPA) in the list of terrorist organizations in the Philippines even as some sectors urge the Philippine government to go back to the negotiating table with the communist movement.

Abu Sayyaf Group (ASG)

It is common to refer to ASG when talking about terrorist organizations in the Philippines. In fact, the United States classifies the ASG as a foreign terrorist organization (FTO) for having been responsible for several high profile terrorist bombings in the Philippines like the Zamboanga City bombing of 2002, the Davao City Airport bombing of 2003, the Super Ferry bombing of February 2004 and the Valentines Day bombing of 2005, among others. The ASG has also been suspected of having participated in the January 25, 2011 bus bombing in Makati City and many recent bombings in Mindanao in 2012. The ASG also masterminded numerous kidnap-for-ransom activities in the Southern Philippines prompting Philippine law enforcement authorities to describe the ASG as a mere bandit group.

But others regard ASG members as rebels because of the ASG’s original Jihadist cause for the establishment of an independent Islamic state in Mindanao. A few believe that the ASG is an agent of the state and the creation of the Armed Forces of the Philippines (AFP) and the Philippine National Police (PNP).

Twelve years after the September 11, 2001 (9/11) terrorist attacks on the United States, the ASG has drastically evolved into an NSAG with multiple personalities involved in various acts of political and criminal violence. Thus, the current nature of the ASG can only be properly understood if it is analyzed on how the group has effectively morphed through the years.

When Abdurajak Janjalani formed the group in 1989, his original intention was to bridge the divide between the Moro National Liberation Front (MNLF) of Nur Misuari and the Moro Islamic Liberation Front (MILF) of the late Hashim Salamat. Thus, Abdurajak recruited followers from the MNLF and the MILF. But when he died in 1998, the ASG rapidly degenerated into a bandit group engaged in kidnapping, extortion and smuggling activities under the leadership of his brother, Khadaffy Janjalani.

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At present, the ASG has adopted a cellular-type structure led by several commanders in their respective geographical turfs in Mindanao, particularly in Zamboanga, Basilan, Sulu, and Tawi-Tawi (ZAMBASULTA). With many commanders at the helm of a single group, the ASG has already evolved into a highly promiscuous armed group linked with other armed groups engaged in terrorism, insurgency, banditry and other violent acts.

The ASG has also become a very resilient armed group having been protected by some corrupt local politicians and a few scalawags in uniform who benefit from ASG’s violent activities. Some ASG members even serve as members of private armed groups (PAGs) of a few local politicians in Sulu, Basilan and Tawi-Tawi, particularly during elections. Some armed men associated with the ASG served as bodyguards of some local politicians who ran for public posts in the May 2013 Philippine local elections.

Thus, the ASG of the late 80’s is no longer the ASG of today because of its current schizophrenic personality. Some armed men who claim to be followers of the ASG are also claiming to be followers of the MNLF and the MILF, depending on the expedient situation. Current remnants still prefer to use the name, ASG, as it has become a very convenient trademark for their violent activities. The ASG is said to have taken its name from Ustadj Abdul Rasul Sayyaf because of his credentials. Sayaff prominently figures at the center of Afghanistan’s political realm through the past three decades. He was the leader of the United Front for the Liberation of Afghanistan. Ustadj Abdul Rasul Sayyaf, the real person whom this trademark is based, is very displeased to see his name being used in the Philippines for violent purposes.

Since the global war on terrorism in 2001, the Philippine government has already put to justice many ASG members for committing various crimes associated with terrorism. But the ASG threat persists because the ASG has a survival instinct that is also shared by some likeminded groups abroad. ASG’s staying power comes from the continuous supply of illiterate and out-of-school youths in Mindanao joining the group for a variety of reasons from personal, economic, social, and political.

In fact, the ASG’s rank-and-file is composed of some young orphans who are being forced by old commanders to mount various kidnap-for-ransom and extortion activities. In a 20 September 2012 raid of an ASG camp in the remote village of Calabasa in Zamboanga City, evidences revealed that young Moros aging from 13 to 21 years were being trained by Khair Mundos not only in Islamic education and Arabic language but also in bomb-making and guerilla warfare.
The Philippine military officially declares that the ASG has around 400-armed members as of 2010. Most of its members operate mainly in Basilan, Sulu, Zamboanga Sibugay and Tawi-Tawi. But there are also sightings of ASG followers in Metro Manila. During the first semester of 2013, the Philippine government says that the ASG membership has declined to around 300 armed followers.

Thus, the ASG is only a very miniscule armed group. But the small number of the ASG members seems irrelevant to the ASG’s strength. The ASG threat looms large because it wields tremendous strength from its superb ability to network with countless armed groups in Mindanao that are engaged in various criminal, terrorist, insurgent and even partisan political activities. These armed groups serve as force multipliers of the ASG. Strictly speaking therefore, the armed strength of the ASG can be much more than 300 armed followers if their force multipliers will be included.

While a few ASG commanders still embrace an Islamic ideology that aims to promote the establishment of a Islamic State in Mindanao, most followers have become violent entrepreneurs engaged in predatory economic activities such as kidnapping, extortion and smuggling of arms and drugs. These violent entrepreneurs have skills in jungle and urban warfare. Worse, they have the ability to manufacture improvised explosive devices (IEDs) that they use for criminal, terrorist and insurgent activities.

Based on the independent investigative research conducted by the Philippine Institute for Peace, Violence and Terrorism Research (PIPVTR), almost 90% of the funds of the ASG are derived from illicit activities, mainly from kidnap-for-ransom and extortion activities. The ASG has also demonstrated its inherent capability to conduct acts of piracy and maritime terrorism.

The Philippine government has declared a policy of crushing the ASG through combined police and military efforts. But it recognizes difficulties in doing so because of the ASG’s complex links with other armed groups like the lawless

elements of the MILF, rouge factions of the MNLF, remnants of Jemaah Islamiyah (JI) in Mindanao and other violent groups such as the Al Khobar Group (AKG), the Bangsamoro Islamic Freedom Fighters (BIFF) and even the New People’s Army (NPA). The ASG’s links with some local warlords, government militias, and local communities confound the already convoluted threat it poses to Philippine internal security.

In other words, the ASG has become a “complex adaptive system” with a superb survival instinct. This instinct to survive is reinforced by their complex linkages with one another as well as with ordinary organized crimes groups and partisan armed movements. Underlying issues of abject poverty, inefficient governance, ethnic conflict, clan feuding and religious/ideological intolerance, among others, also fuel the staying power of the ASG.

Jemaah Islamiyah (JI) in the Southern Philippines

Aside from the ASG, another terrorist group operating in the Southern Philippines is the JI.

The Philippine government initially denied the presence of JI in the Philippines. But the government has admitted that some JI personalities are still operating in the Philippines, particularly those accused of 2002 Bali bombing. The Philippine military says that the Southern Philippines belong to the original Mantiqi 3 structure of JI. The raid of a terrorist camp in Butig, Lanao del Sur on 16 July 2012 indicated that foreign jihadists linked with JI continued to be active in Mindanao.

In 2010, the military has publicly revealed that there are around 50 foreign terrorist personalities in operating in Mindanao. Most of these foreign terrorist personalities are linked with, associated with or inspired by Al-Qaeda. In October 2012, the PNP reported that almost 30 foreign terrorist personalities are associated with JI. Armed groups associated with the ASG, MILF and even MNLF are reportedly coddling them.

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But strictly speaking, it is very difficult to determine the number of JI elements operating in the Philippines as foreign terrorist personalities operating in the country already refuse to be identified with JI. In fact, the use of the term JI in the Philippines has become a generic label to foreign nationals involved in various acts of terrorism in Mindanao. Most of these foreign nationals come from Indonesia, particularly from the province of Sulawesi. An Indonesian based jihadist facilitating terrorist activities in Indonesia, Malaysia and the Southern Philippines is leading this so-called “Sulawesi Extremist Group” (SEG).

The SEG currently serves as the main hub of what was previously known as the JI activities in Mindanao. SEG members and operatives are also associated with Jamaah Ansharut Tauhid (JAT), a new extremist group in Poso, Central Sulawesi. 10 Philippine law enforcement authorities believe that through the SEG, the JAT can operate in Mindanao using its existing networks with the ASG, the MILF, the MNLF and other foreign Jihadists. Based on a recent PIPVTR study, JI is operating in the Philippines through a new shadowy group called Khilafa Islamiya, which will be discussed later.

The Philippine military argues that JI operatives in the Philippines have limited capabilities to launch terrorist attack. But the threat they pose to internal peace and security “is their transfer of terrorist knowledge (i.e. assembly and use of improvised explosive devices) to local groups”. 11

New People’s Army (NPA)

The NPA is the armed wing of the Maoist inspired Communist Party of the Philippines (CPP). 12 Formed on 29 March 1969, the NPA aims to overthrow the current government through an armed revolution using a guerilla strategy of “protracted people’s war” in order to establish a new government patterned after Mao’s concept of a “people’s republic”. The NPA was responsible for several

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high profile violent attacks against government forces for more than four decades of its armed struggle guided by the CPP and supported by its political arm, the NDF. Thus, the Philippine communist movement refers to the CPP-NPA-NDF, collectively called by the Philippine military as CNN.

Because of its violent activities in the form of bombings, genocides, ambushes, murders, assassinations, arsons, extortions, and the like, the U.S. State Department listed NPA as a foreign terrorist organization in the aftermath of the September 11, 2001 (9/11) terrorist attacks. The 2011 National Security Policy of the Philippine government describes the NPA as its greatest internal security threat.13 The Philippine military, on the other hand, regards the NPA as the “primary threat to the country’s internal peace and security” in its 2010 Internal Peace and Security Plan (dubbed as Oplan Bayanihan).14

Official statistics indicate that the NPA has no more than 5,000 fully armed members as of 2010.15 During the first semester of 2013, the Philippine Army estimated the armed strength of the NPA to be less than 4,000. But the Joint Foreign Chambers and Commerce in the Philippines has estimated the total armed strength of NPA to be at least 10,000 during the same year.16 The PIPVTR has estimated the armed strength of NPA to be 18,000 as of May 2013 based on a 12% annual increase in their membership since 2010.17

Half of the total NPA strength is believed to be deployed in Mindanao, particularly in the Eastern side covering the provinces of Agusan del Sur, Agusan del Norte, Bukidnon, Davao del Sur, Compostela Valley, Davao del Norte, Surigao del Sur, Surigao del Norte, and North Cotabato. The 10th Infantry Division of the Philippine Army said the Southern Mindanao has become the epicenter of NPA activities in the entire island of Mindanao with 12 out of 23 reported NPA guerrilla fronts located in three Davao provinces and Compostela Valley.18

15 Ibid., p. 11.
17 Rodolfo B. Mendoza, Jr., Current Situation and Latest Assessment of the Philippine Armed Communist Movement (Presented during the public symposium entitled, “The Current State of Armed Communist Movement in the Philippines: Prospects for Peace and Implications for Tourism” held at the Asian Institute of Tourism on May 9, 2013).
18 “Southern Mindanao is NPA’s New Epicenter”, Philippine Daily Inquirer (9 October 2011).
NPAs in Mindanao have tactical alliance with Muslim rebels through the formation of a shadowy group called Moro Army Committee (MAC). In fact, the NDF has a new front organization in Mindanao coming from a Muslim group called the Moro Resistance and Liberation Organization (MRLO) based in Maguindanao province. The MRLO is considered to be the 16th “allied organization” of the NDF operating in Mindanao. In other words, NPA shares its violent extremist activities with Muslim rebels in the Southern Philippines.

The NPA recently demonstrated its violent extremism when it attacked in October 2011 three mining sites in Surigao del Norte, namely the Taganito Mining Corporation, Taganito HPAL Nickel Corporation and Platinum Group Metals Corporation. These attacks resulted in the destruction of US$68 million worth of mining equipments and facilities including 1 smelting plant, 1 guesthouse, 132 dump trucks, 22 backhoes, 9 barges, 2 cranes, 2 bulldozers, 1 compactor and 1 grader. These attacks have affected not only investors but also the direction of the peace process between the Philippine government and the NDF. NPA’s involvement in illegal taxation, illicit business activities and extortion operations provide the armed group the necessary funding to carry out their violent activities.

**Emerging Extremist and Movements**

Aside from the aforementioned terrorist groups, the Philippines is also facing the problem of emerging extremist armed movements that are involved in various acts of political and criminal violence. These extremist armed movements are usually identified with the so-called lost commands of the MILF, armed wing of the Bangsamoro Islamic Freedom Movement (BIFM), rouge factions of the MNLF, remnants of the Al Khobar Group (AKG), armed fanatics of the Awliya Group of Freedom Fighters, and members of the shadowy Moro Army Committee (MAC) and the Khilafa Islamiya (KI).

19 The existence of a Moro Army Committee (MAC) was classified secret by the Philippine National Police. But the existence of MAC was first discussed in the public domain in January 2011 in the context of the Makati bus bombing on 25 January 2011. See Alcuin Papa, “Bus Attack: A Failure of Intelligence”, Philippine Daily Inquirer (30 January 2011).


21 “NPA Attacks on Mining Firms Imperil Peace Talks, Frighten Investors”, Philippine Star (5 October 2011).

22 Ibid.
“MILF Lost Commands”

The Philippine government does not officially describe the MILF as a violent extremist movement or a terrorist group because of the on-going peace negotiation being facilitated by the Malaysian government. But the 2011 National Security Policy of the current Philippine administration laments that the presence of the MILF is giving the Philippines an internal security problem. The MILF still maintains an armed force that can still challenge the Philippine government.

Government sources say that the MILF has only around 10,500-armed combatants in Mindanao, to date. Sources from the MILF, however, claim that the group has around 100,000 regular troops spread around Mindanao, not to mention its almost a million reserves in its various base commands. At present, the MILF has 17 base commands spread around the Southern Philippines, particularly in Western and Central Mindanao. Intelligence sources said that almost 30% of the armed men associated with the MILF belonged to lawless elements or lost commands.

Based on the recent video obtained by the PIPVTR, the MILF has a strong military ability to launch conventional war against government forces because of its huge arsenal of small arms and light weapons that are locally manufactured. In this video, the MILF showcases its ability to manufacture weapons through its so-called Bangsamoro Firearms Industry (BFI). Through the BFI, the MILF can manufacture their own assault rifles, rocket-propelled grenades, sniper barrels, and machine guns that all can be used not only for conventional and guerrilla warfare but also for the illicit sale of small arms and light weapons.

Though not sanctioned by the MILF Central Committee, some MILF base commanders and sub-commanders have reportedly established operational links with established criminal armed groups in Mindanao engaged in extortion and kidnap-for-ransom operations like the Al-Khobar Group, the Mayangkang Saguille Group, the remnants of the Tahir Alonto Group, and even the Pentagon Gang. In Zamboanga, Basilan, Sulo and Tawi-Tawi areas, the working relations of the MILF with the ASG and residual armed factions of the MNLF also strengthen the armed projection of the MILF.

24 Author’s interview with MILF Chairman Al Haj Murad Ibrahim in Camp Darapanan on 5 September 2011.
25 Data obtained from corroborated sources from Philippine intelligence units October 2012.
Thus, it is imperative for the Philippine government to ensure the success of the peace talks with the MILF. If peace talks with the MILF succeeds, building peace after the war will continue to be the main national security challenge for the Philippine government.\textsuperscript{27}

The signing of the Framework of Agreement on the Bangsamoro on 15 October 2012 has raised hopes that the MILF can be a partner of the Philippine government in law enforcement operations in Mindanao, particularly against lawless elements associated with the MILF. These lawless elements are national security threats as some of them have reportedly joined a new armed group called the Bangsamoro Islamic Freedom Fighters (BIFF).

\textit{Bangsamoro Islamic Freedom Fighters (BIFF)}

The BIFF is the armed wing of the BIFM, a breakaway faction of the MILF. Ameril Umbra Kato, then commander of the 105th Base Command of the MILF, founded the BIFF in December 2010. On 26 February 2011, Kato renamed the BIFF as BIFM during its First General Assembly “owing to its increasing mass base.”\textsuperscript{28}

Sheik Muheddeen Animbang, a former MILF commander, was elected by the BIFM Central Committee as Vice Chairman for Military Affairs and concurrent Chief-of-Staff of the BIFF. Sheik Muhammad Ali Tambako, another former MILF commander, was elected Vice Chairman for Political Affairs of BIFM. Abuazam Endal, also a former MILF commander, was elected Vice Chairman for Internal Affairs of BIFM.

According to Abu Misrry Mama, a former MILF commander and now the BIFM Spokesperson, the movement has almost 10,000 mass membership based largely in Central Mindanao. The armed-wing of BIFM, the BIFF, has 4,815 assorted arms in its local arsenal. But Mama admitted that the armed individuals of the BIFM are only 1,500 distributed among the four military divisions of the BIFF. Each military division has around 2,000 followers but only 200-250 individuals are actually armed. Mama claims that almost all members of the families of BIFM followers have their personal arms, “so the armed potential of the BIFM should not be underestimated.”\textsuperscript{29}

\textsuperscript{27} See Mats Berdal, \textit{Building Peace After the War} (London and New York: International Institute for Strategic Studies and Routledge, 2009).
\textsuperscript{28} Author’s interview with BIFM Spokesman Abu Misrry Mama on 15 December 2011.
\textsuperscript{29} Ibid.
It was rumored that Umbra Kato died of heart attack in December 2011. To dispel rumors of Kato’s death, the BIFM held its Second General Assembly on 20 December 2011 in Camp Al Farouq situated at the tri-boundary of Maguindanao province’s Guindulungan, Datu Saudi and Datu Unsay towns. It was during this General Assembly that the BIFM declared full jihad to “pursue the genuine aspiration of the Bangsamoro people for self-determination, freedom and independence” through armed struggle. It was also during this Second General Assembly that the BIFM reiterated its rejection of the MILF stand on the peace process arguing that the MILF is “selling out the real freedom of the Bangsamoro people.” The BIFM is fighting for the creation of a separate Islamic state in Mindanao.

On 17 November 2011, BIFM founder Umbra Kato met Nur Misuari in Camp Al Farouq. In this meeting, both leaders exchanged views on the peace talks between the Philippine government and the MILF. Both leaders also discussed possibilities of unity between the BIFF and the MNLF. In the aftermath of the signing of the Framework of Agreement between the Philippine government and the MILF, the BIFM and the MNLF reiterated their desires to join forces and forge alliances.

Rouge Faction of the Moro National Liberation Front (MNLF)

Nur Misuari founded the MNLF in 1969 to advocate for an independent state of Bangsamoro people in Mindanao through armed revolution. The Organization of Islamic Conference (OIC) recognizes the MNLF as the sole and legitimate representative of the Bangsamoro people. In 1976, the MNLF signed the Tripoli Agreement with the Philippine government to grant Muslim autonomy in Mindanao. But in 1977, the peace process between government and the MNLF collapsed. Armed engagements continued between government and MNLF troops until 1989 and a new Philippine government re-opened talks with the MNLF.

In 1996, the MNLF and the government signed the Final Peace Agreement (FPA). With the FPA, Nur Misuari became the first governor of the Autonomous Region of Muslim Mindanao (ARMM) and Chairman of the Southern Philippines Zone of Peace and Development (ZOPAD). Around 7,000 MNLF fighters were planned to be integrated into the Armed Forces of the Philippines (AFP) and the Philippine National Police (PNP) but the full implementation of the integration plan became problematic.

30 Ibid.
After Nur Misuari’s term as ARMM governor, he was accused of corruption and unlawful use of public funds. In 2001, Nur Misuari declared another armed rebellion against the government and went into hiding until he was captured in 2002. But his loyal followers in Sulu, Tawi-Tawi and Basilan continued the armed struggle.

The AFP named the MNLF followers loyal to Nur Misuari as Misuari Break Away Group (MBG). But Nur Misuari claims that his group is the genuine MNLF and not the MNLF that joined the Philippine government. At present, around 650-armed individuals belong to MBG currently described by the AFP as rouge MNLF engaged in various acts of violent extremism. Habir Malik, a loyal follower of Nur Misuari, is known to be the most violent commander of rouge MNLF.

These so-called rouge MNLF members continue to wage armed struggle against the government to establish an independent state of the Bangsamoro people in Mindanao. They have become “residual armed groups”, which are parties to the conflict but not parties to the 1996 FPA. Rouge MNLF members are believed to have established ties with the lawless elements of the MILF, key commanders of the ASG and even JI personalities in Mindanao.

At present, the MNLF has five major factions. The Philippine military describes the factions supporting Nur Misuari as rouge MNLF or renegade MNLF. These Rouge or renegade members of the MNLF are currently opposing the peace talks between the Philippine government and the MILF. They are also accused of supporting another group called Awliya Group of Freedom Fighters.

Awliya Group of Freedom Fighters (Awliya)

The Awliya is a new group of Muslim rebels based in Sulu. The group claims itself to be the protector of the Bangsamoro people. Founded by Hatib Zakaria, a known follower of Nur Misuari, the Awliya became known when it led a suicidal attack of a military detachment in Talipao, Sulu on 24 September 2011. Though Muslim leaders in Sulu describe the Awliya Group as a cult, security

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32 For more details, see Benedicto R. Bacani, *Beyond Paper Autonomy: The Challenge in the Southern Philippines* (Cotabato City: Center for Autonomy and Governance and Notre Dame University College of Law, 2004).


experts regard the group as an emerging threat to Philippine security because it endorses suicide terrorism.\footnote{Ibid.}

The official website of the MNLF hails the Awliya Group as an organization reviving the spirit of martyrdom among Bangsamoro people.\footnote{MNLF Website, “Parrang Sabil (War for Martyrdom) Is Again on the Rise!” (26 September 2011) at http://mnlfnet.com/BMNews_New/Parrang-Sabil%20Again%20on%20the%20Rise.htm.} Suicide attacks are known in Sulu as Parrang Sabil, which means “war for martyrdom”. During the Spanish colonial period, this act was described as “juramentado” or a person running amok. Because of its endorsement of suicide attacks, the Awliya Group is an emerging violent extremist group that can further complicate the problem of armed violence in the Southern Philippines.

\textit{Al Khobar Group (AKG)}

The AKG is more known as an extortion group operating in Mindanao, particularly in the cities of Tacurong, Kidapawan, Koronadal and General Santos. Exact date of its foundation is not clear but the group became known in 2006. One of its leaders is believed to be Mukasid Dilna who is also accused of being a member of the Special Operations Group (SOG) of the MILF. Thus, there is allegation that the Al Khobar is a special unit of the MILF with the primary task to mobilize resources through extortion activities.\footnote{Violent Extremism Knowledge Base, “Al Khobar” at http://vkb.isvg.org/Wiki/Groups/Al_Khobar <accessed on 6 February 2012>.} The MILF leadership, however, denies any involvement with any Al Khobar’s bombing activities.\footnote{Maria Ressa, “Philippines’s Evolving Terrorism Threat”, \textit{CNN Opinion} (31 January 2011) at http://articles.cnn.com/2011-01-31/opinion/maria.ressa.bus.bombing_1_al-qaeda-al-khobar-bus-bombing?_s=PM:OPINION <accessed on 6 February 2012>.}

The Philippine military regards Zabide Abdul (alias Commander Beds) as the founder of AKG. Commander Beds is a known member of the 105\textsuperscript{th} Base Command of the MILF used to be led by Umbra Kato. Thus, the AKG is not only being linked with the MILF but also with the BIFM.

Followers of AKG have not been firmly established because arrested individuals linked with this group are also associated with the ASG and the MILF. But Philippine law enforcement authorities claim that the AKG has no more than 30 regular operatives.
This group became notorious in Central Mindanao because of its bombing activities meant to extort commercial buses and business establishments. Its use of 81-mm mortar in its improvised explosive devices (IEDs) became its signature bomb. This signature bomb has already been shared with the ASG through Basit Usman, the known bomb-maker of the so-called MILF-SOG. The AKG is currently being accused of supplying the bomb requirements of the BIFM. Police and military sources argue that the AKG learned its bomb-making skills from JI operating in Mindanao. The AKG is also reported to have established tactical alliance with another group called the Moro Army Committee.

**Moro Army Committee (MAC)**

The Moro Army Committee or MAC refers to the Muslim members of the NPA operating in Central Mindanao. Sources from the PNP said that the MAC was a product of the tactical alliance between the NPA and the Bangsamoro Islamic Armed Forces (BIAF) of the MILF. The Mindanao Commission of the CPP authorized the formation of MAC as early as the late 1990s.

For the NPA, the creation of MAC is only natural, as half of the total NPA strength is deployed in Mindanao, particularly in the Eastern side covering the provinces of Agusan del Sur, Agusan del Norte, Bukidon, Davao del Sur, Compostela Valley, Davao del Norte, Surigao del Sur, Surigao del Norte, and North Cotabato. The 10th Infantry Division of the Philippine Army said the Southern Mindanao has become the epicenter of NPA activities in the entire island of Mindanao with 12 out of 23 reported NPA guerrilla fronts located in three Davao provinces and Compostela Valley.

In fact, the NDF, the CPP’s political wing, has a new front organization in Mindanao coming from a Muslim group called the Moro Resistance and Liberation Organization (MRLO). The MRLO is principally based in Maguindanao province. The MRLO is considered to be the 16th “allied organization” of the NDF operating

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39 The existence of a Moro Army Committee (MAC) was classified secret by the Philippine National Police. But the existence of MAC was first discussed in the public domain in January 2011 in the context of the Makati bus bombing on 25 January 2011. See Alcuin Papa, “Bus Attack: A Failure of Intelligence”, Philippine Daily Inquirer (30 January 2011).

40 “Moro Army Committee” (Briefing obtained from the Philippine National Police, November 2011).

41 “Southern Mindanao is NPA’s New Epicenter”, Philippine Daily Inquirer (9 October 2011).
in Mindanao. In other words, NPA, through the MAC and the MRLO, shares its violent extremist activities with Muslim rebels in the Southern Philippines. The presence of MAC is exacerbating the problem of emerging extremist armed movements in Mindanao.

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Based on the classified intelligence information obtained by PIPVTR, the KI was organized by a young Moro extremist sometime in early 2012. The group was responsible for the August 16, 2012 bombing of the Rural Bus Transit in Barangay Guiwan, Zamboanga City.

On October 11, 2012, KI also carried out the bombing of Maxandrea Hotel along JR Borja Street in Cagayan de Oro City. Police investigation revealed that Zulkipli bin Hir (alias Marwan), a JI operative in the Philippines, guided KI in the Maxandrea Hotel bombing. On December 24, 2012, the group orchestrated the bombing of Pension House in Iligan City.

Based on the intelligence information obtained by PIPVTR, key leaders of KI met Umbra Kato of BIFM in July 2012 to form a tactical alliance for the establishment of an independent Islamic state in Mindanao. During this meeting, KI and BIFM reportedly established a united front to oppose the peace talks between the Philippine government and the MILF.

**Conclusion**

Based on the aforementioned discussions, the Philippines continues to face the national security problem of terrorism and violent extremism. The twin problem of terrorism and violent extremism exacerbate the over-all threats of armed violence in the Philippines.

Current terrorist groups and emerging extremist armed movements have complex relations with one another. They even use social networking sites to solidify their relations.

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Though the Philippine government has already entered into Final Peace Agreement with the MNLF in 1996, so-called rouge factions of the MNLF continue to wage armed struggle. Even the so-called lost commands of the MILF continue to be involved in armed violence even as the central leadership of the MILF engages in peace talks with the Philippine government. Other armed groups associated with the ASG, JI, the BIFF, AKG, Awliya, MAC and KI are also complicating the armed conflict situations in Southern Philippines.

Having a more circumspect and nuanced understanding of the interrelationship of the current terrorist groups and emerging extremist armed movements in the Southern Philippines is therefore essential in order to effectively deal with the challenges they pose for Philippine internal security and regional stability. Without a circumspect and nuanced understanding of these armed groups, the Philippine government is bound to face the vicious cycle of threats they pose to national security.

LIST OF REFERENCES


CHAPTER IV

Security Cooperation and Regional Security Dynamics
Furthering Community Building: 
PROSPECTS AND CHALLENGES FOR THE ADMM-PLUS *

Raymund Jose G. Quilop **

The ASEAN Defense Ministers Meeting (ADMM)-Plus serves as a venue for the defense ministers of ASEAN to interact with the defense ministers of ASEAN’s eight dialogue partners (Australia, China, India, Japan, New Zealand, Russia, South Korea and the US), thereby serving as a mechanism for security dialogue among the ministers. Defense ministers exchange views on regional and international defense and security issues. Beyond being a dialogue mechanism, the ADMM-Plus has become a platform for promoting practical cooperation among the defense ministries involved, particularly with the establishment of several Experts Working Groups (EWGs) on issues of common non-traditional security concerns. Deepening cooperation among the current members has also become a key thrust of the ADMM-Plus. But alongside these prospects for the ADMM-Plus, several challenges are worth noting. These include the possibility of overlap between the ADMM-Plus and a mechanism established earlier, the ASEAN Regional Forum (ARF), the ability of the ADMM-Plus to manage strategic competition among regional powers (i.e., US and China) and the feasibility of venturing into cooperation in the domain of traditional security issues. This article primarily delves into the concept, purpose and dynamics of the ADMM-Plus and discusses the author’s views on the prospects and challenges of the latest ASEAN-led mechanism in the region.

Introduction

The Asia-Pacific has always been described as full of dynamism, perhaps borne out of the diversity of states in the region. Political set-ups vary. Levels of economic development differ. Military capabilities are asymmetric. And the socio-economic composition of societies is heterogeneous. It is in the Asia-Pacific where recognized major powers, rising powers and developing countries either find themselves located or induced to focus their attention.

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* The views contained in this essay are strictly the author’s personal opinion and do not reflect the official position of the Department of National Defense.
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Not only are states comprising the region diverse, the security challenges that abound in the Asia-Pacific are varied as well. Present are the range of so-called traditional issues such as territorial and maritime disputes, nuclear proliferation and non-traditional security concerns to include maritime security, natural disasters, transnational crimes, cyber security, and piracy to name just a few.

Amidst such diversity whether in terms of political systems, economic development, military capabilities and socio-cultural make-up or in regard to security challenges in the Asia-Pacific, one thing seems common. There is this web of numerous and interlocking regional institutions mostly centered on the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN).

Interestingly, whether one talks of major power relations or addressing security challenges, everything seems to converge on ASEAN. Not only are the regional security concerns attempted to be addressed through ASEAN, major regional powers whether the established ones or the emerging players find themselves in ASEAN-led institutions.

The latest of the myriad of ASEAN-led institutions is the ASEAN Defense Ministers Meeting (ADMM)-Plus, the inaugural meeting of which was held in 2010, four years after its core, the ADMM was first convened in 2006. Indeed, it could rightfully be argued that if there are two words to describe the Asia-Pacific, they would be “diversity” and “ASEAN-centeredness” (although ASEAN would prefer to call it ASEAN Centrality). Such diversity and ASEAN-centeredness underpin the dynamism in the region.

The ADMM-Plus

In the community building efforts of the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN), the defense track has been recognized as important so much so that a meeting of ASEAN’s defense ministers was seen as valuable and therefore needed to be institutionalized. Indeed, in the building of a political-security community, which is one of the three pillars in the envisioned ASEAN Community, cooperation among the defense ministries of the ASEAN states is necessary and a platform where the heads of these ministries could come together is useful. After

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1 Some of the text regarding the ADMM-Plus, specifically those with data prior to May 2011, were culled from Raymund Jose Quilop, “The ADMM Plus: Yet Another Layer in the Region’s Dense Security Architecture? - A Perspective from the Philippines” (Paper presented at the Asia-Pacific Roundtable organized by the Institute for Strategic and International Studies-Malaysia and held in Kuala Lumpur, Malaysia on 30 May-1 June 2011).
all, policy guidance emanate from the ministers. This is the premise behind the establishment of the ASEAN Defense Ministers Meeting (ADMM), with its first gathering taking place in 2006.

And it is worthy to note that the ADMM took the fastest route in expansion. Within a span of merely a little bit of more than 4 years and with just 4 meetings, the ADMM has expanded to include 8 of ASEAN’s dialogue partners into what is now known as the ADMM-Plus. The positive thing about this fast pace of expansion is that the ASEAN defense ministers now has a mechanism for engaging their fellow defense ministers from ASEAN’s dialogue partners. However, there are apprehensions that the deepening of cooperation among ASEAN’s defense ministers themselves may have been relegated in the background as the broadening of ADMM’s membership became the focus.

This may not necessarily be case. For one, the ADMM has had a three-year (2008-2010) work program approved in 2007. Among the projects undertaken which are meant to advance defense cooperation in ASEAN include (1) the use of military assets in humanitarian assistance and disaster relief and (2) cooperation on non-traditional security between ASEAN’s defense establishments and civil society organizations.

And during the 5th meeting of the ADMM held in Indonesia in May 2011, there was emphasis on further strengthening cooperation among ASEAN’s defense ministries as another 3-year (2011-2013) work program was adopted along with two other projects namely (1) the establishment of ASEAN Peacekeeping Centers Network and (2) ASEAN Defense Industry Collaboration (ADIC).

And while only the concept paper on increasing the frequency of ADMM-Plus meetings resulted from the 6th ADMM in Cambodia in 2012, the 7th ADMM held in Brunei in May 2013 had the ministers adopting two more projects meant to advance ADMM cooperation: (1) an ASEAN defense interaction program and a framework for establishing logistics support.

The real challenge for the ADMM in relation to the ADMM-Plus is how to ensure that the ADMM, being the core of the ADMM-Plus, is able to maintain and promote ASEAN centrality. Currently, ASEAN centrality gets upheld more in terms of the process whereby the ADMM drives the ADMM-Plus. Agenda, concept papers and proposals, joint declarations and other issues such as admission of new members in the ADMM-Plus are first vetted, discussed and decided among the ASEAN countries at the ADMM track before these are presented and consequently examined with the Plus countries in the meetings of the ADSOM-Plus working group,
ADSOM-Plus and the ADMM-Plus itself. But beyond such procedural upholding of ASEAN centrality, the ADMM must ensure that it remains to be a driving force of the ADMM-Plus in substance.

Moving back to the ADMM-Plus, the idea of opening the ADMM process to the defense ministries of ASEAN’s dialogue partners was immediately suggested at the inaugural ADMM in Malaysia in 2006. And so, the process of conceptualizing how the defense ministries of ASEAN’s dialogue partners could come into the picture commenced.

A year later, the ADMM convening for the second time in Singapore in November 2007 declared to “deepen interactions and cooperation with ASEAN’s friends and dialogue partners through the establishment of among others, the ADMM-Plus…” Along side with this declaration was the adoption of the Concept Paper on the ADMM-Plus. In the said concept paper, the ministers noted that “cooperation between countries, both within ASEAN and with countries in the larger Asia-Pacific, is required to address ... challenges for the benefit of ASEAN countries” and acknowledged that “ASEAN countries are also keen to engage ASEAN in the area of defense and security”.

In the said concept paper, it is emphasized that the “purpose is to bring expertise, perspectives and resources from extra-regional countries to bear on shared security challenges”. This would later on be further emphasized in the composition and configuration paper where it is explicitly stated that the 3rd criterion for membership in the ADMM-Plus is the “ability to work with the ADMM to build capacity so as to enhance regional security in a substantive manner.” The third criterion for membership explicitly states that “the ADMM-Plus country must be able to bring expertise, perspectives and resources to bear on shared security challenges.”

Barely over a year from that meeting (1 year and 3 months to be exact), the Principles for Membership to the ADMM-Plus paper was approved by the ministers in the 3rd ADMM held in Thailand in February 2009. In this paper, the ASEAN defense ministers reiterated the principles for membership in the ADMM-Plus

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4 See ADMM Defense Ministers’ Meeting-Plus (ADMM-Plus): Concept Paper, paragraph 3.
5 See The ASEAN Defense Minister’s Meeting Plus: Configuration and Composition, paragraph 6.c.
6 See The ASEAN Defense Minister’s Meeting Plus: Configuration and Composition, paragraph 6.c.
namely: (1) full dialogue partner status, (2) significant interactions and relations with ASEAN defense establishments, and (3) ability to work with the ADMM in building capacity.  

And again after just barely a year, two papers: one on the configuration and composition of the ADMM-Plus and another one on modalities and procedures of the ADMM-Plus were approved during the 4th ADMM held in Vietnam in May 2010.

In the configuration and composition paper, the ministers noted that among the various possible configurations (i.e. ADMM Plus 1, ADMM Plus 3 and ADMM Plus X), the ADMM Plus X would be the most effective and efficient. The Plus 1 set-up would result in numerous meetings which could lead to inefficiency while the Plus 3 option would be specific only to a particular sub-region in East Asia as it was in reference to the ASEAN Plus Three composed of ASEAN and China, Japan and South Korea. The ministers also came to a decision that there are 8 countries that best meet the criteria of being the Plus countries in the ADMM-Plus at that point in time. These are Australia, China, India, Japan, New Zealand, Russia, South Korea and the US.

In the modalities and procedures paper, the ministers spelled out that the ADMM-Plus shall meet every three years with the Chairman of the ADMM also being the Chair of the ADMM-Plus. Like the ADMM, all activities of the ADMM-Plus would be reported to the ASEAN Summit through the ASEAN Politico-Security Council. In the intervening years, the ADMM-Plus working group headed by the ADSOM Chair shall meet and Experts Working Groups may be established to facilitate cooperative activities among defense and military establishments of the ADMM-Plus countries.

It must be clarified that in this paper, it was stated that it is the ADSOM Chair who will head the ADSOM-Plus working group. This was premised on the idea that with the additional 8 working group leaders from the major and bigger powers of the Asia-Pacific, a higher level official in the person of the ADSOM Chair would have to chair the ADSOM-Plus working group, which would have been otherwise chaired by the ADSOM-Plus working group leader.

This set-up, however, would be changed in the attachment paper to the modalities and procedures paper which was approved in the ADMM Retreat held on 11 October 2010 prior to the ADMM-Plus meeting the following day (12 October 2010). In that attachment paper, it was clarified that the ADSOM-Plus working group shall be chaired by the ADSOM Working Group chair and the ADSOM-Plus shall

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7 See ASEAN Defense Ministers’ Meeting Plus: Principles for Membership, paragraph 6.
be chaired by the ADSOM Chair. This was meant to ensure that the ADMM-Plus reflected the support structures of the ADMM namely the ADSOM and the ADSOM working group.

With the concept of bringing in ASEAN’s dialogue partners’ defense ministers being approved as early as 2007 and together with principles for membership, configuration and composition as well as modalities and procedures of the ADMM-Plus being available, the ADMM-Plus was launched and its first meeting was held in Vietnam in October 2010. Amazingly indeed, within merely 4 years, the ADMM has expanded to an ADMM-Plus.

In the first ADMM-Plus Joint Declaration, the 18 defense ministers agreed to establish Experts Working Groups (EWGs) on five areas of common concern: maritime security, humanitarian assistance/disaster response, peacekeeping operations, military medicine and counter-terrorism. Chaired by an ASEAN and a non-ASEAN country, the EWGs were meant to ensure that practical cooperation would be pursued and undertaken.

On a side note, the Plus countries initially had the perception that the inaugural ADMM-Plus meeting would actually decide which country would be chairing which EWG. This, however, was not the case. The 1st ADMM-Plus merely had an initial indication which country would want to chair an EWG. The following countries volunteered to co-chair the following working groups: Malaysia and Australia for maritime security, Vietnam and China for HA/DR, Philippines and New Zealand for peacekeeping operations, Singapore and Japan for military medicine, and Indonesia and the US for counter-terrorism.

The ministers in that inaugural ADMM-Plus meeting gave explicit instructions for the ADSOM-Plus to establish the EWGs. Work about this immediately commenced with an initial meeting of the ADSOM-Plus working group for this purpose being convened by Vietnam in December 2010 before the start of Indonesia’s chairmanship the following year. In that meeting, it became clear and definite that the countries which initially volunteered to chair the various EWGs would indeed be co-chairing the working groups.

This was followed by a meeting of the ADSOM-Plus working group in Surabaya, Indonesia in February 2011 where the concept paper on the establishment of the EWGs was refined and finalized along with a presentation and discussion of their respective work plans. These were then finalized in the ADSOM-Plus working group meeting held in Yogyakarta, Indonesia in April 2011 and are now annexes to the concept paper on the ADMM-Plus Expert Working Groups.
When the ADSOM-Plus met in Yogyakarta, Indonesia in April 2011, the five experts working groups were formally established. The Concept Paper on the Establishment of the EWGs provides that the co-chairs will serve for a minimum of two years and a maximum of three years.⁸ The ⁵ᵗʰ ADMM held in Jakarta, Indonesia in May 2011 acknowledged the establishments of the working groups.

Then in the ADMM in Brunei in May 2013, the ASEAN defense ministers adopted a Concept Paper on the Transition of the ADMM-Plus Experts’ Working Group Co-Chairmanship which provides the modalities for identifying and having new co-chairs for each of the EWGs. In anticipation of the end of the watch of the current co-chairs in early 2014 on the assumption that all the current co-chairs serve for 3 years (2011-2014), a new set of co-chairs had to be determined when the ADMM-Plus met in August 2013. Members with none or fewest co-chairmanships are given priority thereby ensuring that all members eventually get the opportunity to co-chair a working group.

The following countries have volunteered to co-chair the following current working groups: Brunei and New Zealand for maritime security, Laos and Japan for HA/DR, Cambodia and South Korea for peacekeeping operations, Thailand and Russia for military medicine, and Singapore and Australia for counter-terrorism. A new and the sixth working group (on humanitarian mine action), the establishment of which was likewise approved in the 2013 ADMM in Brunei, will be co-chaired by Vietnam and India.

Meanwhile, the ADMM-Plus would be meeting more frequently after the Brunei meeting in August 2013. Originally, the ADMM-Plus was to meet only once every three years.⁹ But in the ADMM Retreat in 2011 in Indonesia, the ASEAN ministers took note of the possibility of increasing the frequency of the ADMM-Plus meetings from once every three years to once every two years. It was argued that this would enable the ADMM-Plus to more frequently take stock and examine the progress of cooperation among the 18 countries and would provide the ministers with more opportunity to exchange views on issues of common concern.

The ADSOM working group and the ADSOM subsequently worked on this matter and in the ADMM meeting in May 2012 in Cambodia, the Concept Paper on the Review of Frequency of ADMM-Plus Meetings was adopted. Hence, after the ²ⁿᵈ ADMM-Plus in Brunei in August 2013, the ADMM-Plus would then be convening

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once every two years, with the 3rd ADMM-Plus slated to be held in Malaysia in 2015.

**Prospects for the ADMM-Plus**

While the ADMM-Plus is indeed the newest addition to the numerous multilateral regional bodies in the region, value is found in the fact that it brings together the defense ministers of 18 Asia-Pacific countries (the ASEAN defense ministers and 8 dialogue partners namely Australia, China, India, Japan, New Zealand, Russia, South Korea, the US). This enables the 18 defense ministers not only to interact with each other but more importantly to exchange views on regional security issues and developments.

There may be perceptions from the outside that security issues that are sensitive are not discussed at the ADMM-Plus considering that ASEAN, known for putting sensitive issues under the rug is the driving force behind the ADMM-Plus, with observers pointing out the sensitive issues to include the West Philippine Sea/South China Sea issue was not tabled as an agenda of the 1st ADMM-Plus.\(^{10}\) Contrary to such perceptions, the ministers did discuss security issues, including the sensitive ones such as the West Philippine Sea/South China Sea, under the agenda item “Exchange of Views on Regional and International Defense and Security Issues.”

Secondly and the greater prospect for the ADMM-Plus is in regard to promoting practical cooperation, something which has been clearly enunciated both during the discussions at the levels of the ADSOM working group and ADSOM prior to the convening of the ADMM-Plus. In fact, the promotion of practical cooperation is specified as one of the agenda items of the ADMM-Plus. The modalities and procedures paper for the ADMM-Plus which was approved by the ADMM in its May 2010 meeting explicitly states: “… the ADMM shall determine the areas and levels of interaction with defense establishments of extra-regional countries, with a particular focus on practical cooperation”\(^{11}\).

The idea behind the establishment of experts working groups is exactly to promote practical cooperation and to ensure that the momentum for such gets sustained. And this is also exactly the reason why each of the EWGs had to submit

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\(^{10}\) This point was raised during the Session on “The ADMM-Plus: Yet Another Layer in the Region’s Defense Security Architecture?” of the Asia-Pacific Roundtable organized by the Institute for Strategic and International Studies-Malaysia and held in Kuala Lumpur, Malaysia on 30 May-1 June 2011.

\(^{11}\) See ADMM Defense Ministers’ Meeting-Plus (ADMM-Plus): Modalities and Procedures, paragraph 11.
individual three-year work plan (for 2011-2013) which became integral annexes to the concept paper on the establishment of experts working groups approved in 2011.

True to the thrust of promoting practical cooperation, each of the EWGs went on to organize various activities to include meetings, seminars and workshops on issues within their respective functional areas of concern, with at least one activity for each of the working groups during the remaining months of 2011. For 2012, an average of two activities for each EWG were undertaken. For 2013, a humanitarian assistance/disaster relief and military medicine exercise was jointly spearheaded by the EWGs on HA/DR and military medicine. It was hosted by Brunei and held in June 2013. A field training exercise on maritime security cooperation and a counter-terrorism exercise were held in Australia and Indonesia respectively in September 2013.

For the EWG on peacekeeping operations co-chaired by the Philippines and New Zealand, four activities have so far been conducted. These include the legal seminar on peacekeeping operations held in New Zealand in November 2011, the peacekeeping regional capabilities workshop hosted by the Philippines in June 2012, the operational challenges of peacekeeping co-organized with the International Committee of the Red Cross and hosted by Indonesia in November 2012 and a force generation workshop held in New Zealand in April 2013. The working group is currently preparing for a Table Top Exercise on peacekeeping operations to be hosted by the Philippines in early 2014.

The third prospect for the ADMM-Plus is the prevailing sense of the need to further deepen cooperation among members of the ADMM-Plus before broadening its membership. In 2012 and barely two years after the ADMM-Plus first convened in 2010, other partners of ASEAN, particularly Canada, conveyed its intention to be part of the ADMM-Plus.

Canada, notwithstanding its being a full dialogue partner of ASEAN was not one of the initial Plus countries of the ADMM-Plus given its nascent interactions and relations with ASEAN defense establishments at the time the ADMM-Plus was being conceptualized. It could be recalled that one of the three principles for membership is significant interactions and relations with ASEAN defense establishments.

In the 2013 ADMM held in Brunei, the ASEAN defense ministers endorsed the ADSOM’s recommendation “not to accept Canada’s application at this time stressing the need for the ADMM-Plus to consolidate and build on its initial success”.\(^\text{12}\) It must be stressed though that the door is not forever closed to Canada and

\(^{12}\) See Report on the 7\textsuperscript{th} ASEAN Defense Ministers Meeting, paragraph 11.
other interested parties. Canada, for its part, has declared that it intends to intensify its defense engagement with Southeast Asian countries in order to meet the second criteria of membership for the ADMM-Plus.\textsuperscript{13}

**Challenges for the ADMM-Plus**

With the launching of the ADMM-Plus, a key issue that has come to the fore is the matter of how the ADMM-Plus would interface with the ASEAN Regional Forum (ARF). With the possibility of overlap between the two bodies, the need to delineate the roles and functions of these two mechanisms came to light.

In a discussion paper on creating synergies between the ARF and the ADMM-Plus prepared by Thailand then in anticipation of the inaugural ADMM-Plus, it was pointed out that “it may be useful for the ARF to continue to focus on key policy issues” such as those pertaining to “regional security challenges, trends in non-proliferation and disarmament, counter-terrorism and the regional security architecture”. The ADMM-Plus, the Thai paper argued, “could focus on more specialized defense issues [where] defense agencies have a more direct role” such as “defense policies and modernization of defense forces as well as regional trends which affect these policies”.\textsuperscript{14}

Acknowledging that the ARF has progressed in “developing policy frameworks for cooperation”, the paper argued that the ADMM-Plus “could focus on operational aspects of dealing with non-traditional security challenges ... such as developing defense capacities for dealing with humanitarian assistance and disaster relief (HADR)”.

The same paper suggested that the ARF would remain to have the strategic objective of developing preventive diplomacy measures and ultimately elaborating approaches to conflict while the ADMM-Plus could “provide a forum to undertake further discussions on issues such as defense industries and welfare of defense personnel”.

A month prior to the 1\textsuperscript{st} ADMM-Plus meeting, the Tokyo Defense Forum organized by Japan’s Ministry of Defense, which was held in September 2010 and

\textsuperscript{13} Remarks of The Honorable Peter MacKay, Minister of National Defense at the Asia-Security Summit (Shangri-la Dialogue) organized by the Institute for International and Strategic Studies (IISS) and held in Singapore on 31 May-2 June 2013. While this point is not contained in the text of the remarks found in the IISS website, this point was made by the minister.

\textsuperscript{14} See Discussion Paper: Creating Synergies between the ARF and the ADMM-Plus.
attended by mid-level officials from Japan and ASEAN countries’ defense ministries, had the same issue being discussed. In that forum, emphasized was the idea of having the ARF focus on policy issues considering that the ADMM-Plus purports to focus on practical cooperation.

Similarly, in the ASEAN Senior Officials Meeting held in Surabaya, Indonesia in March 2011, the issue of creating synergy between the ARF and the ADMM-Plus was an agenda item. In that meeting, there emerged a view that the ARF could focus on broad strategic and policy issues while the ADMM-Plus could focus on the more operational aspects of cooperation among defense and military establishments.

This issue was also intensively discussed in the April 2011 meeting of the ARF’s Defense Officials Dialogue (DOD) held in Sydney, Australia such that the ARF indeed would concentrate on policy related issues and the ADMM-Plus would zero-in on practical cooperation. Other participants however noted that the agenda of the ADMM-Plus should not unnecessarily be limited so much so that it is constrained or forced to deal only with practical cooperation. The ADMM-Plus, by the very essence that it brings together the defense ministers of 18 Asia-Pacific states, is also a useful security dialogue mechanism. With this issue being anticipated to remain at the center of discussions in the immediate future, the participants in that meeting agreed that this item remain be included in the agenda of future DOD meetings.

And in the 18th ARF held in Indonesia in 2011, the foreign ministers stressed the “importance of achieving ideal synergy with the ADMM-Plus”. While there is recognition that the two regional bodies, both dealing with security should pursue their respective mandates, it must be stressed that “greater functional coordination” is called for so as to avoid “unnecessary duplication of activities”.

Some of the proposals being considered include cross-reporting between the ARF and ADMM-Plus, joint meetings between the ARF’s Intersessional Meetings and the ADMM-Plus EWGs, closer coordination with and through the ASEAN Secretariat, and strengthening of coordination between ARF and ADMM-Plus representatives at the national level.15

Meanwhile, there is a need to rationalize the meetings held within the ambit of the ARF. Held thrice a year is the DOD, which provides a venue for working level defense officials of the ARF participants to discuss issues. With the regularity of meetings of the ADSOM-Plus working group and the ADSOM-Plus, it may be

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15 These proposals are contained in the non-paper “Improving Synergies between the ARF and ADMM-Plus” which was presented for consideration during the ADSOM meeting held in Brunei on April 2-4, 2013.
pragmatic to reduce the number of meetings of the DOD. In the same way, the ASEAN Security Policy Conference (ASPC) which involves the defense vice-ministers of ARF participating states could be done away with considering that the ADSOM-Plus now regularly meets as well.

Indeed, there is the possibility of overlap between the ARF and the ADMM-Plus. After all, as in the case of the other mechanisms in the Asia-Pacific, both the ARF and the ADMM-Plus deal with security issues, specifically how to address the numerous security challenges confronting the region. What is usually alluded in the foreign affairs circle is the observation that the areas of cooperation identified by the ADMM-Plus (with the exception of military medicine) namely HA/DR, maritime security, counter-terrorism and peacekeeping operations are also areas which the ARF has been working on and notable progress have been made.

In addition to this obvious case of overlap is the fact that while the ADMM-Plus emphasizes practical cooperation, it is also a security dialogue mechanism. In fact, exchange of views on regional security issues has been explicitly spelled out as one of the main agenda items of ADMM-Plus meetings in the modalities and procedures paper.16

Similarly, while the ARF is primarily a security dialogue mechanism, it has also undertaken practical initiatives such as the ARF Voluntary Demonstration of Response (ARF VDR) co-hosted by the Philippines and the US and held in Manila, Philippines in May 2009 and the ARF Disaster Relief Exercise (ARF DiRex) co-hosted by Indonesia and Japan and held in Manado, Indonesia in March 2011. Other practical activities are also being planned within the ARF framework. And if all the workshops and seminars organized within the ARF are considered as practical cooperation among its participants, then it could rightfully be argued that the ARF has and will continue to promote practical cooperation.

These overlaps are not necessarily bad. Given the reality that both mechanisms now exist and that the ADMM-Plus has already been launched and is expected to run its due course, it would actually be more productive to focus on examining how the ARF and ADMM-Plus could complement each other given their respective strengths.

The ARF has the advantage of having been there for almost two decades, serving as an important platform for examining security challenges and exchanging views on how to deal with those issues. True enough, the ARF has been criticized for being a talk shop. But isn’t that what it was meant to be in the first place? It is a

forum, after all. By providing a venue whereby participant states come together and exchange notes on various issues, it has definitely made a substantive contribution in building confidence among the states involved. It may not have progressed and evolved as observers have suggested; it may not have moved from merely promoting confidence building measures to undertaking preventive diplomacy measures as analysts would have wanted; and it may be impossible for it to really substantively undertake conflict resolution as many have desired. But it could not be denied that it has made a contribution in promoting regional peace and stability; slow as may be case but a contribution nonetheless.

The ADMM-Plus for its part brings with it the optimism that it is possible after all to bring defense ministers to sit together in one formal gathering for them to discuss security issues and provide policy guidance to their respective defense and military forces thereby ensuring that their militaries which have had their own respective meetings are appropriately provided with policy guidance.\textsuperscript{17} The ADMM-Plus has also generated an enthusiasm that beyond dialogues and consultations, undertaking practical cooperation is important and necessary if security issues were to be dealt with effectively. It also brings with it the momentum of pursuing practical cooperation, what with the establishment of the five expert working groups. And as was previously mentioned, a sixth EWG (on humanitarian mine action) has recently been added.

The ARF has the advantage of bringing together a greater number of participants with 27 participating states with both foreign ministry officials in the ARF itself and defense officials in the DOD. The ADMM-Plus has the advantage of bringing together a smaller number but more specialized group of officials, those from the ministries of defense, in the ADSOM-Plus working group and ADSOM-Plus levels. As noted in the composition and configuration paper, the Plus 8 configuration would enable “the ADMM-Plus [to] ... find a good balance between effectiveness and legitimacy”. To be effective, “the ADMM-Plus should be small enough to be nimble and responsive to security challenges facing the region”.\textsuperscript{18} For legitimacy, “it should be large enough to include the key stakeholders and to represent the interest of the region”. What should not be forgotten is the usefulness of the ADMM-Plus in bringing together the defense ministers themselves.

\textsuperscript{17} It must be noted that in the case of the ADMM, various meetings among ASEAN defense forces have been organized and have been taking place even before the ADMM came into being. These include the ASEAN Chiefs of Defense Informal Meeting, the ASEAN Chiefs of Army Multilateral Meeting, the ASEAN Navy Interaction, now called ASEAN Navy Chiefs Meeting, the ASEAN Air Force Chiefs Conference, and the ASEAN Military Intelligence Informal Meeting.

\textsuperscript{18} See The ASEAN Defense Ministers’ Meeting-Plus (ADMM-Plus): Configuration and Composition, paragraph 7.
It must be recognized though that one impetus for the emergence of the ADMM and subsequently the ADMM-Plus perhaps is the need to have a mechanism whereby defense ministers themselves come together and sit as a group. The absence of such a mechanism within the ARF framework could have actually been one of the inducing factors for the eventual emergence of the ADMM and the ADMM-Plus.\(^\text{19}\) In fact, at the start of the previous decade, at a time when the ARF was nearing its one decade anniversary, there have been observations that it may be useful and worthwhile for the ARF to include the defense ministers of ARF participant states. Way back in 2000, for example, it has been noted that defense ministers should be allowed to sit side by side with their foreign ministry counterparts in the yearly meeting of the ARF. This would pave the way for a sense of “equality” between the foreign ministers and defense ministers of the ARF members. Providing the defense ministers with the opportunity to sit alongside their foreign ministry counterparts in the annual ARF meeting would make the ARF truly a forum for security dialogue.\(^\text{20}\)

The second challenge for the ADMM-Plus is whether it could be a platform for mitigating or managing the strategic rivalry between two of the Plus countries. This is another question that begs to be answered. Never has the seeming competition between two regional powers, the US and China, the first described as an established regional power and the second considered as a rising regional power, been more observed today than in recent years. Beyond their respective pronouncements that cooperation among regional states, with themselves included, is most important, it could not be denied that rivalry between these two major powers manifests itself in various ways.

The US maintains that its network of alliances with regional states to include Japan, South Korea, the Philippines, Thailand, Australia and New Zealand underpinned regional stability in the post-World War II Asia-Pacific landscape thereby enabling regional states to focus and pursue economic development. China argues that its less than 10% average growth rate for the past two decades has driven regional prosperity.

Washington believes that the US alliance network needs to be revitalized to ensure that it remains relevant in the current regional environment. Along this line, it has taken steps to enhance its network of alliances. Deepening its engagement with


\(^{20}\) Raymund Jose G. Quilop, Institution Building in the Asia-Pacific: The ARF Experience (Quezon City, Philippines: Office of Strategic and Special Studies, Armed Forces of the Philippines, [2000]), p. 41.
its regional allies is one. Broadening the issues to include non-traditional security matters where the US and its allies cooperate is another. On the other hand, Beijing consistently argues that the structures of the Cold War period should be done away with, perhaps in direct allusion to the US alliance system which was established during the early years of the Cold War.

Meanwhile, as China tries to deepen its economic ties either through trade or direct investments and financial assistance to regional states as well as political engagement with regional bodies such as ASEAN, the US is keen on making its presence felt in ASEAN-led institutions to include the East Asia Summit (EAS), ARF and the ADMM-Plus as well as through its policy of rebalancing to the Asia-Pacific.

The US claims that it has always been a resident power in the Asia-Pacific and has never left the region notwithstanding its previous pre-occupation in other parts of the globe. China argues that Asia-Pacific matters are better left for Asia-Pacific states to address. And while Washington emphasizes that containment of China has never been a US foreign policy, Beijing insists that US actions in the region are meant to contain China.

On the other hand, notwithstanding Chinese declaration that freedom of navigation, specifically in the sea west of the Philippines and south of China, would not be compromised, the US is deeply concerned with Chinese growing assertiveness in the area thereby casting doubts as to whether foreign ships would continue to navigate freely in those waters.

Related to the matter of being a platform for managing or mitigating the strategic competition between the US and China is how to avoid a situation where the ADMM-Plus itself becomes another platform for the two regional powers to compete strategically with one another.

On the part of China, it has been able to engage the defense ministers of ASEAN collectively through the series of informal meetings between China’s defense minister and the ADMM at the sidelines of ADMM meetings. Commencing at the 2011 ADMM during Indonesia’s chairmanship, a second meeting of such nature took place the following year during Cambodia’s chairmanship. China’s defense minister made an official visit to Cambodia at a time when the ADMM was being convened. An informal meeting between China’s defense minister and the ASEAN defense ministers then ensued. During the most recent ADMM in Brunei in May 2013, the defense minister of China who was in Brunei for an official visit at the time the ADMM was meeting, once more had an informal meeting with the defense
ministers of ASEAN. De facto, this practice could rightfully be considered as an ADMM Plus One meeting, except that the meetings were informal. More recently, the US defense minister put forth the idea of inviting the ASEAN defense ministers for an informal meeting in the US.

While it is “important for ASEAN to enhance cooperation with China and the US, as [they] play important roles … in the region”, the situation previously discussed is de facto an ADMM Plus One configuration. How then would such a set-up relate with the current modality of the ADMM-Plus which is an ADMM Plus Eight.

As previously mentioned, when the configuration of the ADMM-Plus was being discussed, it was clear that the ASEAN defense ministers need to engage the defense ministers of ASEAN’s dialogue partners as a collective. An ADMM Plus One configuration, where the ADMM engages the eight dialogue partners individually would have not have been efficient; hence the decision to adopt the ADMM Plus X formulation where X would refer to eight dialogue partners as a collective.

The third challenge for the ADMM-Plus as it evolves is whether it would remain to confine itself on dealing with non-traditional security issues, specifically promoting practical cooperation on these issues or would there be at least attempts to venture into the domain of traditional security issues.

Non-traditional security issues definitely are less contentious and less sensitive, thereby making them the focus of the ADMM-Plus has been a big factor in getting defense ministers to sit together and convene in a meeting. To have done otherwise may have discouraged the other Plus countries from sending their defense ministers to the inaugural ADMM-Plus.

Confining practical cooperation to non-traditional issues may be productive in the short term but to continue limiting ADMM-Plus cooperation within the confines of the less sensitive non-traditional issues could be counter-productive over the long term. The non-inclusion of the sphere of traditional security in ADMM-Plus cooperation could lead to questions as to whether the ADMM-Plus has successfully built confidence among its members so much so that they would be willing to venture into the more sensitive domain of traditional security cooperation.

Including traditional security cooperation, however, would indeed be difficult for several reasons. For one, the question arises as to what are the modalities of practical cooperation regarding traditional security concerns. For another, cooperation on traditional security matters could be interpreted as having the ADMM-Plus moving
towards collective security, something which the ASEAN members themselves have reservations given ASEAN’s view that security cooperation within its ambit should preclude activities that are traditional security in nature as these are the focus of an alliance type of organization, something which ASEAN is definitely not.

Some Concluding Thoughts

Overall, the value of the ADMM-Plus as an addition to the plethora of multilateral mechanisms in the region could be seen in terms of the overall value of regional institutions which do not only provide channels of communications and thus help improve the quality of information being shared but de facto create certain standards with which actions of states could be evaluated. More importantly, institutions “prescribe behavioral roles, constrain [certain] activity and [help] shape expectations”.

And indeed, the ADMM-Plus has not only shaped expectations of the participating states but also of the entire region. It could not be denied that a lot is expected of the ADMM-Plus, particularly in its ability to promote practical cooperation among the defense institutions of ASEAN and the Plus countries. Those involved in the ADMM-Plus process, at least the present group, are conscious of this expectation and are committed in ensuring that the ADMM-Plus makes progress in promoting practical cooperation. This is the idea behind establishing the experts working groups.

One thing going for the ADMM-Plus is that the Plus countries have been enthusiastic about getting involved as manifested not only by their attendance or participation in the inaugural ADMM-Plus meeting but also in co-chairing the EWGs of the ADMM-Plus.

Another thing going for the ADMM-Plus is the fact that compared to the ARF which has a relatively more “ambitious” three-stage trajectory of progress (from building of confidence to promotion of preventive diplomacy measures to elaboration of approaches to conflict), the ADMM-Plus has a more modest thrust: to promote practical cooperation. Defense ministries do not also have the burden of

resolving conflicts but the conduct of practical cooperation between and among them could actually help build confidence and reduce the likelihood of conflict, which is the essence of preventive diplomacy.

Given the expectations and the enthusiasm, the ADMM-Plus therefore is faced with the tremendous challenge and burden in proving that the momentum for practical cooperation is sustained and is actually undertaken. The context characterized by uncertainty and seeming lack of trust and confidence among regional states may help explain why the ARF had to move at the pace and way it proceeded, prioritizing the building of confidence among its participants at the expense of not having progressed quickly towards the preventive diplomacy stage. The ADMM-Plus emerged out from a context where confidence among states is assumed to be already in place after the many years of confidence building having been undertaken within the framework of the ARF, leaving no reason why practical cooperation could not be pursued.

The ADMM-Plus compared to other regional mechanisms has relatively a shorter period of time to show that it is making headway. Notwithstanding the two other challenges namely the ability of the ADMM-Plus to manage major power relations and the matter of venturing into traditional security cooperation, an evaluation of the ADMM-Plus would have to be primarily in regard of its ability to promote practical cooperation as this has been its stated purpose. In fact, the idea of practical cooperation has become almost synonymous with the word ADMM-Plus.

Otherwise, the confidence on the ADMM-Plus’ ability to foster practical cooperation may slowly wane and worse, the ADMM-Plus would simply become another one of the numerous meetings in the region where officials meet and discuss issues.
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China-ASEAN Conflict and Cooperation in the South China Sea:
MANAGING POWER ASYMMETRY *

Aileen S.P. Baviera **

This exploratory study examines how the rise of China has transformed the territorial disputes over the Paracels and Spratlys in the South China Sea (SCS) from relatively low-level bilateral tensions into a litmus test for relations between a big power and its smaller neighbors. It lays down some theoretical arguments based on the concept of power asymmetry, developed by Brantly Womack. Asymmetry, Womack says, “inevitably creates differences in risk perception, attention and interactive behavior between states, and ... can lead to a vicious circle of systemic misperception.” The paper then tries to address the following question: How do Malaysia, the Philippines and Vietnam as relatively smaller or weaker states manage their respective claims in relation to great power China? Malaysia’s strategy may be described as one of accommodation and enmeshment, whereas Vietnam is engaged in a complex mix of internal balancing, internationalization and assurance-seeking. For the Philippines, the strategy is one that relies on institutionalism and external soft balancing.

Rising China and the South China Sea Disputes

The territorial disputes in the South China Sea arise from long-standing issues dating back even to Japanese occupation of the rocks and reefs in Spratlys and Paracels prior to World War II. Because ownership of these features was not decisively settled during the San Francisco peace talks (which in contrast negotiated the terms of surrender by Japan of other occupied territories and colonies),

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they became subject to competing claims and interests by various littoral states at the conclusion of the war.

Other major political developments and conflicts in the region had effectively sidelined the disputes, including the division of China into the People’s Republic of China (PRC) and the Republic of China (ROC) on Taiwan, the Korean War and continuing division of the Korean peninsula, the Sino-Soviet conflict, the consecutive wars in Indochina, and the Cold War itself which preoccupied both the great powers as well as secondary powers in Southeast Asia.

Concerns over internal instability also pushed the disputes to the backburner for various countries for years at a stretch, such as the Cultural Revolution in China (1966-1976) and the uprising against the Marcos dictatorship and rightist coup d’etats under the Aquino government in the Philippines (1983-1992). For Malaysia which staked its claim only in 1979, suspicions against China remained focused on China’s support for the outlawed Communist Party of Malaysia, until the party disbanded in 1989. Although armed conflicts occurred between China and Vietnam in 1974 in the Paracels and again in 1988 in the Spratlys, the international community and even Southeast Asian states did not pay much attention, turning the spotlight instead on Vietnam’s occupation of Cambodia and likely seeing the South China Sea disputes as merely symptomatic of larger historical and ideological disagreements between two socialist states China and Vietnam.

Taiwan had been the first among the claimants to occupy a feature in the Spratlys – the largest island called Itu Aba (Taiping) – since 1955. Vietnamese troops had been based in the Paracels at least since the early 1970s, alongside PRC presence, before they were evicted by the PRC and then moved to occupy the largest number of islets in the Spratlys. Since before WW II, the Philippines had registered concerns that whoever controlled the Spratlys could pose a security threat to its porous archipelagic borders, and the features became the subject of interest of private Filipino citizens led by Tomas Cloma. But the Philippine government became active in the Spratlys area beginning in the late 1960s and early 1970s, when it laid claim to a group of islands and began exploring for offshore oil just off of its Palawan province, in the area known as the Reed Bank. Malaysia was the latecomer, in 1979 claiming some features that it said were on its continental shelf. PRC sources now claim that all of these activities constituted encroachments on China’s sovereignty, but that at the time, because of other pressing concerns, the PRC was not as assertive as it has become in the last few years toward other claimant states.
Low-level tensions nonetheless took place among various states through the 1980s-1990s. However, rather than outright military to military confrontations, most involved allegations of vessel intrusions, poaching of fisheries and oil resources, attempts by one or another state to limit economic activities by nationals of other states in its exclusive economic zone or continental shelf, and the unilateral passage of laws and administrative measures that impact upon the various territorial claims. Other than the long-standing friction between China and Vietnam, no other government in the region was overly concerned over the South China Sea until possibly the mid-1990s.

In 1992, China issued a new law on its territorial sea claiming the Spratlys and the Paracels. In response, the ASEAN Foreign Ministers (of the six original members, as Vietnam had not yet joined ASEAN) issued upon Philippine initiative what became known as the Manila Declaration on the South China Sea. The Declaration called on parties to the dispute to exercise self-restraint. The Vietnamese ambassador in Manila, having consulted Hanoi, expressed support for the Foreign Ministers’ statement, while the Chinese government said there were “positive elements” in the declaration but that China nonetheless had indisputable sovereignty over the area.

Subsequently, two important developments further raised the stakes for the littoral states bordering this sea – the growing demand for hydrocarbons (oil and natural gas) to satisfy the energy needs of fast-growing economies in the region, in particular China; and the entry into force of the UN Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS) in 1994, which would give coastal states sovereign rights over waters and resources hitherto not under their control.

In 1996, China issued a Baselines Declaration which reiterated its sovereignty over the Paracels and the Spratlys, enclosing the former in baselines while seeming to defer action on the latter. UNCLOS appeared to have had the unintended consequence of exacerbating the competition for control of maritime spaces, despite its contrary intention of providing guidelines urging states to amicably resolve competing claims and to cooperate in the management of shared ocean spaces and resources.

Still during the early 1990s, in the aftermath of the end of the Cold War and as states began to devote attention to building new multilateral cooperative arrangements (APEC, ARF, ASEM among others), regional discourses on the South China Sea were dominated by efforts to build confidence and promote functional cooperation, such as the Informal Workshops organized by the Indonesian Foreign Ministry and Canada’s University of British Columbia on ‘Managing Potential
Conflicts in the South China Sea. Discussions at the Workshop series avoided sensitive matters that would impinge on the legal questions of sovereignty, in deference especially to China.

It was China’s 1995 occupation of Mischief Reef, close to the Philippines, which signalled that the prospects for cooperation would not be so easy. ASEAN was sufficiently worried over China’s actions to stand together and issue a collective statement of concern. However, none of the five other ASEAN members then felt the same pressure on the issue that the Philippines, still grappling with the consequences of the 1992 closure of US military facilities, felt at the time. When tensions between China and the Philippines continued to escalate in 1997-98, the rest of Southeast Asia – preoccupied with the debacle of the Asian Financial Crises and grateful for China’s economic assistance – preferred not to ruffle China’s feathers. However, subsequently ASEAN opted to endorse the negotiation of a Code of Conduct (COC) with China that they hoped would help prevent armed confrontation from taking place.

It took four years of discussions from 1999-2002, before the parties (the ASEAN-10 and China) could agree on a document – as it turned out a ‘Declaration of Conduct of Parties in the South China Sea’, that fell short of the more binding treaty some had hoped a COC would be. It took another nine years for ‘implementing guidelines’ of the Declaration of Conduct (DOC) to be agreed upon in 2011 by an ASEAN-China joint working group, mainly due to ASEAN’s preference for a multilateral approach where ASEAN would face China only after consulting among themselves, and China’s position that ASEAN itself was not a party to the dispute thereby making this unnecessary.

Attempts by the Philippines in the late 1990s to publicize and to internationalize the dispute, at one point by calling for action by the United Nations, did not garner much support from its neighbors, at least not in public. But efforts to seek cooperative solutions continued, with the Philippines, Vietnam and China undertaking joint seismic surveys of potential oil and gas deposits in the areas nearest the Philippines in 2005. The agreement to hold joint surveys was terminated in 2008 owing in large part to domestic political problems in the Philippines, but also at a time when China was reported to be pressing foreign oil companies to desist from engaging in exploration with Vietnam in areas contracted out by Hanoi. Since then the conflicts between China and the Philippines, as well as between China and Vietnam, have gone from bad to worse as China began to take more and more assertive actions and as concerns over the rapid advancement in Chinese military capabilities grew.
Compounding the tensions were incidents of confrontation between China and the United States such as that of the March 2009 USNS Impeccable incident and another the following June when a Chinese submarine collided with the sonar array of a US naval destroyer it had been stalking.

Coincidentally, three days after the USNS Impeccable incident, the Philippine Congress passed an Archipelagic Baselines Law designating baselines from which the Philippines can formally claim its maritime zones (territorial sea, contiguous zone, EEZ) under UNCLOS. The law also restated the Philippine claim to the Spratlys and the likewise disputed Bajo de Masinloc (Scarborough Shoal) but referred to them as a ‘regime of islands’ not encompassed by the new baselines. In May, Vietnam and Malaysia made a joint submission to the Commission on the Limits of the Continental Shelf that would extend their continental shelves beyond 200 nm (nautical miles), in an area within the nine-dashed lines representing Chinese claims. China promptly protested both UNCLOS-sanctioned actions by the three Southeast Asian countries. The close sequence of events seemed to suggest an action-reaction chain of events, implying coordinated moves by various countries that led to an escalation of the disputes. Yet the driver in both the Philippine and the Vietnam/Malaysia initiatives was a May 13, 2009 deadline set by the continental shelf commission.

In April 2010, there were reports that Chinese officials, in meetings with US counterparts, had called the South China Sea a “core interest” for their country, but such reports later turned out to be unreliable. These nonetheless merited a response from the United States, with Secretary of State Hillary Clinton at the July ASEAN Regional Forum saying that “The United States has a national interest in freedom of navigation, open access to Asia's maritime commons, and respect for international law in the South China Sea." Clinton also said “We oppose the use or threat of force by any claimant" then declared US support for a collaborative diplomatic process toward resolution of the disputes. Specifically, she called for a binding regional code of conduct to be signed, something that ASEAN was pushing for but that China was perceived to have been delaying since the signing of the 2002 DOC. The United States also offered to provide support toward a resolution of the dispute, although as expected, China immediately rejected the offer (BBC, 3 Aug 2010). Subsequently, there were attempts by both sides to downplay the significance of these supposed exchanges, and ASEAN was happy to contribute to de-escalation.

Nonetheless, it became clear that aside from the South China Sea disputes over sovereignty, jurisdiction and maritime resources between China and some Southeast Asian countries, there was also a fundamental US-China disagreement in
the South China Sea over US military activities in areas closest to China’s coastlines—where activities US insists to be its exercise of freedom of navigation were seen by China as potentially hostile acts directed against it.

These great power military and security interests have also helped enlarge the significance of the territorial and maritime jurisdiction disputes, implicating ASEAN and specific member states of ASEAN in US-China great power competition. China has tried to downplay concerns that it would ever pose a threat to freedom of navigation or impede the flow of trade in the seas.

Before too long, indeed, fresh tensions arose with arrests of Vietnamese fishermen by Chinese fisheries authorities, harassment by Chinese vessels of Philippine oil survey activity in Reed Bank off the western Philippine coasts, and incidents where Chinese vessels cut the cables of Vietnamese boats engaged in resource exploitation. The most dangerous escalation for the Philippines occurred in April 2012, when an attempt by the Philippine Navy to board and inspect Chinese fishing vessels led to a 2-month long standoff between official vessels of both sides on Scarborough Shoal, ultimately resulting in Chinese control of the shoal and the Philippines losing rich fishing grounds in the process. China has also been strengthening its capacity to enforce its own laws within the famous nine-dashed lines, including setting up a new administrative base in the Paracels (Sansha City), and increasing its presence and frequency of military exercises. Chinese actions have driven Manila and Hanoi to strengthen military ties with Washington, involving joint exercises and conclusion of agreements on maritime security cooperation.

Tracing the development of the disputes over the decades, it becomes clear that China is not the only claimant that has been engaged in unilateral actions or demonstrations of sovereignty, but China— as the biggest and most powerful claimant—holds the key to whether armed confrontation among the claimants or even involving external powers might take place. It is therefore also the fulcrum on which any resolution of the South China Sea disputes will rest. However, as China increases its military strength and political as well as economic influence, and as it grows in confidence (driving ultra-nationalism particularly on territorial issues), the prospects grow dim of attaining an equitable resolution that would be considered satisfactory by the weaker claimants.

The disputes have been referred to as a ‘litmus test’ and this is probably true in different ways. It may be seen as a litmus test of China’s real attitude and intentions towards its smaller neighbors in Southeast Asia—whether it can restrain its big-power impulses and allow what it claims as sovereignty and territorial integrity to be limited by agreements with ASEAN or individual claimant-states (Valencia
The disputes are a source of the dilemma in security relations between China on the one hand and ASEAN on the other hand (with four of the claimant-states being members of ASEAN). The weaker states (ASEAN) realize that they must band together to strengthen their influence relative to the stronger power (China), but fear that this will lead to a perception of ganging up against China and thus elicit greater hostility than may already exist. On the other hand, the stronger state (China) can leverage division among the weaker ones (ASEAN) but finds power asymmetry to be a double-edged sword, as weak states standing on their own may refuse to engage at all in what is perceived as an unlevel playing field, leaving the strong state without an arena for leveraging.

The disputes are also a litmus test of the effectiveness of multilateral institutions and approaches – whether they can truly influence, through collective pressure if not through norm diffusion, the behavior of a superior military power. Finally, it is a litmus test of how asymmetric states, living in close geographic proximity and in an environment marked by sharp historical animosities and political tensions, can minimize the effects of power asymmetry to attain shared objectives and promote common interests.

The next section lays the theoretical arguments of this paper based on certain concepts of power asymmetry developed by Brantly Womack. The last section explores how the three ASEAN claimants – Malaysia, the Philippines and Vietnam – have developed strategies with respect to their respective territorial claims in order to neutralize the effects of asymmetry.

**Relations among Asymmetrical Powers**

An oft-quoted adage in international relations is Thucydides’ “The strong do what they can and the weak suffer what they must.”

The proposition implies that structure of power in international relations, or one’s relative position in the hierarchy of power, determines the choices states can enjoy or the lack thereof, giving little room for agency or free will – working through diplomacy and stratagem – to influence the course of events.

An interesting addition to this argument was that of asymmetry theory presented by Brantly Womack (2001, 2004). Asymmetry theory is described as a new paradigm that addresses the effects of national disparities on international

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1 Taiwan does not have juridical personality to participate in state-level interactions on this issue, so it is not mentioned here.
relations, Womack says that the relationship between two states with disparate capabilities is not one relationship, but two distinct sub-relations: the relationship of A to B, and the relationship of B to A.

Examining US-China ties as a case of asymmetric relations but applicable to other unequal power relationships, his asymmetry theory posits that:

Asymmetry inevitably creates differences in risk perception, attention and interactive behavior between states, and ... can lead to a vicious circle of systemic misperception.

...For A, the larger side, the relationship will represent less of a share of its overall international interests, and in any case its domestic interests will command a larger share of its attention. For B, the smaller side, international relations in general are more important because there is a smaller domestic mass, and the relationship with A is much more important to B than vice versa.

In an asymmetric relationship, or in a regional complex of asymmetric relations, the greater power is in a position of leadership not because it can force compliance, but because its actions have the full attention of lesser powers. It is difficult, though not impossible, for a weaker country to provide leadership—regardless of the quality of its ideas or statesmen—because it may not have the full attention of the larger powers (p.364)

Womack continues,

in every asymmetric situation the stronger state needs to be confident of the deference of the weaker state. By ‘deference’ I do not mean that the weaker state obeys the stronger, but that the weaker state acts in accordance with the reality of the disparity between them. On the other side, the weaker state needs to be confident that the stronger state respects its autonomy. In a normal, peaceful relationship, autonomy and deference can coexist, but if misperceptions sour the relationship, then B will view A’s demands for deference as threats to its autonomy, and A will view B’s attempts to protect itself as threats to the real distribution of power. But whether at peace or at war, the asymmetric relations of A to B and of B to A are different.

Womack acknowledges that small states can do certain things regardless, and that strong states cannot do everything they want to do to small states, under a
stable international environment.

Metz and Johnson (2001) writing on an altogether different subject (asymmetry and US military strategy) say that asymmetry can be material as well as psychological. A material asymmetric advantage can generate psychological advantages, particularly effective when a strong state projects an image of fierceness.

These two authors also look into how weak states can claim victory over the strong in warfare (or if not warfare then political conflict, as in the case of relations between China and its neighbors). Weak states can emerge ‘victorious’ when they draw the external support of other strong actors, or because they are willing to suffer more or bear higher costs that strong actors who tend to be reluctant to escalate violence. Strategic interactions or internal political dynamics, on the other hand, may serve to weaken strong states thus giving weak states an advantage.

While there is yet no empirical basis to speak of “victory of the weak over the strong” in the case of the South China Sea, it is nevertheless important to examine how the weaker claimant-states (also called secondary powers) try to maximize advantages and minimize threats in relation to the stronger state (great power) China. What strategies have the small states of Malaysia, Philippines and Vietnam adopted to preserve and enhance their autonomy from the influence of great power China in relation to their territorial claims? To what extent do these countries demonstrate ‘deference’ to the great power? How successful have these strategies been in mitigating the effects of asymmetry?

Similarly, it would be important to examine how China itself as a strong state makes use of disparities not just in capability but in perceptions, to advance its own regional goals, while at the same time minimizing the anticipated resistance to its obvious superior capabilities. Even an aspiring hegemon, assuming China is one, is faced with a dilemma. By asserting special privileges or even primacy over what takes place in the region, China risks counter-balancing behavior that may undermine its ability to gain recognition as a legitimate power, especially when it is still trying to consolidate such power.

**How secondary powers are coping with the rise of China: neither balancing nor bandwagoning**

There is a growing body of literature about Southeast Asia’s responses to the rise of China. (To name a few scholars: Evelyn Goh; Robert Ross; David Kang; Cheng Chwee Kuik; Ian Storey; Denny Roy) Most would argue that in general,
Southeast Asian states eschew the option of engaging in outright external balancing against China, not only because of the massive material costs that would entail, but because of the political cost of bringing in another great power (limiting autonomy and free choice in one’s international relations) as well as the consequences on economic gains many of them still hope to obtain from good relations with China.

Neither is there a rush to bandwagon with China, for the same reasons cited above – the fear of constraints on autonomy and of forgoing economic advantages from relations with other countervailing powers. Instead of ‘balancing’ or “bandwagoning”, therefore, “engagement”, “accommodation”, “hedging” or “soft balancing”, omni-enmeshment, or other descriptors come up as middle-range options that avoid those unacceptable costs.

In previous work, I have used the term ‘accommodation’ to refer to a particular set of policies characterized by secondary or weaker states (i.e., ASEAN) adapting their own behavior to conform with the expectations of the rising power (i.e., China) (Baviera 2011). While the emphasis of the more generic term “engagement” is inclusion in order to influence the object of one’s engagement; the emphasis of “accommodation” is adapting or transforming one’s own behavior in order to satisfy the expectations of other party. This is similar to what Womack calls ‘deference’. It may come in the form of avoiding actions or statements that would be considered provocative by the great power, recognizing and upholding its interests as legitimate, and respecting its right to have a seat around the decision-making table, among others.

“Accommodation” in this context is a strategy of choice that arises when the socialization processes between the great power and the secondary states are seen to have already led to some mutual confidence and mutual trust, even if partial or limited. It also indicates optimistic expectations of reciprocal behavior. “Hedging”, in contrast, arises from the expectation that any cooperative behavior on the part of a source of threat, while being possible, is bound to be slow in coming, limited or even unsustainable (Baviera 2011).

Hedging strategies, like balancing, may include developing military capabilities and reliance on great-power alignment; however, they differ from hard balancing in three respects: (1) they are useful only as part of the more general engagement process which they intended to influence, the implication being that hedging avoids foreclosing other options of re-engagement; (2) the weaker power is able with some autonomy to determine the timing, degree and approach, whereas in hard balancing the initiative is surrendered to the external great power one chooses to ally with; and (3) to remain credible, hedging strategies must be highly sensitive
to current or emerging developments that may especially affect the balance among great powers.

I characterize the Southeast Asian response (or, interchangeably, the ASEAN response) to China as “accommodation with hedging”. In this paper, I would like to explore further what approaches and strategies the weaker claimants to the South China Sea - Malaysia, the Philippines, and Vietnam, have adopted in order to cope with the realities of power asymmetry with China, and if there are significant differences among them.

**Malaysia : “accommodation”, “enmeshment”**

Unlike the Philippines and Vietnam, the South China Sea disputes have never occupied a central position in Malaysia-China relations. It has been difficult to determine the real perceptions of Malaysia about China’s stance in the South China Sea because, as Elina Noor (2012) tells us, “discussion of the South China Sea within Malaysia is limited to closed-door foreign policy and security circles within Track 1 and Track 2, and public discourse is limited to occasional media reports of developments in the region or commentaries.” This approach, she says, is intended to avoid fanning nationalist emotions and “ceding control of the issue to the media and the masses.”

Malaysia staked its official claim to a section of the South China Sea only in 1979, five years after it had normalized relations with the PRC as the first ASEAN country to do so. Prior to that, its relations with China had been colored by Chinese communist fraternal support for the Communist Party of Malaya, which was dominated by ethnic Chinese at the time. During the Vietnamese occupation of Cambodia, Malaysia saw China rather than Vietnam as the greater threat to regional security. Mahathir in 1981 had expressed serious concerns over PLA modernization and even criticized US arms sales to China. In 1983, Malaysia occupied Swallow Reef and then in 1986 did the same on Mariveles Reef and Ardasier Bank (Storey 217). In 1984, it signed a Bilateral Training and Consultation Agreement (BITAC) with the United States (Storey 2011, 223) and issued a document titled “Managing a Controlled Relationship with the PRC” which was intended to balance security concerns with growing economic interest in China (p.218).

Soon after China announced its 1992 Law on Territories, Defense Minister (now Prime Minister) Najib Tun Razak announced that Malaysia was going to quadruple its defense spending, explaining it in terms of the potential for conflict in disputed areas (p.223) Then in 1994, the BITAC agreement was upgraded into
an Acquisition and Cross Servicing Agreement (ACSA) that would allow US ships and aircraft to transit through Malaysia for resupply and maintenance. In the aftermath of China’s occupation of Mischief reef in 1995, Malaysia also increased its naval patrols, conceivably to prevent similar moves that may target features closer to its coast. The military relationship with the US continued to grow, albeit discreetly, and in 2002, Najib confirmed that 15-20 American naval ships visited Malaysian ports every year and that Malaysia was conducting annual combined military training exercises with the US in Johore (p.224).

Yet following the end of the Cold War, Malaysia’s foreign policy and security discourse had shifted, Joseph Liow (2009) says, such that China was no longer considered a threat. Rather, Malaysia had become China’s “major political and diplomatic ally” as its interests converged with China’s on many fronts. These included Malaysia’s support for China’s espousal of a multipolar regional and international order, with China in turn supporting Mahathir’s position in the Asian values and human rights debate. Mahathir had also been the key advocate in Southeast Asia of greater economic interdependence with Northeast Asia (Tang 2012,11) and the establishment of an East Asian community that would bring the economies of Northeast Asia and Southeast Asia toward closer integration. When Japan failed to take leadership of the initiative, Malaysia turned to China. These broader considerations help explain why Malaysia’s position towards China in the South China Sea disputes, despite its being a claimant, was directed at avoidance of confrontation.

In 1996, just as the Philippines was trying to bring international pressure to bear on China over its Mischief reef occupation, Malaysia’s Defense Minister Syed Hamid said: “…we in SEA generally feel that China has so far been a sober and responsible regional player. Its advocacy of joint exploitation of South China Sea resources with other regional states and its recent indication of readiness to abide by international law in resolving the Spratlys issue have made us feel that it wants to co-exist in peace with its neighbors” (Liow 2009, 64).

By the late 1990s, particularly following the Asian Financial Crisis where China provided assistance and helped shore up the most badly hit economies in Southeast Asia, Malaysia indeed began to explicitly support China’s preference for bilateral negotiations to address the South China Sea dispute. Mahathir had gone on record as saying he preferred bilateral approaches in foreign policy dealings, in general, as “allowing for greater intimacy, understanding and results” compared to multilateral approaches (Liow 2009, 66). Malaysia prefers that a solution be found among the claimant states, rather than involve others (Noor 2012).
Abdullah Badawi addressing the 2005 Asia Pacific Roundtable was still saying that China “has no hegemonic ambitions” and ‘had never been openly declared by the region as a military threat or potential threat.” In that same speech, Badawi also labelled security and defense alliances in the Asia Pacific as “unnecessary” and even “destabilizing” (Liow 2009, 72).

Badawi defended this position of closeness to China but somewhat belied the driving forces behind it when he said: “Close relations and cooperation between Malaysia and China would alleviate any attempt by China to resort to military action because that would also be detrimental to China...If there is no cooperation, there is a possibility China may resort to military action (against Malaysia) or cause a conflict here because it will not lose anything. We want to create a choice (for China)” (Liow 2009 in Tsunekawa, 51).

This apparent accommodation of China goes beyond statements that China is not a threat. Malaysia has been criticized by fellow ASEAN members for stonewalling multilateral initiatives to press China into addressing the issues, such as the 1999 requests by the Philippines to bring the SCS disputes to the ASEAN Regional Forum (where Foreign Minister Syed Hamid Albar reportedly “categorically rejected” the Philippine proposal). On the discussions on the DOC guidelines, there were reports that Malaysia and not China was holding back agreement, and agreement became possible in 2002 only when both Malaysia and China agreed to remain open to a Code of Conduct (Liow 2009, 67, 65).

In reciprocity, China’s responses to Malaysia’s claims to some Spratlys features have been observed to be “much more benign” compared to China’s responses to Vietnam (Liow, p.63) or the Philippines. For instance, China was silent when the Malaysian Sultan visited Terumbu Layanglayang in May 1992, but lodged a strong protest against Vietnam’s construction of a science, technology and economic zone in mid-1989. In 1999, when Malaysia occupied new features of the Spratlys within the Philippine claimed area, China again kept silent, thus fueling some speculation of a Chinese-Malaysian collusion.

Malaysia’s attitude toward the SCS however was not only shaped by its perceptions of China. Its espousal of non-alignment meant unwillingness to undertake hard balancing behavior. Its preference for bilateral solutions rather than resort to third parties or international legal institutions stems from its experience of losing Pedra Branca with finality to Singapore by virtue of an ICJ decision, and on the other hand having successfully negotiated bilateral resource sharing arrangements with Vietnam and Thailand along border areas. Another major difficulty was its own relations with co-claimant Philippines, whose claims overlap
with Malaysia’s occupied islands and where a more complex historical dispute over Sabah prevented any substantive discussion between the two on matters pertaining to territorial disputes and maritime boundaries. In fact, Liow (2011, 62) observes that there is ambiguity among analysts and policymakers in Malaysia as to whether China represents a larger threat to Malaysia than any of its other neighbors. In this light, while Malaysia’s desire to keep the US militarily engaged can be seen as ‘hedging’, it may be more in the spirit of ‘omni-enmeshment’ – using Evelyn Goh’s concept - than a China-directed soft-balancing.

Having said that, Malaysia also became a target of Chinese displeasure when it submitted jointly with Vietnam its continental shelf claims as required of UNCLOS states-parties in 2009. More recently, there may be a more subtle shift back to emphasizing soft balancing, particularly in the last two years. In 2010, Malaysia upgraded its participation in the US-led Cobra Gold military exercises from observer to participant. It stood with other ASEAN states advocating the need for intra-ASEAN consultations on a code of conduct prior to discussing the same with China. It also supported the Philippines and Vietnam during the ASEAN foreign ministers’ debacle in Phnom Penh, when Chair Cambodia opposed mention of the Scarborough Shoal standoff and other recent incidents in any joint statement (Kuik 2012).

Some Malaysian scholars have been writing more critically about both ASEAN and Chinese policies in the SCS. For example, Nazery Khalid of MIMA criticized China for insisting on a bilateral solution even if the others clearly rejected it, and indirectly scored ASEAN for pursuing a DOC that was ineffective in restraining Chinese actions. The Secretary of the National Security Council was quoted in September 2011 to have said at a colloquium in Kuala Lumpur, that Malaysia can no longer maintain “a silent, wait-and-see attitude” because the stakes were “indeed very high” (Noor 2012). Perhaps sensing this shift in Malaysia’s position, in late March 2013, China sent a flotilla of four ships backed by aircraft which conducted naval exercises near James Shoal, which was only 50 miles from the Malaysian coast and the southernmost point in the South China Sea that the PLA-Navy had ventured. This was despite the fact that the two countries had just held the first annual Malaysia-China Defense and Security Consultation in September 2012 (Kuik 2012).

Storey (2011, 227-229) argues that Malaysia’s main concern has stemmed from strategic uncertainty arising from China’s rise – including its implications on Taiwan issue and on domestic instability in China, rather than fear of a China threat itself. It wishes to avoid becoming a pawn in great power machinations, and to keep its ability to shape the future of the region (i.e. strategic autonomy) even as it seeks
to sustain great power interest by US, China and Japan.

Malaysia moreover appears to recognize China’s desire to boost power as a legitimate goal (Tang 2012, 225). This is consistent with Womack’s asymmetry theory that the smaller state exhibits deference, defined as behaving in accordance with the reality of disparity between them. It is also in keeping with my own earlier definition of accommodation, defined as adapting or transforming one’s own behavior in order to satisfy the expectations of other party. The driving force behind such deference and accommodation appears to be a desire to enmesh the greater power, as a means of neutralizing the effects of power asymmetry.

**Philippines: “institutionalism” and “external soft-balancing”**

Since the normalization of diplomatic relations with the PRC in 1975, there have been two main irritants in the bilateral ties – the handling of Manila’s relations with Taipei and the territorial and resource disputes in the South China Sea. With much improved ties between Beijing and Taipei under the KMT-led government, the one China policy has been easier to manage on the part of China’s Southeast Asian neighbors, including the Philippines. On the other hand, the disputes over the South China Sea islands and waters have blown hot and cold in the last two decades since the Manila Declaration of 1992, but in the last two years led to a sharp deterioration of ties.

While China has become an important market for Philippine exports, its potential as a major source of foreign investments or of official development assistance has yet to be realized, thus having less impact as a deterrent to conflict behavior than might otherwise have been the case. China’s interest among others lies in Philippine agricultural and mining resources, and both sides recognize mutual benefits of cooperation in these areas. But in the South China Sea, the contest for oil and gas resources, as well as disagreements over fishing rights, portend more conflict than cooperation.

The Philippines has tried to manage the asymmetric relations with China in the SCS through two primary means – reliance on institutions and norms (ASEAN, ARF, Law of the Sea) and external soft-balancing strategies invoking its mutual defense treaty and close security ties with a countervailing power- the United States.

The emphasis on an institutionalist approach – i.e., peaceful, diplomatic, norms- and rules-based solutions for the disputes may be observed in many previous initiatives of the Philippines, whether bilateral or multilateral. These include
the 1992 Manila Declaration on the South China Sea by the ASEAN ministers of foreign affairs. The Declaration called for self-restraint and peaceful settlement of disputes.

In 1995, shortly after Philippine discovery of Chinese occupation of Mischief Reef, it signed with China a bilateral agreement on “principles for a code of conduct”, seeking to move forward even without a satisfactory resolution on Chinese occupation of Mischief Reef. The two parties set up working groups for confidence-building measures, fisheries and marine environment protection – with a provision indicating possible expansion of such agreement into a multilateral arrangement, with either other claimants or the whole of ASEAN in mind. A similar Philippines-Vietnam bilateral agreement was signed in 1997.

Manila also played an active role in persuading ASEAN and China to negotiate a code of conduct (COC), resulting in the 2002 Declaration of Conduct of Parties in the South China Sea (DOC), and it insisted on moving the agreement forward from the DOC into a legally binding COC.

The Philippines paved the way for the state-owned oil companies – originally its own Philippine National Oil Company and China’s China National Offshore Oil Corporation, but later joined by PetroVietnam – to hold a Joint Marine Seismic Undertaking (JMSU) involving pre-exploration research possibly leading to joint development of disputed areas. The agreement was signed on the premise that it was without prejudice to the respective positions and sovereignty claims of the countries. (However, it was allowed to lapse after getting entangled in domestic Philippine politics.)

The Philippines also proposed to ASEAN to turn the South China Sea into a Zone of Peace, Freedom, Friendship and Cooperation (ZOPFFC), a proposal that has yet to find traction with the other littoral states, including member states of ASEAN. It has also challenged China to allow the international court to decide on the merits of the claims.

There have been periods of apparent inconsistency in Philippine policy as well, such as shifting of focus from multilateral (Ramos and Estrada governments) to bilateral (Arroyo government) and then back to multilateralism (Aquino III). To some extent, these twists and turns were a function of leadership change and regime interests; but to some extent they also showed frustration with failures of either the bilateral track with China or the ASEAN-China processes to move forward. Ultimately, however, peaceful diplomatic approaches focused on regional cooperation were pursued rather than any major military build-up or outright
balancing or containment strategies involving extra-regional partners.

In other words, these particular Philippine actions were directed toward building an atmosphere conducive to establishing cooperative regional regimes, more than being mere assertions of sovereignty or a strengthening of its claims.

Having said that, there was no timidity in Philippine efforts to use its alliance with the United States to shore up its defense posture, particularly after the events of 9-11, 2001, when the need for Manila-Washington anti-terrorist cooperation gave it fresh impetus. The debates in Philippine security circles on whether the US was bound to come to the country’s aid in the event of an attack against its troops in the disputed islands or against its vessels in disputed waters had been going on for decades. Even before the closure of the US military facilities in Clark and Subic in 1992, the Americans had denied any such guarantees to its Philippine allies, but their military presence was presumed to have at least a deterrent effect on such scenarios. In the post-bases period, despite the continuing effect of the Mutual Defense Treaty and reinvigoration of security ties after 9-11, with the Philippines being classified a “major non-NATO ally”, the question of US commitment to its external defense became even more critical to the Philippines.

As China’s military power and assertiveness grew, so did voices within the United States’ security think tanks and policy establishments calling for a stronger expression of the alliance commitment to the Philippines, if only in recognition of its strategic geographic location and importance to US’s own military power projection. The Aquino III government, in particular under the leadership of Secretary of Foreign Affairs Albert del Rosario, has embraced this opportunity to embark on a long overdue program of military modernization and capability-building (including more exercises and training for inter-operability with the Americans) to face the country’s myriad maritime security challenges, but no doubt with one eye on a scenario of potential conflict with China.

In contrast to Malaysia’s approach, the Philippines – bound as it is to the alliance with the United States – has tried to use both multilateral institutions as well as external soft-balancing strategies – to strengthen its position as it faces asymmetrical ties with China. It also continued to engage China economically and on other fronts, with the two countries even launching an ambitious program of multi-dimensional exchanges billed “Years of Friendship and Cooperation” covering 2012 and 2013. These were complimentary and simultaneous strategies. However, since the Scarborough Shoal standoff of April-June 2012 and indications of a Chinese aggressive push to alter the status quo in its favor (including blocking off the shoal from Filipino fishermen, sending military escorts with their own fishing
fleets into the Kalayaan Islands and in May 2013 surrounding Philippine-occupied Ayungin Shoal), the Philippines has decidedly been moving towards the direction of hard balancing. A bilateral strategic dialogue process with the United States has resulted in an agreement to host increased rotational presence by the Americans.

Another means by which the Philippines seeks to address asymmetry with China was its filing of an arbitration case under the International Tribunal of the Law of the Sea. Citing the unlawfulness of Chinese actions under the UNCLOS (Notification and Statement of Claim on West Philippine Sea, 2013), the Aquino government wishes the panel to comment on: whether China can lawfully make any maritime claim based on its nine-dash line, either to sovereignty over the waters or to sovereign rights to the natural resources within the waters; whether the “islands” occupied by China can claim more than 12 nm territorial sea, or are even legitimately subject of sovereignty claims; and whether China can be commanded to refrain from preventing Philippine vessels from exploiting the living resources in the waters (Beckman 2013). China has thus far refused to participate in these arbitral proceedings, citing their indisputable sovereignty as well as preference for bilateral dialogue and consultations.

It remains to be seen whether international law will, as the Philippines hopes, help level the playing field. The fact that the Philippines filed the case unilaterally and without seeking China’s consent has led China to see this as a hostile and confrontational act. Thus, whether or not the Philippines is able to get a favorable outcome on the legal questions, unless the Philippines finds some way to persuade China that its intentions are not unfriendly, this act has potentially aggravating effects on the asymmetrical ties.

Vietnam: "internal balancing", “internationalization”, “assurance-seeking”

Anyone who is a long-time observer of Vietnam-China relations will appreciate that this is one of the most complex bilateral relationships to have emerged in the Asia Pacific region. Storey (2012, 101) describes Vietnam’s China psyche as “deeply ambivalent: respect for a fraternal socialist country whose economic reforms Hanoi seeks to emulate, coexisting with a deep resentment, bordering on hatred, of Chinese condescension, bullying and perceived attempts to control the country’s political destiny.” This is reciprocated by a similarly conflicted view of Vietnam by China as “a tenacious fighter of colonialism worthy of Chinese support, but also as a devious, ungrateful, even unfilial member of the ‘Sinic family.”
The Vietnam-China dispute in the South China Sea is only one of the territorial conflicts between them, as there is also a land border dispute and some unresolved issues in the Gulf of Tonkin. In the South China Sea, the two have conflicting claims over the Paracels (now fully occupied by China), and over the Spratlys (where both, as well as the Philippines and Malaysia, occupy certain features, with Vietnam holding the majority in number).

Vietnam joined ASEAN at a time when relations with China had taken a turn for the worse. In 1992, China passed a Territorial Sea law that encompassed the Paracels and Spratlys, awarded an oil exploration contract to the American company Crestone in waters claimed by Vietnam, and sent survey vessels into the disputed Gulf of Tonkin. Formally, China welcomed Vietnam’s membership in ASEAN as a positive development, although there were suspicions that Vietnam would try to use ASEAN to strengthen its leverage vis-à-vis China. However, there is a risk of overstating the role that Vietnamese perceptions of a China threat may have played in its decisions to join ASEAN, as Vietnam had every reason and opportunity after the Cold War to diversify its international relations. Since Vietnam joined ASEAN, tensions with China in the South China Sea continued to occur, especially over oil exploration in what Vietnam claims to be its continental shelf.

Vietnam has been disappointed with ASEAN on at least two occasions where it expected but did not receive support for its positions. The first was following the 1997 Gulf of Tonkin incident when Vietnam briefed the ASEAN ambassadors on the supposed Chinese intrusions but got no words of support. The second came in the course of the multilateral negotiations for the Code of Conduct/Declaration of Conduct between China and ASEAN, where other ASEAN states acceded to a non-binding agreement that did not specify Paracels in its coverage.

Vietnam was also unwillingly drawn into a joint oil survey initiative with the Philippines and China in 2005 (the Joint Marine Seismic Understanding), when the state-owned oil companies of these two countries entered into such an agreement which originally would have excluded Vietnam. Despite Vietnam’s huge misgivings about the project stemming from mistrust of China, it had little choice but to accept the belated invitation to participate in the project, if it were to hang on to its own sovereignty claims.

But Vietnam did get some gratification from ASEAN in 2010, during its chairmanship of ASEAN when it was able to foreground the South China Sea disputes in ASEAN-China relations and in a very significant move, got the United States to openly declare its support for a multilateral approach to addressing the disputes during Hillary Clinton’s statement at the ARF in Hanoi. This occurred after even
more spats with China over oil exploration activities, and over fisheries resources in 2008-2009, and after China’s creation of Sansha City in 2007 to administer the Paracels and Spratlys, and Vietnam’s joint submission with Malaysia of extended continental shelf claims which led to even more serious tensions. Vietnam has also been actively seeking to internationalize the disputes, among other ways by organizing conferences of the Diplomatic Academy of Vietnam since 2009.

Vietnam’s approach has also involved a continuing dialogue with China to seek assurances and explore functional cooperation prospects. In October 1993 and in January 1994, a framework for cooperation was agreed upon by the two sides, whereby three working groups - one each on the land border, the Gulf of Tonkin and the South China Sea - were organized. While the first two working groups successfully led to some agreements, the SCS working group did not make much progress, with Vietnam wanting to discuss the Paracels and negotiate within a multilateral framework, and China interested only in bilateral talks limited to the Spratlys. A joint steering committee was also organized in 2007 which pledged to properly handle relations through dialogue and consultations. In 2010 after the confrontation at the Hanoi ARF, Vietnam sent its deputy Defense minister Nguyen Chi Vinh to Beijing to reassure China that Vietnam would not allow foreign bases on Vietnam and “would not develop relations with any country aimed at any third country.” In October 2011, the Vietnamese Party leader visited Beijing and the two sides decided to establish a hotline (indicating a desire to manage crises at their level), to continue deputy defence minister level strategic dialogue, increase port calls, expand exchanges of officers, and to hold regular border negotiation meetings (Li Mingjiang, 2012).

Another key emerging strategy of Vietnam involves a military modernization program involving new purchases of frigates, corvettes, missile boats, jet fighters and most importantly six Kilo-class submarines that have been ordered from its traditional security partner Russia. The latter are expected to serve as a credible deterrent to Chinese naval forces (Storey, 120). Military cooperation with the United States is also being sought, but much more cautiously for fear of sparking a Chinese reaction. Since 2000, high-level exchange visits of the US and Vietnamese military leadership have been taking place, but by mid-2010 these included noncontroversial ship visits at Cam Ranh Bay (Storey,2011) and cooperation on transnational threats, search and rescue, disaster relief and military medicine. However, observers point to the fact that many Vietnamese leaders remain distrustful of the US, and that alignment with or dependence on one power or the other is unlikely due to Vietnam’s past experiences with great powers.
Vietnam, as the country under the most sustained pressure from China with respect to territorial disputes, has mobilized the widest array of strategies for coping with the situation of power asymmetry.

**Conclusions**

What are the effects of asymmetry on the relations among claimant states in the South China Sea? The South China Sea disputes, especially in the Spratlys archipelago, are multilateral disputes involving overlapping claims of three or more countries. Yet the power asymmetry between China on the one hand and Malaysia, the Philippines and Vietnam on the other hand has reshaped perceptions of the multilateral disputes as if they were sets of bilateral problems that revolve around China (i.e. Philippines-China, Vietnam-China, Malaysia-China). China itself insists on this position, so that rather than being viewed as only one among several claimants, it has claimed a position as the central party with whom all others must negotiate their respective sovereignty issues. While the weaker claimants realize that a purely bilateral solution will not be feasible, and will not be advantageous to them, the institutions currently in place (e.g. ASEAN, ITLOS) lack the capacity or will to put in place realistic alternatives.

Power asymmetry has allowed China to dictate the pace and approach for addressing the disputes, for instance stalling the DOC implementing guidelines for many years, pushing the issue to the backburner despite the importance the Philippines and Vietnam attached to it, refusing to bring the issue to other possible arenas for intervention such as the ARF, and playing a divide and rule game in ASEAN to further strengthen its advantage.

Asymmetry, as Womack argues, also means the bigger power gets the attention of all, and each of its moves are perceived as important and purposeful, while the actions of secondary powers can be portrayed (often by the big power) or otherwise perceived as random, insignificant, or even trivial or troublesome, the way China has sought to depict Philippine moves, such as the Zone of Peace, Freedom, Friendship and Cooperation (ZoPFFC) proposal.

As such the principal problematique has become managing the power asymmetry rather than seeking multilateral or cooperative solutions among the various claimants, leading to individual states developing uncoordinated strategies, at times even working at cross purposes.
What strategies have the small states of Malaysia, Philippines and Vietnam adopted to preserve and enhance their leverage against great power China in relation to their territorial claims? Each of these states have employed different strategies, which depend on (1) the degree of threat perception or fear/suspicion of China (e.g. Malaysia being least suspicious and therefore most accommodating); (2) their strategic orientation culled from historical experience (e.g. internal balancing rather than alignment for Vietnam); (3) ideational or value preferences (e.g. institutionalism for the Philippines, non-alignment for Malaysia); or even (4) path dependence, or how history and past policies have locked in certain options (e.g. US alliance for Philippines).

A future research agenda arising from this exploratory paper will need to address questions such as: Can a typology of small state strategies for dealing with asymmetry be developed based on a study of China-ASEAN relations? How successful have these strategies been in mitigating the effects of asymmetry and in promoting freedom of action for the smaller states? How does China itself deal with power asymmetry and manage perception problems in its relations with smaller states arising from its own size and strength?

LIST OF REFERENCES


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